Abstract. The paper explores Plato’s Statesman in the perspective of its philosophical unity and autonomy. The relevance of this approach arises from the problem posed by the traditional readings of the Statesman – the developmental and unitarian. Both methods interpret the Statesman in the context of Plato’s major political dialogues of, the Republic and the Laws, thus preventing the exposing of the internal theoretical coherence of the dialogue. Hence this paper focuses on the analysis of the main political themes of the dialogue – conflict, statesmanship, and political knowledge – and their relations to each other. By discussing the emergence of the political and its importance for conceptualizing political practice, as well as by indicating the structural elements of statesmanship, the author of the paper argues that the Statesman contains a coherent and internally completed political theory.

Keywords: Plato, the Statesman, statesmanship, conflict, political knowledge.

Plato’s Statesman has been rightly described as a ‘lonely’ and ‘unlovely’ dialogue (cf. Lane 1998: 1; Márquez 2012: xiii). The dialogue was ignored by students of Plato for quite a period due to its bizarre structure, dubious assumptions, deceptive discussion and enigmatic arguments. To redeem its uncomfortable and alien nature scholars have been trying to read the dialogue through the lens of the Republic and the

1 For instance, in Lithuanian so far there are three papers on Plato’s Statesman: Važgėlaitė, R. 2011. ‘Audimo, kaip tekstą organizuojančio elemento, vaidmuo Platonų Valstybininkes’ [“Weaving as a Text Arranging Element in Plato’s Statesman”], In: Literatūra, 53 (3): 100-114; Važgėlaitė, R. 2014. ‘Platono Valstybininkas: draminiai aspektai ir filosofinis mitas’ [“The Myth and Drama of Plato’s Statesman”], In: Literatūra, 55 (3): 50-71; Bartninkas, V. 2014. ‘Meistrų vadyba Platonų dialoge Valstybininkas’ [“The Conflict of Arts in Plato’s Statesman”], in: Literatūra 56 (3), 32-44. Važgėlaitė in both articles deals with the composition, structure and philological issues of the Statesman. However, my previous paper approaches the dialogue from the political perspective: I aim to define the meaning of τέχνη in the Statesman, its proximity to knowledge and philosophy, its status in the political realm and its political significance. A part of this paper is based on this article (see note 3).

I also regret to inform the reader that I was unable to include the most recent findings in Plato’s Statesman published in Plato’s Statesman, Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium Platonicum Pragense (ed. by Aleš Havlíček, Jakub Jirsa and Karel Thein, Prague, 2013) as it reached me when this paper was already completed.
This new perspective is split into two interpretative methods. The developmental view holds that Plato’s understanding of politics gradually changed and moved from the utopian political project in the Republic to a more practical, realistic view in the Laws. Given this approach, the Statesman is seen as a transitional stage between the two dialogues which has a less utopian grasp of politics, but nevertheless lacks a completed conception (cf. Annas and Waterfield 1995; Kahn 1995; Klosko 2006). The unitarian view claims that Plato’s ideas expressed in various dialogues are compatible with each other and form a single philosophical teaching. A unitarian reader also regards the Statesman as a lesser dialogue in respect to the Republic and the Laws which complements and fills the missing gaps of the two major dialogues (cf. Strauss 1989; Rosen 1995; Benardete 2006; Blitz 2010). Although different in their general perspective, both approaches reach a similar conclusion which states that the Statesman is not a self-sufficient and internally complete dialogue.

Malcolm Schofield suggests a third approach to Plato’s interpretations, a thematic reading which examines Plato’s dialogues as separate intellectual projects with their own specific tasks, problems, and principles (Schofield 2006: 3). This perspective seems to be productive when inquiring into the question of the Statesman’s integrity and autonomy. This perspective will be adopted to explore the dialogue’s political ideas expressed by the main protagonist the Stranger from Elea. The main questions are: (a) what are the preconditions for the political, why there is a need for politics; (b) how political activity is understood, what functions a political actor has; (c) what empowers the political actor to perform his or her aims. A comprehensive and coherent picture of dialogue’s political theory will prove that the Statesman is an independent project with a status comparable to the Laws and the Republic.

