Unity and diversity: 
Culture as a source of identity and otherness

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Clifford Geertz has emphatically written that alienation begins not at the shore of the ocean, but at the border of skin. Describing the subject of ethnocentrism, he shows the problem of identity and otherness. The old argumentation of two feud philosophical orientations, systematized by Dilthey, can be actually brought to the issue of understanding historicity and the internal structure of culture. One group desires to see in culture a unique and immanently closed structure, others, on the contrary, would like to see a universal scheme for all cultures.

Geertz’s remark shows us that we have difficulties with our own culture (its identity) and our understanding of reality. Beata Szymańska in her book “Cultures and Interpretations” states that the level of understanding of one’s own culture translates to one’s understanding of different cultures. The problem is not in diversity then (or its lack), but in our understanding of diversity.

It can be said that, on the one hand, man needs identification (the need of identification Linton wrote about). Then, the sense of uniqueness of one’s own culture turns out to be very helpful. On the other hand, the need of cognition forces other thinkers to search for something that is disturbingly different.

The question, which is still unsolved and will be analysed in this article, is whether this diversity is always standing for otherness, or maybe this diversity, especially in the area of one culture, is related to a specific unity.

Key words: communication, diversity, philosophy, unity, otherness

The problem of diversity brings up symbolic, if not archetypical, issues. The myth of the Babel tower gives a good explanation of this problem. The tower itself has many, often contradictory, meanings – what in the structure of the symbol seems to be an obvious feature actually – deriving from the primal intuitions and ideas of man. Initially, in the symbolism of Babel Tower the positive characteristic was dominant. In the Babylon civilization, the tower symbolized the contact of man with the Divine, being the means of communication between humanity and God. In the Christian symbolism, the positive meaning also prevailed as axis mundi, the space unifying man with the transcendence. The negative symbolism begins with the Jewish thought which presents the tower as a symbol of human objection against God. In this way, the symbol picturing the human aspiration to achieve excellence and eternity, the sphere of sacrum, becomes a symbol of rejection of all these positive
aspirations. The pursuit for excellence becomes pride, the will of meeting God is replaced by a wish of being equal to God and independent of divine rights. And thus the myth of Babel Tower becomes the story of people determined to equal themselves to the Absolute, the prior positive meaning being forgotten. In this way, the ideas initially appearing in the symbol not only were misrepresented, but the symbol itself was blemished. As a consequence, in the revised myth, man must be punished – the God separates mankind dividing them into languages and groups (nations, cultures). This diversity becomes the source of chaos. Having lost the common language, mankind loses the power to communicate and starts acting chaotically, often contrary to others’ intentions, with whom before the loss of the unity of language they could cooperate. Thus, a conflict begins to appear, the lack of the possibility of an agreement becomes the lack of the possibility to find the common end, common values. The different man becomes the Other, the Stranger – someone who can threaten “our” actions and “our” aims. The divine punishment can be understood then as taking away the unity, brotherhood, sentencing man to eternal diversity. It seems clear that in this interpretation of the myth, the diversity is something negative, creating barriers, taking away the possibility to cooperate and work for the common goal. The diversified mankind scatter around the world, creating separate worlds of individual cultures.

So much for the myth itself. Disregarding the rightness of the ideas enclosed in it, on this mythical level a very important message appears. From the very beginning of culture, the diversity seems to have been something disturbing, often provoking a whole set of negative feelings and ideas. In this myth, the answer to the question of the origin of human attitude to diversity is also enclosed. The diversity brought chaos and division, destroyed the known order. The diversity was afterwards related to otherness and hostility, which entering the everydayness destroyed the rhythm of what mankind had known before, bringing in disorder and destructive actions. The question of how to deal with the diversity, carrying these symbolic and archetypical meanings, appears before modern man in an articulate way, strengthened by the present social and political situation. In this way, the problem refers not only to the intellectual sphere of philosophers, anthropologists and ethnographers, but also to our individuality, our experienced everydayness and existence. And, we might add, the problem itself isn’t new, the whole 20th century had to deal with this issue due to the phenomenon so clearly described by Marchal MacLuhan in his global village theory and the shrinking of the world. So, what is exposed by the myth needs a new rethinking and an attempt to analyse diversity in the dimension of our everyday experience.

