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**Modern Nomad and Colonialism**  
(Šiuolaikinis klajoklis ir kolonizmas)

Santrauka

Civilizacijos tyrinėtojų šiandien sutartina pripažįstama, kad dvipusio geografinio skirstymo (Rytai/Vakarai, Orientas/Ocidentas) pagrindas yra veikiau kultūros, bet ne geografiniai veiksniai. Straipsnyje bandoma atsakyti į svarbų civilizacijos analizės klausimą: kiek iš nuolatinio Rytų ir Vakarų gretinimo galima daryti iššūkių apie universalius despotizmo ir demokratijos modelius, kuriuos savitai atsiskleidžia istorikai sudetingo įtakos istorijai, derinančių du priešingus - laisvės ir suvargžymų - pradus. Pateikiami argumentai, susiję su ideologiniais "reikšmių racionalizavimo" veiksnių, kurie rodo kasdienio diskurso ir vaizduotės, žiniasklaidos, populiarųjų menų ir estetinių skoniių svarbą formuojantis reikšmingoms socialinėms padetims šiuolaikinėse visuomenėse.

In the context of civilizational investigations, there appears a constant tension between East-West, at times demarcated as the histories of Orient and Occident. Accordingly, the confrontation of east and west is the ultimate issue, since the winner will determine the kind of world we shall inhabit: despotism or democracy. From the outset, the difference between them was decisive. One was completely autocratic, Persian, Byzantine, despotic, lending itself solely to an interpretation of “imperative ordering” by the autocrat. While it is possible for an autocrat to be benevolent toward the population, his benevolence depends purely on his momentary dispositions, and the latter can coincide with the power of the laws the autocrat prescribes. It would not add much to our investigation to digress toward the psychological dispositions of the power holders. Our concern is more with its nature and logic.

For civilizational reading, freedom is the West, while despotism is East; we hear the chains from Siberia, the cries of holy wars from middle east, and Middle Ages, the torture cries from the dungeons of the autocratic papacy, the threats of total destruction by the reborn and their second coming - and all armed with the latest means of power. The division into the East and West is not geographic but composed of cultural topography. Hence the West has imported, or accepted an exportation and imposition of a Judeo-Christian tradition stemming from, and completely correlated to the Persian autocratic mode of exercising power. The power can be spread by the sword; it becomes a specific form of colonization. Of course, apart from militaristic colonization, Judeo-Christianity correlated militarism to verbal, i.e. textual colonization. Peoples had to be converted into believers of imported texts. If they refused, they would be regarded as false and evil, and hence abolished. There is a close correlation of universalization of particular discourse or text as truth as colonialism to militaristic colonialism. This is well reflected in one, among numerous others, structural designs: imperial Persia and the divinities signifying such a structure. To understand this correlation we must revert briefly to the question of legitimation.

The ambiguity of legitimation can be dispelled mainly with respect to mythological imagery. The mythological region is peopled by figures that are structurally isomorphic with the power inhabiting the solar-imperial palaces. There is the celestian Lord-King, his Queen,
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their retinue, their subservient supplicants and worshipers, each with a sign of appointed and anointed rank, and hierarchical position. This is precisely the imperial regality. In the final analysis the mythological composition coincides with the ruling composition. This is to say, there is no legitimation here, since the mythical does not justify the imperial deeds but is identical with them. The emperor can claim without a fear of contradiction that “we are divine.” Thus we find that the Persian imperial morphology and the Judeo-Christian composition also coincide. The ruling emperor is the law giver and the law, and there should be neither deviations nor questions concerning the power of such law. The language here is one of edicts and imperatives, couched at times in the pronouncements of prophets. The latter are there to insure that the highest authority is once again installed and recognized without interrogation. All that lives and exists must obey and be subordinate to the edicts, indeed must act in ways that would constitute a support and enhancement of the edicts. No one can question the imperial force of the law, specifically when the law coincides with the mythical power of the paternal “maker of the world.” The imperial powers make the world by their commands, and their posited images of patriarchs make the world by uttering appropriate words. At this level, we are faced with an understanding of verbal power that becomes coextensive with making, and indeed with an indistinction between word and event. The power holder’s every uttered wish becomes coextensive with deed and reality.

We must point out that the coincidence between the ruling powers and the divine, allows the ruling powers to claim universality and, by extension, colonialism. Our divinity rules over all, and hence demands of us to rule over all. This trend toward universality is still prevalent in stronger or weaker forms in current Islamic, and Judeo-Christian practices. Each claims the universality of their texts and the right either to proselitize it by verbal colonization, move into specific lands because they are promised, or to have a holy war against all who are incapable of recognizing the sole and universal truth. The unbelievers are evil by definition and hence destined for total destruction. It is of note that Europe was colonized by one of the proclamations of universal truth - the Judeo-Christian - both by word and at the cost of millions of lives. Having submitted to this truth, and having become, in turn, the propagators of this truth, the Europeans became Neo-Colonials. At the same time, being called to spread this truth, The Europeans, at one level of their civilization, became colonizers. This level of colonization extends all the way into facism, communism and current claims, in some quarters of the United States, that this continent is the promised land to the white christian believers. We can only mention that this sort of colonization is nomadic. The bearers of the truth, of the “good tidings,” must go everywhere and establish their rule (fortresses, temples, and castles) and lead the indigenous populations to truth. Such nomads rule either as divinities, or as direct representatives of divinities. Moreover, since they have a higher task to perform - preoccupied with spreading and then of maintaining, inforning, and enhancing the truth - they must leave the mundane labors, such as tilling the land, planting and reaping, to the lesser beings. It is to be noted that we do not offer, here, some explanatory metaphysics, such as “real” reasons why one does this type of nomadic proselitization. Reasons provide metaphysical multiplicity of explanations, ranging from psychological, through economic, to bio-genetic. We are simply offering the colonialistic modes of awareness without raising questions concerning their “essential” reality.