The Foundation of Politics

The Stranger’s account of the emergence of the political appears in a complex discussion which includes his conception of human nature and later a cosmological myth. The Stranger’s anthropological views are presented in two passages: 261a-262a and 263c-266e. His initial thesis is that the primary human social unit is a herd (261d). The notion ‘herd’ stresses animality of human beings as well as irrationality. Upon the question of whether human beings are not essentially rational creatures, the Stranger responds that some animals are also intelligent (e.g., cranes (263d)). The Stranger believes that human beings can not be distinguished by this criterion from beasts. The difference between them lies in the fact that humans are domestic animals while beasts are wild animals (264a). Further discussion of human nature where humans are compared to other domestic animals, such as wingless bipeds (supposedly, chickens) or hornless pigs, has been considered as a joke if not a sheer absurd (Dorter 1994: 187; Michelini 2000: 181). Besides, according to some scholars, these images ‘conceal more than reveal what man is’ and they ‘do not reflect its essence’ (Miller 2004: 31-32). But even if these are unessential human features, they still give a negative definition – they expose what human beings lack of in relation to other creatures. Xavier Márquez rightly observes that these images are about a natural human disadvantage which prevents human beings from protecting themselves against other
animals (Márquez 2012: 98). Thus, human beings are defined as weak, irrational and unarmed creatures.

The unstable and vulnerable human condition is parallel to the structure of the universe. The Stranger tells that the first mythical period of the universe was managed by an omnipotent god who moved the universe and maintained its harmony. When the maximum degree of harmony and order was reached, the god released the universe from his rule and it became autonomous. The second autonomous period coincides with our current times. The new source of movement of the universe is a bodily element (σωματοειδής) which creates changes and disorder (269e1-2, 273b4-5), stimulates destruction and enmity (273d2-3).

An increasing rate of annihilation brings a possibility of extinction of the universe. The universe is threatened to ‘sink racked by storms and confusion, and be dissolved again in the bottomless abyss of Unlikeliness’² (273d5-e1). The cosmic processes of disorder directly affect human beings. On the one hand, in the current period human beings cannot expect for a divine protection and custody as they must learn to survive on their own. On the other hand, human beings compete with both wild and domestic animals for survival. Since humans ‘lacked all tools and all crafts’ (ἀμήχανοι καὶ ἄτεχνοι) for survival, they were endowed with a potential to take up technical works which ensure survival. A skilful attainment in various arts (τέχναι) allows human beings to overcome a natural vulnerability and secure stability. Therefore, the Stranger defines human beings as essentially ‘technological animals’ (Ferrari 1995: 391).

Though technical abilities solve some problems of natural deficiency, they do not remove the hostile human relationships. The Stranger presents two types of conflict inherent in the human condition. The first one is discussed in a passage 287a-291c where the Stranger enumerates arts active in the social realm. This classification describes how arts tackle human deficiency: some of them provide material goods, others create tools or supply with services. It also shows a social hierarchy of human activities. This passage is frequently bypassed as insignificant to the political theory of the Statesman. However, it begs a question why there is a need for such list. The classification shows that arts not only handle the tasks intrinsic to the nature of their practice but also receive prestige and authority. Those arts which have a considerable influence are mainly bureaucratic and religious (the Stranger too easily dismisses economic enterprises in his account). The Stranger clearly implies that the achieved status encourages arts to compete for a political power (289c5-6, 290b8-9). In this way arts transgress their proper purpose of doing what they are designed for. Prestigious arts are entangled into antagonistic relationships with each other. None of them achieve a lasting power because conflict solving does not constitute the nature of these activities. Thus, there remains for the Stranger to find an expertise which would be designed to manage conflicts.