The problem of diversity is at the same time a problem of understanding, or the lack of translation of ideas, notions, dilemmas. Above all it is the issue of our openness or closedness towards what is foreign, different from our way of understanding reality. Beata Szymańska begins her book “Cultures and Comparisons” with remarkable considerations named “Culture and
the art of addnotations”. Two very important assumptions are made here, at the very beginning: cultures with their diversity are sets of meanings, problems and ideas “translatable” and possible to be described, as well as to be understood. The second issue is that cultures, with their diversity, are rich sets of meanings and ideas which have a strong influence on the meanings and ideas of different cultures. The diversity has thus an enriching aspect, is not only a fact, but also a phenomenon changing our lives, influencing our existence and having a positive effect. What one must do is to look closely at this diversity and learn its meanings. Above all, one must learn how to recognize diversity, reach its cultural specificity. Basing, among others, on Karl Popper’s remark mentioning the myth of notional scheme, Szymańska explains that the understanding of culture is a specific process which mustn’t lead to the end defined as scientific cognition. Very often, the one who discovers a new culture should rather rely on intuition, empathy or even an act of re-living, rather than strive for scientific precision and exact definitions. Karl Popper himself said that the man mustn’t have a clear and total definition of the enquired problem to understand its specificity. Szymańska adds to this thought a remark that what happens around the understanding is more important, such as meeting people, experience which is born in the dialogue, coming from the attempt to seize the identity of the other who appeared before us.

What does it actually mean? What is this something around understanding the given problem? As I presume, this issue can be explained in two ways: either metaphorically or by an example (let’s call it a practical explanation of the issue). The understanding – in the metaphorical interpretation – will be the reaching of the meaning by description. The meaning will manifest itself as a horizon showing us more and further aspects of the given problem. In practical interpretation, we have an example given by Szymańska. In other cultures, some notions exist that are so specific and different from ours that they seem untranslatable. One of such notions is iki. Martin Heidegger in his attempt to understand iki couldn’t find a word equivalent, which led him to a conclusion that this notion is untranslatable and alien to our culture. Further in his adventure with Japanese culture, Heidegger made a remark that there are impassable differences between European and Japanese cultures, built upon the inner structure of untranslatable notions and cultural phenomena. A different attitude can be seen in Szymańska’s approach. Above all, taking conclusions from Popper’s remark, she points out that in order to understand what is alien we do not have to possess an exact translation. A word equivalent to our notion is actually not necessary. On the other hand, the inability of finding a proper notion doesn’t imply that it doesn’t exist in our culture, nor does it make our understanding of such notion impossible.

The whole issue is described by Szymańska in a simple way, referring to her own experience, recalling a meeting at the Department of Philosophy of Culture of UJ, at which the specialist Yumiko Matsuzaki was presenting her paper concerning iki. In her presentation, Matsuzaki described dif-
different uses of the *iki* notion as well as situations in which one can use it, i.e. by presenting examples she introduced us into the sphere of meanings carried by *iki*.

As a participant of this meeting, I had an opportunity to experience how the new contents and contexts of the notion, presented by Yumiko Matsuzaki, could be used even in European culture. This is exactly the point of view of Szymańska. As she states, together with experiencing new presentations of the meaning of a new notion, the inquirer starts to create a picture. The interpretation which takes place while experiencing something new and alien is an act of recognition of the context, of getting closer to the meaning it has in the culture it came from. An exact translation, as impossible, becomes replaced by a description and interpretation. The broader and more accurate the description, the more accurate interpretation arises.

