Problemos <p>A peer-reviewed journal of philosophy founded in 1968 that publishes research articles, book reviews and an academic chronicle. Indexed in the Scopus database from 2002 and in the Web of Science database from 2005.</p> en-US <p>Please read the Copyright Notice in&nbsp;<a href="">Journal Policy</a>.&nbsp;</p> (Nijolė Radavičienė) (Vigintas Stancelis) Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 OJS 60 Editorial Board and Table of Contents <p>[text in English and Lithuanian]</p> Nijolė Radavičienė ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 Author Guidelines and Bibliographic Data <p>[text in English and Lithuanian]</p> Nijolė Radavičienė ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 Heraclitus: Λογος as the Forthtelling of Φυσις <p>[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]</p> <p>The article presents a specific interpretation of the Heraclitean Logos. Initially, general ontological and gnoseological assumptions of early Greek philosophy are discussed. The relativity of the boundary between the subject of thought and the object of thought is considered to be the most important feature of this philosophy. Therefore, the Heraclitean aphorisms are treated as phenomenological insights. Following this approach, an attempt is made to explore the content of the main Heraclitean aphorism DK22 B1. The meaning of this aphorism is gradually revealed through other aphorisms of Heraclitus. Since individual aphorisms and their groups open up different aspects of the Heraclitean philosophy, these aspects are consistently discussed in the article. Presuming that early Greek philosophy presents by itself an attempt of theoretical thinking to assimilate the concrete thinking of the time, it is shown that the measure of the same of theoretical thinking determines the three-dimensional concept of reality and poses to the thinker the problem of the existential assuredness. As a philosopher locates himself in the sphere of awakening, and the existential assuredness can be expected only in the sphere of the Logos that satisfies the measure of the same, he is faced with the problem of thematizing this realm of reality. Dream, awakening, and the Logos are treated by Heraclitus as incommensurable realms of reality, so the question arises how to thematize all of them exploiting one and the same language. This problem is further complicated by the fact that Heraclitus prioritizes the object of thought, and therefore is forced to over-emphasize the etymology of language. It is shown that Heraclitus copes with the above-mentioned problem exploiting total metaphoricalness of ontologically treated language, or reality itself. The article concludes with the inferences about the mission of Greek philosophizing and the existential obligations imposed upon a man by the hierarchically treated three-dimensional concept of reality.</p> Skirmantas Jankauskas ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 The Relationship Between Tool and Technique in Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology <p>[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]</p> <p>The aim of the article is to reveal the difference between the tool (Zeug) and the technique (Technik) in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. Differences point to the problem of the world constitution. While Heidegger presents Dasein’s relation with the tool as “ready-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit), he presents the relation with the technique as diametrically opposite. Technology which is emerging from natural sciences tied up with machination (Machenschaft) by the philosopher is presented as Dasein’s creative powers in the context of suppresing medium establishment (Gestell). The article reveals a twofold problem. First, it shows the ontological differences between a tool and technique. Second, it shows the ambiguity of the ontology of establishment. Establishment for Heidegger is not merely the ultimate mechanism of technical mastering but also a “saving power”.</p> Tadas Čapanauskas ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 The Context of Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology: Cassirer, Jünger, Spengler <p>[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]</p> <p>In this article the context of the formation of some important elements of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is presented. The parallels between Heidegger’s and Ernst Cassirrer’s, Ernst Jünger’s and Oswald Spengler’s philosophical reflection on the process of industrialisation are discussed. While discussing the connections of their conceptions the development of characteristic Heideggerian articulation of industrialization process comes to the fore, as well as of some important themes of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology: planetary scope of modern technology’s reach and impact and the notion of technology as destiny of the West and modern humanity in general.</p> Tomas Nemunas Mickevičius ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 The Doctrine of Separation (Khōrismos) and Its Critique in Aristotle’s Metaphysics <p>[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]</p> <p>The paper deals with the concept of separation (khōrismos) and its criticism in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. More specifically, the paper aims to show that in the Metaphysics, Aristotle criticized the separation of Forms and the separation of numbers as two inextricably linked (rather than two separate and utterly unrelated) philosophical doctrines related to two distinct yet inherently connected cases of the same theoretical problem. This thesis is supported by the general thematic structure of books M and N, Aristotle’s testimonies regarding the genesis of the theory of Forms, as well as an interpretation of the latter according to the phenomenon of number, as it was understood by the ancient Greeks.</p> Virgilijus Petuška ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 The Origin and Meaning of Social Openness in Bergson’s and Popper’s Thought <p>[full article and abstract in Lithuanian; abstract in English]</p> <p>The article is focused on the analysis of the origin and meaning of social openness in Henri Bergson’s and Karl Popper’s thinking. It aims to reveal the foundational significance of the concept of open society in the works of its creators. The first part of the article is focused on Bergson’s research into formation of closed society, the vantage point being the analysis of a human being’s reaction to death. The second part reveals H. Bergson’s process of social openness; its anthropological foundation is the conversion of instinct into intuition or the contact with the principle of élan vital, realized by the mind. The third part analyses Popper’s concept of closed and open society in the context of Bergson’s philosophy.</p> Povilas Aleksandravičius ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 A Kantian Critique of Grotius <p>[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian]</p> <p>During the last few years, it has become usual to turn to some seventeenth century readings of the traditional idea of an original common possession of the earth for philosophical aid to explain and support the rights of persons in situations of extreme need, including refugees. Hugo Grotius’s conception of this idea is one of the most cited ones. In this paper, I hold that a Grotian reading of the idea of an original common possession of the earth is not a fruitful principle if we want to elaborate a solid defence of the rights of the ones in need. I reconstruct and analyse the role this idea has in Grotius’s theory of private property and present objections to it from a Kantian perspective.</p> Macarena Marey ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 Why Kant is a Weak Conceptualist <p>[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian]</p> <p>The question whether Kant is a conceptualist has attracted significant attention of Kant scholars in recent decades. I present all three dominant positions in the debate (strong conceptualism, weak conceptualism, nonconceptualism) and argue that strong conceptualism and nonconceptualism are less plausible interpretations of Kant’s philosophy. I argue that the first cannot explain Kant’s commitments related to the incongruents, animals, and infants. The second one, meanwhile, cannot explain Kant’s argument on causation against Hume. At the end of the paper, I try to show that the key to a plausible and convincing interpretation of Kant as a weak conceptualist is the distinction between categories and empirical concepts.</p> Ruslanas Baranovas ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300 The Absolute and Relative Pessimistic Inductions <p>[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian]</p> <p>The absolute pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although successful, were abandoned, so current theories, although successful, will also be abandoned. By contrast, the relative pessimistic induction states that earlier theories, although superior to their predecessors, were discarded, so current theories, although superior to earlier theories, will also be discarded. Some pessimists would have us believe that the relative pessimistic induction avoids empirical progressivism. I argue, however, that it has the same problem as the absolute pessimistic induction, viz., either its premise is implausible or its conclusion does not probably follow from its premise.</p> Seungbae Park ##submission.copyrightStatement## Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0300