In the final part of the dialogue (306a-308b) the Stranger presents the second type of conflict which is based on human characters. The Stranger does not directly connect the traits of human nature which appear in the framework of the conflict with those remarks on human nature which

² Here and in the following quotes J. B. Skemp’s translation (1952) is used.
were discussed earlier. However, the continuity of the theory is evident since (a) the conflict of characters illustrates 271e and later develops the theme of human enmity; (b) the new distinction between courage and moderation is roughly similar to 263e-264b distinction between wild and domestic animals. Though the latter distinction identifies human beings as domestic animals which can be tamed (264a), they are also wild beings due to their hostile nature. According to Teruo Mishima, courageous and moderate characters cannot be unified without an external help since (i) qualities of these characters are conflicting, and (ii) the same person cannot spontaneously possess both characters (Mishima 1995: 307). Courage is defined by ‘speed and intensity and vivacity’ (305e4-5). Moderation is described as a gentle, quiet, tender, orderly character (307a-b). Due to inconsistency and opposition, courage and moderation have hostile attitudes towards each other. Enmity of characters grows into an open conflict and strife and is considered to be the greatest disease of a community (306b, 307d). The conflict of characters is a political phenomenon because it affects and shapes the community. This is implied in an example from foreign policy. Predominance of a moderate character leads to a peaceful existence of state and this order allows avoiding public life and focusing on private realm. But an excessive avoidance of war leaves citizens to the will of the enemies and threatens with an enslavement of the state. Conversely, courageous citizens too frequently rush into military actions and thus risk with a destruction of the country. In other words, moderation and courage operate as political vices (Bobonich 1995: 315). Both the conflict of arts and the conflict of characters are discussed in political terms. More importantly, they structure the political life and explain why politics arise. In Stranger’s theory conflict is merely another name of the political.

The Conflict Manager

The next step is to specify what type of political activity is adequate for coping with the problem of political antagonism. But before it, the Stranger suggests using a model which is structurally isomorphic to the true political practice, or statesmanship. Unexpectedly his chosen model is weaving (279a-c). Weaving’s art lies in making cloaks, but it is not the only expertise which participates in creating them. In the process of cloak making, weaving is assisted by carding, art of darning, art of spinning, and other arts (281a-d). Every expertise which engages into the preparation of cloaks is responsible for a concrete stage of production. Meanwhile, weaving is responsible for the entire process of production and its completion. Two phases of weaver’s work can be indicated. Direct involvement of weaver concerns only the last phase when a weaver gets the warp and woof prepared by other arts and creates a final product (283a). But indirectly weaving partakes in the whole process of production. It supervises the participating arts so that they would appropriately prepare the fabric needed for the final phase of production. Thus weaving acquires two functions: (a.1) coordination of arts which participate in the production of cloaks; (b.1) weaving of warp and woof into a cloak. Analogously a statesman also has two functions: (a.2) supervision and organization of arts in a state; (b.2) unification of the courageous and moderate characters into a unanimous fabric of the community. Both
aspects of statesmanship-weaving respond to the fundamental problem of the conflict.

If the statesman is considered to be an arbiter in the conflict of arts, then he has to be defined in relation to other arts\(^3\). Firstly, the Stranger compares the statesman with a general, an orator and a judge. These forms of political practice are traditionally associated with a political rule. In the Stranger’s theory it implicitly means that these arts manage conflicts. Although these professions can become means in the conflict management, it does not imply that the essence of generalship, oratory or judging is to solve the conflict of arts. The purpose of these arts is confined to the boundaries of their own activity: generalship seeks to win a war, oratory seeks to persuade, and judging seeks to render justice. When the Stranger compares statesmanship with these professions, he distinguishes two orders of practice: the first-order is to exercise practice while the second-order is to decide whether to begin the activity at all (304c-e).