One more very important thing remains. The description given should have a dialogical character. The one who presents to us the contents of other culture should be in a dialogical interaction with the inquirer. Yumiko Matsuzaki explained to us most when she had finished her official presentation and started simply to discuss with us. In questions and answers, a broader meaning of *iki* started to present itself to us, giving an opportunity, even to those least oriented in the subject, to grasp the specificity of this aesthetic category. That is why Szymańska writes: “The explanation of culture is possible only in a long dialogue, as Buddhists would say – in *mondo*, an infinite cycle of questions and answers” (Szymańska, 2003). What is then *iki*? It is a black kimono with dark-red embellishment, so delicate that it is hardly to be seen. It is a bare foot of a geisha in a sandal, walking in snow. Is it not then a category of a specific taste, elegance, a connection of exquisite beauty and subtle erotism together? Is such category of beauty, requiring subtle taste and practice, to be found in European culture? Of course it is, and even the examples given by the Japanese could find their references in European thought about sublime elegance and style. And, although the notion still remains untranslated, it enters our thought with its meaning. As Szymańska remarks, it becomes a notion which we, Europeans, can use, showing our understanding of the presented meaning. In such interpretation of culture, the attitude is important. The diversity is perceived as a positive category, a cultural adventure which can teach us and help us develop. Such attitude must be developed by the investigator’s though. It is not easy to treat what is different from our challenge, an adventure or a task. We speak then about the openness of man, a certain willingness and curiosity towards the world, an approach of consciousness which searches, instead of closing itself by stating that it already knows. The act of opening is here the first step towards the description and interpretation of different cultures. The second step is understanding, which as a process develops in us from the very beginning of our existence inside culture.

Growing up in a certain culture, man adapts to the language, rules, cultural patterns. Many of them remain in unconsciousness, used everyday in an almost automatic way: all these behaviours and beliefs, which can be explained as *so it is* /
I do it because such is the law / because this is the way one should do it. The difficulty we are confronted with at the very beginning of our adventure with otherness is the attempt to understand why it is so and not the other way round. So the understanding of our own culture, of our own behaviour is needed. What drives us towards thinking of some things as obvious and others as improper? It is then the effort of cognition, as precise as possible, of the surrounding world and ourselves in it. The better, the more precisely we get to know our own culture, the easier it will be for us to discover another culture. Why? Because, on the one hand, we practice our intellect, on the other though, what is more important, we see for ourselves that the system of values and patterns is a set of rules coming from a certain tradition developing in specific history often under the influence of concrete people. Nothing then exists in culture, because it is as it is, because it is at it should be, but is shaped by the historically developing social practice which can be concealed before us. “Eventually, one might argue that similarly to linguistic abilities (or actually due to them) there exists a cultural ability of adopting culture with which we are in touch from the day we are born. It becomes our first, proper language through which it is possible to understand and translate a different culture”. As a matter of fact, the level of understanding one’s own culture becomes a level of understanding the foreign, the alien. The better we know our own culture, the more possibilities we have to discover a foreign culture. Again, the question arises why does it happen like this? I think that it is worth remembering that we have to deal here with the ability of practicing the intellect, its openness which, in contact with what is foreign, can occur to be a helping attitude towards understanding. Szymańska points out another important phenomenon described by Clifford Geertz. In Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, Geertz shows that the otherness, and at the same time the cultural diversity, doesn’t appear with the contact with a foreign culture, but is inherent already in our own society. For people from different social levels or belonging to different subcultures, societies, cultural groups, so many differences can appear, along with modifications of our own language, that the communication between them can occur to be difficult, if not impossible. “The attitude, taken by anthropologists since Malinowski as well as philosophers since Wittgenstein, that the Shi’it as the stranger is a problem, but for example football fans as part of our society are not such a problem, or at least they are not the problem of the same kind, is simply false. The social world doesn’t break up along joints of unambiguous us, towards whom we feel empathy regardless of how much we differ from them and enigmatic them, towards whom we cannot feel the same. The other appears before we reach the edge of the village” (Geertz, 2003).

The problem of otherness lies mainly in diversity, which is an inner feature of every culture. Every culture breaks up into a series of smaller, distinct, often contrasting systems. The understanding, the first moment I discover who I am and what surrounds me is the moment in which the pic-
ture of the internally differentiated world appears before me. Cultural diversity is not then a spectacular diversity of cultures, but a multiplicity of forms of behaviour and patterns of action inside one cultural system. The understanding of this truth opens towards otherness and allows us to understand the surrounding world – the closest – as well as reality geographically, historically and linguistically distant.

The second very important issue shown by Szymańska is the fact of existence of a specific common ground which can appear above cultures and their inner diversity. This common space is the state of similar understanding and openness towards the world. Therefore, two people coming from different cultures can find understanding between themselves faster, if they are open towards otherness and can seize the process of understanding, searching for the truth. The one who doesn’t want to understand, who even doesn’t want to look at what is different, can turn out to be a person difficult to communicate with, even if he comes from the same culture, city or village. Exactly as Geertz wrote, “the other appears before we reach the edge of the village”. This “other” is the man presenting a different attitude towards the world, having different values, or belonging to a different social group. He will create the same problems as a person from a foreign culture. The closedness can occur to be the greatest cognitive barrier.

What then is left? To develop interpretations, as Szymańska states, to enter the world by interpretations, like a plant releasing new rhizomes, discovering in this way new meanings, problems and people. It is not an easy task, it is not impossible though. Culture – ours or foreign – is a challenge which should be constantly confronted by man. And so we become a culture of “references, close-ups, commentaries. (...) We know that there is nothing in any culture what couldn’t be thought about in another culture. As Noam Chomsky wrote, if something doesn’t exist in one culture, it only means that some possibility hasn’t been used there.”

The problem of identity and cultural diversity, openness and interpretation, as described above, faces us with the irremovable problem concerning the attitude towards diversity. It is not diversity itself that is problematic, but our thinking about it. Again, starting with our own culture, one can notice that the issue is not easily solvable. Leszek Kołakowski in his book “Problems with Culture” analyses European culture, promoting an Europocentric attitude pointing out that the origin of this culture, its shaping was not an unambiguous process. What was actually the beginning of European culture? Was it Socrates’ philosophy? Or St. Paul’s activities? Or perhaps the reign of Charlemagne? Kołakowski deliberately points to these people, together with three different epochs. The beginning of philosophy, Christianity or maybe of strong monarchy set the features of European culture. Actually, all these events, as well as many others, constituted the process of shaping and duration of such and not a different culture. Even at its beginning, as these examples show, culture was ruled by diversity. More can be said: this diversified process and contradictory phenomena had
the culture-shaping power only when put together. Diversity is then inscribed into the cultural process and gives it the power to arise and develop.

As far as cultural differences are analysed, the thought of Kołakowski becomes ironic and untoward. Our besettlement in own culture creates certain barriers. They are not easy to overcome. Szymańska wrote about openness and interpretational possibilities which bring us closer to the otherness. Kołakowski writes about distance which, when not kept, doesn’t always mean a positive opening towards the otherness. Asking what it means that an European analyses and accepts what is different, Kołakowski presents a great problem of diversity. Can an investigator of a different culture actually understand it? When understood, can he adapt to it? In the practical sense, a question arises whether our European anthropologist would allow, e.g., a Muslim law to be used on or against him? Does he accept practices and actions on other continents to the degree at which he could himself start practicing them? The obvious answer that our cognition and tolerance of what is foreign is only a theoretical attitude makes Kołakowski state not only objections, but also an ironical attitude. Isn’t it that we treat the foreign either as untranslatable, alien or as indifferent and consequently worse? Because of that, we accept the diversity of the forms of existence, not caring what they really present and what values they have. At this point, it turns out that even interpretation and understanding are not that easy. According to Kołakowski, while being in one culture, we have an inscribed set of values and meanings that not only determine our thought, but also formulate our attitude towards the foreign ambiguity.

Kołakowski writes about the illusions of universalism, pointing to diversity not as a negative value but, in its untranslatability, as the one separating and manifesting otherness. “Here we stand confronted with differences which at the same time give birth to contradictions, confronted with conflicting values which cannot coexist in mutual neutrality; they do not allow to be set one next to another as museum artifacts coming from different civilizations”. Cognition is then always a form of engagement. Even when we deal with interpretation, it always reaches our attitude towards what is interpreted and of course engages us. The situation we find ourselves in, as Kołakowski states, is ambiguous: willing to know objectively, we are at risk of engagement, which forces us either to valuing, or neglecting, or radicalizing. Whatever we do, we will always be in such an ambiguous situation, because we will always introduce what is already known to our thought, we will be subject to our values and the reaction to them.