As Melissa Lane notes, a concrete expertise can only decide upon the means to attain a goal, but it cannot decide if it begins or ends: ‘Debating cannot decide whether it is best to stop debating; fighting cannot decide to stop and give way to dialogue’ (Lane 1998: 143). This decision belongs to a higher order expertise which oversees lower order arts and at the same time does not exercise the function of the overseen arts. Therefore in relation to other arts, the statesman’s task is to initiate, supervise and suspend activities (305d). In the Stranger’s theory the statesman appears as ‘a political manager’ (Schofield 2006: 178) who coordinates arts in the state. The statesman is able to control the conflict of arts because (i) due to indirect participation he does not get involved into the conflict; (ii) he has a unique art which empowers to coordinate other arts; (iii) he can use any expertise to remove the political strife.

The organizational abilities of the statesman and his exceptional art are bound to two assumptions. Firstly, the statesman must perceive not only the ends of a concrete expertise, but also the final end of community (cf. 305e3). Conflict as the main object of the political art suggests that it is not a positive end – the statesman does not seek for justice, virtue or the good of the state. As commentators have noticed, there are no requirements for the statesman to be an ethically virtuous person (Schofield 1999: 174; Cherry 2012: 123; contra Weiss 1995: 222). The Stranger’s statesman aims for a minimal end: he is a protector and guardian of state who is determined to eliminate the political strife and to secure survival of the political community. Secondly, the statesman has ‘to perceive the right occasions (ἐγκαιρίας) for undertaking and setting in motion the greatest enterprises of state’ (305d2-4). Καιρός, or the right moment, ‘the suitable opportunity for action’ (Lane 1998: 139), gives the statesman a mean (μέτριον), a standard, which reveals actions that are required, appropriate and necessary in the given situation (cf. 284d-e). The faculty to capture the right moment enables the statesman to be dynamic and to understand the concrete political reality. These qualities characterize the statesman as ‘a master timer’ (Lane 1998: 142) who grasps constantly changing circumstances.

\(^3\) The ideas presented in the two following paragraphs and in the third part of the article were firstly introduced and developed in my previous article ‘Meistrųčių vadyba Platono dialoge Valstybininkas’ [‘The Conflict of Arts in Plato’s Statesman’], in: Literatūra 56 (3), 32-44 (esp. p. 39-43).
and flexibly adapts to them. The control of καιρός and the understanding of the final end allow the statesman to harmonize the arts. But how extensive is his coordination? Lane argues that the statesman coordinates every expertise in the state (Lane 1998: 195). Frederik Arends argues against Lane that the statesman’s coordination is discussed in the dialogue only in relation to a general, an orator and a judge. Therefore, ‘it is concerning these three arts, and these three arts only, that the statesman determines the proper moment to activate or stop them’ (Arends 2001: 151). Both authors do not highlight the context in which the Stranger argues for the requirement to coordinate the arts. The analysis shows that this demand springs from the conflict of arts. Consequently, the statesman coordinates neither three, nor all arts. The statesman organizes and coordinates as many arts as the conflicts emerging and varying in the concrete situation demand.

The second task of the statesman is to reconcile the conflicting characters. In his discussion the Stranger again follows the example of weaving (308d). Weaving exemplifies a connective work as it involves binding together warp and woof. The connective stage is preceded by a preparatory action performed by carding, which separates those threads that are unfit from those fitting for a fabric (282b). Analogously, statesmanship is preceded by an auxiliary expertise – education – which is overseen by the statesmanship and assigned to perform a separation of the vicious types of courage and moderation (308e). It has already been mentioned that both of these characters lean to excess which is equal to a political vice. Excessive characters are blind to καιρός, proper moments in politics, and therefore the courageous become ‘excessive and maniacal’ in their political judgments while the moderate – ‘cowardly and indolent’ (307b9-c2). Vicious characters are not reliable in defending peace and stability of the state. Education works to preserve the balance and proportions in characters. Education is essential in creating political unity since it prepares future citizens for political ties. The statesman is incapable to suppress political antagonism alone by himself; he is in need of citizens who would be already properly educated.