Does an objective look actually mean an attempt to understand diversity in a man differing from our culture, our way of life? Irony and ambiguity, pointed out by Kolakowski, appear in three attitudes and consequences of cognitive or interpretative reaches towards other cultures. “Either I want to say that I live in a specific culture and other cultures do not interest me, or that there is no absolute, non-historical standard to settle any culture, or that such standard, on the contrary, does exist,
and according to it all forms of mutuality are equally rightful” (Kolakowski, 1984). What is presented by Kołakowski is actually an intellectual trap into which an over-enthusiastic or too detached inquirer can fall. The first attitude is actually closedness towards the otherness. Even when it perceives a different culture, it instantly presumes its closedness. In such an attitude, the danger of affirmation of one’s culture as the only one to be understood and actually the only right one exists, then why should one make an attempt to know it if everything that should be known already exist in my own culture? The second attitude is indifference, which solves the problem by a smooth statement: no foundations for comparison. And although, as Kołakowski writes, it cannot be defended or sustained, it becomes a comfortable alternative for our research. It secures not only our feeling of uniqueness, but also explains the intellectual closedness. The third attitude, we might presume, open towards the otherness, according to Kołakowski is as closed as the other two. Accepting certain aspects or relations allowing for an analysis of culture, it easily makes comparisons and unifications. It can quickly lead to cliché or the objectifying of another culture, bringing it to a better or worse (more often to a worse) structure similar to ours. Ambiguity shown by Kołakowski points out to the problem of consciousness entangled in the otherness. Cognition, according to the philosopher, is always a form of engagement and valuation. Being confronted with the otherness, the man feels that he should choose the one which is better, search for what will bring a proper answer. Cultural diversity is a challenge which cannot be actually fully realized. One either defends his own culture and closes oneself in its system, or opens to other cultures, thus losing a certain individuality or overinterpreting. I think that Kołakowski’s text is above all a kind of ironic warning, showing the whole complicated structure which develops before consciousness – both on the side of one’s own and a different culture. The philosopher also reaches to the symbolic and mythical image of diversity as a disturbing and unsolvable problem on the ground of human intellect.

Let’s come back to Clifford Geertz for a moment. An important remark of this philosopher makes us realize that Kołakowski’s warning refers mainly to avoiding improper interpretations or over-interpretations not only regarding the cultural diversity, but also ourselves. The diversity we have to confront with is above all our own, internal issue. The description of culture, its interpretation from which we have started, comes back in a series of descriptions and narrations used by Geertz. The so-called dense description (Bernard, 2006) should be considered a source of knowledge, not only about what surrounds us, but also about ourselves. Anthropology as a specific kind of literature is a description of different levels of culture, which according to its complexity should embrace as many different phenomena as possible. Therefore, anthropological writings, according to Geertz, are oriented towards searching for diversity and a description of smallest details. It is interesting that in this description we find only a narration. An explanation would not be possible – or
even dangerous. Therefore, Geertz’s method can be considered an escape route from the problem raised by Kołakowski.

In Geertz’s concept, one can clearly see the problem of different levels of diversity. The starting position for explorers of culture was the diversity, or otherness, of distant cultures. Analysing Levi-Strauss’ anthropology, Geertz notices that the situation of initial otherness, with which the early anthropologists were confronted, has drastically changed in the modern world. Otherness and diversity become experienced not only by an explorer going to a distant land – they become our everydayness. On the one hand, the old cultural formations have disappeared along with the exotic diversity. On the other hand, through the processes of modern world – migrations, globalization or the development of information, technology, communication – diversity has entered our everyday experience. And so, anthropology has lost the world of closed, separate communities, which has been replaced by a situation in which an average man has to learn how to live in a world of cultural polyphony. The explorer of culture can, as Geertz suggests, do nothing more than sharpen his sensitivity and look closer at the processes shaping culture, but in a completely new meaning. Above all, man and his culture should be studied as subtle creations demanding far more sensitivity and focus of the inquirer to reach what seems invisible at the beginning. This exploration of property, values and cultural institutions means that one should analyse once again not only the foreign, but also his own culture. The cultural reflection starts to embrace all aspects of life.

The explorer of culture must realize that the matter under analysis often changes itself. The world is changing, and it is not only the problem of modernity. The appearing diversity is above all a diversity of cultures. On the second level, it is a diversity inside a culture, deriving from its dynamics, historicity, change, created and affected by man. The difference between the cultures becomes obvious, if we look at their internal historicity. Every value, institution, tradition or, as Ruth Benedict would say, all patterns of culture appear, according to Geertz, from history. In the process of shaping the history, the man shapes his culture with its spiritual and material background. Everything, from symbols to language, will have a historical determinant. To understand culture means to look at the immanent structure of its history. The understanding of one’s own culture comes through otherness, through the discovery of who we are in confrontation with otherness.

The problem of culture and diversity is actually the problem of our own existence. The meeting with the other occurs, as Geertz metaphorically states, on the border of my skin, on the border of my body, of who I am. The problem with diversity appears in our existence and through it is drawn in the most explicit way. Thinkers like Dilthey or Burckhard pointed out to this phenomenon of culture: in culture, individuality appears. On the level of nature, as Dilthey mentions, we deal with unification and gender unity. Culture creates a level opening life for valued individualities and behaviours different from the standard. Of course, one can argue with
Dilthey, or imply a biased opinion in his argument. What is important, though, is the remark pointing out that culture is the domain of specific action. Even though it is based on cooperation, inside the group it allows an individual to create his own consciousness of the ego, a certain uniqueness of his own existence. Looking at European culture, one can reconstruct the history of individuality, the feeling that human existence brings some uniqueness with it. Individuality becomes one more level of diversity, a discovery that the other is someone radically different. And as Geertz wrote, the meeting with the otherness can occur just after coming out from my own house. Why? Because, as an individual, I feel as someone unique, it is me distinguishing myself from the others by my own, unique existence.

The concept of Babel Tower, brought at the beginning of this article, can be analysed once again now. Understanding our uniqueness, the existence of man as unrepeatable, gives us a new dimension to discovering diversity. Perhaps it was in the builders themselves where the problem could be found. Maybe it wasn’t God who mixed their languages and scattered them in the diversity of action and cultural forms, but it was themselves who carried this diversity which emerged only after they had discovered that they can be themselves. This way we can say that the myth of Babel Tower is a story of our need of being oneself, which reveals new layers of new behaviours making us different from other identities. In “Works as lives: the anthropologist as an author” Geertz analyses “the Sadness of Tropics” by Levi Strauss. This book allows him to see the problem of diversity, which appears to be ungraspable. It is the diversity that can be found not only on the side of individuals and their unique existences, not only on the side of diversity of the analysed cultures, but also being in the change and duration of culture itself. As people are condemned to meeting the other, gaining experience from this act, the change whose duration existentialists would define as a constant creation of oneself, so cultures are condemned to being confronted with other cultures, diffusion, change and intersection. Diversity creates itself when confronted with the other, becoming the foundation of being in the world. One could risk a statement that diversity is an intrinsic feature of any culture. Perhaps man is condemned to living in the world after Babel Tower, in the world where diversity is the most stable but at the same time the most creative element.

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Clifford Geertz empiriškai nustatė, kad atskirtis prasideda ne okeano pakrantėje, o ties oda. Aprašydamas etnocentrizmo subjektą jis atkleidė tapatybės ir kitybės problemą. Senoji argumentacija, pateikta Dilthey, galėtų vartoti prirastant kultūros istorinę perspektyvą ir vidinę struktūrą. Vienos grupės siekia matyti kultūrą kaip išskirtiną ir gana uždarą sistemą, čia pat kitos mato ją kaip universalią scheme, tinkančią visoms kultūroms.


Klausimas neišspręstas ir analizuojamas šiame pranešime stengiantis nusakyti, ar skirtingos pranešantys susiję su kultūros iš-skirtinimu, unikalumu.