The statesman takes the prepared characters in order to connect them with the divine and human ties (309b-c). These ties correspond to the distinction between soul and body: the divine tie is designed to connect human beings with a common worldview, while the human tie is intended to unite in kinship. The divine tie is introduced through ‘a right opinion concerning what is good, just and profitable’ (309c5-6). In Márquez’s view, the divine tie is created through indoctrination when using various techniques of persuasion citizens are compelled to have a unanimous view (Márquez 2012: 331, 333). However, the Stranger nowhere mentions persuasion, discussions, exchanging of opinions or agreement upon common view. The statesman is not assisted by orators or rhetoricians. He acts through art and laws (309d3, 310a2). In other words, the statesman’s task is to create a juridical-cultural horizon where different characters are to be pierced by common values. But the statesman is not a Socratic teacher who individually educates or instructs every citizen. The statesman uses legislation which is a medium between the statesman’s knowledge and the political community. It has already been mentioned that the statesman acts dynami-
cally and therefore the given laws cannot be fixed once and for all. He rather gives decrees which address a concrete problem in a concrete situation⁴. These decrees are superior to usual laws which are introduced to run for unlimited time and to be applied for many diverse problems.

Now the human tie is established through marriages and procreation. According to the Stranger, different characters usually do not mix together and therefore they marry characters who are similar to their own nature (310c-d). An excessive concentration of the same character in a family threatens the descendants with a radical nature. The Stranger’s solution is to produce a mixed type families. Of course, the statesman does not directly marry citizens. Similarly to the case of the divine tie, the statesman creates legal conditions where these characters are forced to unite into a community. Contrary to the majority of scholars, Arends has noticed that the Stranger inexplicitly mentions the third, governmental tie (Arends 1993: 177) which is presented in a short passage 311a. The governmental tie is a distribution of power and offices between different characters. In this way they bring a balanced degree of caution and vitality (or conservatism and radicalism) into the political life.

The solution of the conflict of characters is different from that of the conflict of arts. In the conflict of arts the Stranger strongly emphasizes the importance of relevant time and circumstances: he believes that the coordination of arts must take into account the concrete political situation and search for the most favourable moment to manage the enmity. Furthermore, there is no indication that the conflict of arts will ever be resolved. When the statesman organizes the activities of arts, he uses various arts and professions as means to reach the wellbeing of the state. But the statesman is not supposed to solve concrete and varying discords between factions with different characters. The reconciliation of characters is considered to be a long-term process which lasts for almost an entire life of citizens. In this sense, the work of the statesman is steadier than in the conflict of arts. The statesman must create and control a complicated mechanism which indirectly harmonizes different lifestyles, attitudes, and choices. This practice reaches a removal of conflict and ‘a true fellowship by mutual concord and by ties of friendship’ (311b9). But here the statesman treats citizens as instrumentally as arts. Whenever the fabric of citizens is woven, the Stranger justifies any means.

The Political Knowledge

The extraordinary performance of the statesman naturally raises a question about the foundations of his activities. The Stranger does not answer how the statesman learns or acquires competences for a political life. It seems that the Stranger simply proposes a hypothesis that one might achieve such knowledge and then he examines how the political knowledge would operate (Schofield 2006: 174, 183). From the scarce information about the emergence of statesmen, one can only summarize that they are figures of political crisis. The statesmen appear when the political body is in the utmost need of them and when the community is in a danger of extinction. Their appearance is quasi miraculous because they emerge without an external assistance and there-

⁴ It is likely that this is the main idea of 294a-297c, where the Stranger criticizes the traditional understanding of legislation.
fore it is an uncontrollable process. Even though it is difficult to say how they learn the mastery of politics, the reconstruction of the structure of their knowledge can still be made. The political knowledge is not a merely dubious assumption in the dialogue that one can easily discard. This assumption might be justified if one would read it as a conclusion of the Stranger’s thoughts on political activity.

There is a trend of interpreting political knowledge as a branch of philosophy. It is claimed that the Stranger’s statesman is characterized by ‘moral-intellectual insight’ (Skemp 1952: 51), that he knows the good (Rowe 2000: 237; White 2007: 11-12), he is educated in dialectics (Klein 1977: 177) and in first principles (Blitz 2010: 256). But the Stranger is peculiarly silent on the importance of philosophy for statesmanship. Philosophy is mentioned only once when the Stranger inquires about its place in the previous period of the universe (272c) and he leaves this question unanswered. Dialectics are mentioned twice, but without connections to statesmanship. In both cases the Stranger only tells that participation in a discussion develops dialectical skills (285d, 287a). The Stranger is also silent on the ideas or the first principles. As it has already been mentioned, the statesman seeks for the good of the community, but its meaning is practical-political rather than philosophical. Márquez quotes the Stranger telling that ‘the understanding (σοφὸς) and upright (ἀγαθὸς) ruler will administer the affairs of those whom he rules’ (296e3-4). From this quote it does not follow that ‘the Stranger expressly emphasizes the interconnection between the character of the statesman and his knowledge’ (Márquez 2012: 347).

Actually, the Stranger does not mention the importance of knowledge for the character; wisdom is mentioned here only as an epithet without any serious theoretical implications. Moreover, Márquez notes that knowledge is linked in the dialogue to ‘the good, the just, and the noble’ (Márquez 2012: 179). However, there is little evidence to confirm this thesis. In the dialogue there are three segments where the activity of the statesman is related to these virtues – 295e, 309c, 310e. Firstly, the Stranger claims that the statesman lays down the laws which define ‘what is just and honourable and what is not, and what benefits society and what hurts’ (295e4-5). Later in both passages the Stranger tells that the statesman instructs citizens about what is good and evil. In other words, the statesman watches over the values of the community, which is his proper work according to our analysis of the conflict of characters. But one cannot conclude that the statesman or his knowledge is ‘good, just and noble’. There is one more discussion where the question of justice arises. The Stranger argues that the actions of the statesmen are justified ‘so long as they work on a reasoned scientific principle following essential justice and act to preserve and improve life of the state’, ‘they may purge the city for its better health by putting some of the citizens to death or banishing other’, ‘they may lessen the citizen body by Sending off colonies [...], or they may bring people in from other cities and naturalize them so as to increase the number of citizens’ (293d4-9). The context of these reflections is the critique of the traditional constitutions which are too weak to handle the conflict. The quote suggests that any action of statesmen is justified if it terminates the conflict. Precisely the solution to the conflict is called ‘justice’ and improvement of ‘life of the state’. Generally, it can be noted
that the Stranger is rather unfavourable to philosophy: in the constitution established by the statesman there is no place for philosophers (cf. 299b-c). The knowledge and expertise of the statesman is independent from philosophy.

And yet there seems to be an argument in favor of philosophy. The statesman’s knowledge, according to the Stranger, is theoretical (γνωστική), like science of numbers, not practical (πρακτική), like carpentry and manufacture (258d-e). Stanley Rosen argues that the Stranger either contradicts himself or his classification is not consistent, since it has already been argued that the statesmanship is described as similar to the weaving, a practical expertise, not a theoretical knowledge (Rosen 1995: 20). Therefore commentators reject the Stranger’s thesis on the statesmanship as a theoretical branch of knowledge (Skemp 1952: 123; Griswold 1989: 146). Truly, the statesmanship is technical and to ‘political production’ orientated practice. But this does not serve as an argument against its theoretical nature. Márquez accurately points out that the Stranger’s employed distinction between theory and practice is not between contemplation and action, or general rules and concrete application (Márquez 2007: 32). Márquez believes that the Stranger’s distinction corresponds to distinction between soul and body. This argument rests on the passage 259c, where the Stranger explains what he means by πρακτική and γνωστική. Practice requires ‘using hands and bodily faculties’, while theory uses ‘mental power and force of personality’ (259c6-8). The statesmanship is not practical because its realization does not need statesman’s physical appearance and participation in the public realm. The statesmanship is theoretical because its realization depends on the political expertise.

The statesman is in an exceptional intermediate position between a politician and a political philosopher. The statesman differs from a politician, who is defined by a direct participation in a public sphere and not by the political knowledge. The statesman is similar to a political philosopher because both of them are distinguished for their mental powers. But unlike the political philosopher, the statesman’s practice of soul has political consequences. How does the statesman implement his enterprises if he does not directly participate in politics? The Stranger claims that the statesman is in need of mediators who implement his decisions. This appears when the Stranger divides theoretical knowledge into the critical (κριτική) and directive (ἐπιτακτική) branches. Critical knowledge is defined by correct judgments, assessments and critique. Its nature is advisory; it does not require to be implemented. The Stranger illustrates this kind of knowledge with an example of arithmetic, but it can also be illustrated by the political philosophy. In this sense the political philosopher, as well as a counter, is a ‘mere spectator’ (260c2). Therefore, critical knowledge is self-sufficient and in no need of other’s help or mediation (Márquez 2007: 46). This is not the case with directive knowledge. Unlike a spectator, the statesman implements his decision through mediators. The statesman belongs to the directive branch of knowledge which is illustrated by the Stranger with an example of the master builder (ἀρχιτέκτων). The master builder does not have a practical art of knowing how to use hands in the process of building. He knows how to draw a blueprint of the building and how to materialize
it. This is theoretical knowledge. Since the master builder also commands the builders and distributes tasks for them, his knowledge is directive. The analogy with the master builder qualifies the statesman with the architectonical expertise (Schofield 2006: 182). The architectonical knowledge corresponds to the conflict management. When coordination of arts was discussed, it was argued that statesmen do not perform the activities of arts but organize and oversee them so that they could accomplish political ends. In terms of architectonical knowledge, statesmen do not know how to perform a concrete task of art. They are not experts of a specific field of knowledge. Statesmen must comprehend the general functions of arts and know which expertise is needed to achieve a political end. The architectonical nature of statesmanship reveals that it is a theoretical knowledge with practical results.

Finally, the Stranger divides directive knowledge into autonomous and subordinate knowledge. This distinction once again emphasizes the architectonical nature of statecraft. An example of directive knowledge which is not autonomous is an emissary, who receives orders from the sender and issues commands to the receiver. But the statesman is the origin of all commands in the state – he does not receive any superior orders and his commands are emanating to the lower units. This makes him an example of autonomous knowledge (ἀυτεπιτακτική). Though the statesman is the origin of commands, he is not an omnipotent sovereign. The success of statesman’s decisions depends on the abilities of his subordinates to implement the given decision. Every expertise which does not need help from other arts is more sovereign than the statesmanship which depends on the mediators. The statesman is autonomous only in the sense that his knowledge does not depend on others’ commands and his commands reside in his knowledge. Thus, the authority of architectonical knowledge is founded upon itself without any references to higher authorities.

Conclusions

Plato’s *Statesman* is truly a gloomy and bleak dialogue. Far from the *Republic* or the *Laws* which discuss models of possible political communities, the *Statesman* deals with problems presented by the concrete political reality. To answer the first question of this paper, the defining, persistent and always emerging element of politics is a conflict. Politics is a series of attempts for various groups to accomplish their ends by antagonistic means. For the Stranger, broadly this is a popular practice and understanding of politics. The Stranger distinguishes from the latter a normative understanding of political practice defined as statesmanship. Its function is to find means to control the conflict so that it does not exhaust and annihilate the body politic. To answer the second question, the true political practice is understood as management of arts and characters, as awareness of the final end of community and the concrete moment for action. Upon developing the structural components of the political activity, the Stranger finds that its cornerstone is the political knowledge, an autonomous branch of knowledge separate from philosophy, which empowers the political actor to adequately address the problem of the conflict. Thus, Plato’s *Statesman* is conceptually coherent, consistent and internally complete dialogue. It is a separate and original project of Plato’s political philosophy.
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Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Platonas, Valstybininkas, valstybininkystė, konfliktas, politinis žinomas.

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