It is to be noted that the emergence of the colonial powers can be correlated to nomadic means, and, accordingly, such means were once the horse. It is a “technology” that corresponds to other “domesticated” technologies, except for the difference in power and speed. The horse is mobile and fast and allows the nomad a wide range of rulership. This is to say, the horse can be a means by which one is capable of conquering, subjecting, and finally wasting one settled community and then going to the next.
for conquest and subsistence until this too is exhausted. It may be said that the economy of settled peoples, i.e. agrarian and domestic, the indigenous whose warriors too must be domesticated and taught the truth of the new divinities, is an attraction for conquest by the mobile nomadic peoples who become the robbers, yet with a claim to superiority in truth, power and birth. Indeed, such a position is usually correlated to monistic mythologies, proclaimed to be universal and all inclusive. All is made by our divinity and hence all must give deference to it, and, by extension to us, since we rule in its name. The nomads are the leisure class, i.e. unconcerned with the production of the means of subsistence, but very much concerned with the art of ruling. The division into “settled” and “nomadic” can be extended into the division between warlike and peaceful, power seeking and ruling and the ruled. We can not only espay such ruling in the nomadic power of the horse rider-warrier, but equate such power to modern warfare of powerful and mobile machinery of war: tanks, ships, aeroplanes. This corresponds to civilizational concept of EAST and WEST as civilizational topographies that include Persian, Byzantine, Mongolian, Christian, Judaic, Russian and Islamic Empires that extend the conception of autocratic-absolutist power, correlating to an autocratic mythological structure, and in opposition to these, the Hellenic DEMOS backed by discursive, interrogative and alterable mode of life that correlates to the LOGOS of nature to which the human belongs. What is “natural” is what constitutes proper legitimation. Thus it is natural for humans to use fire and it is inappropriate for someone to use autocratic-imperial edicts to deprive humans of fire. There is a possibility to strike bargains, to change them, contest them in the public arena. Greek mythology, for example, reflects this way of natural bargaining. The understanding of legitimation must be adjudicated discursively in the public and not imposed by prophetically pronounced edicts. According to Junger, this discursive freedom is what characterizes the WEST and at the same time what deflects the imperative absolutes of the EAST. This division is not to be understood geographically, but in terms of civilizational topographies. Thus, there are self-managing communities all over the globe, and they would be civilizationally the West, while there are also autocratic rulerships in diverse places - including Europe, and this would be EAST.

The LOGOCENTRIC conception of DEMOS is what legitimates the subsequent conception of natural equality of all persons. Of course, within such an equality there were marked differences between abilities and developments of human potential, as was evident from Platonic and Aristotelian writings, leading to the Platonic call for a POLIS ruled by the BEST. This was of course the answer to the inadequacies of the rule by the many. In fact such a rule by the best would be partially justified by the LOGOCENTRIC conception of the world where EPISTEME was deemed to be in a position to decipher and hence correspond to, and indeed be capable of ruling in accordance with the ALL RULING LOGOS. Thus those in possession of EPISTEME should rule by virtue of their knowledge. What is to be understood is that knowledge could not be regarded as a legitimation to make, to transform the world. Knowledge of what is the case by nature is knowledge how one should act. This sort of rulership does not use power against a person or nature, but is capable to show discursively the mistakes the person might make with respect to the nature of the cosmos and its LOGOS. If a person is made to understand what is natural, he/she will act in accordance with such an understanding. If one knows what is beneficial to one’s health and what is not, then one will certainly do the beneficial thing. No imperative from emperors or gods could alter the cosmic logos. To the contrary, emperors and gods come and pass with the sway of the cosmos.

While the life in “accordance with nature” seems to offer a settled and peaceful context, requiring no building of empires, there is in it an incipient disequillibrium that may tend toward a rulership by the best. The latter, such as Plato, might regard the population as being
in error, in need of correction, and hence to be ruled from above in order to move it to the utopian state. Of course, the latter for Plato may be the most real.

APPEARANCE OF REFLECTIVE THOUGHT

The cosmic logos is not to be understood as power, but as enduring and elastic strength that yields but cannot be defeated. Those who live in accordance with its sway are also the enduring, the ones who bend with the storms but remain unbroken. The difference between strength of logos and power is that logos is ever present and never vanishes, while power has its rise and fall. It can be absent, withheld, and in the withholding can become awesome, more terrible than its direct exercise. Yet it could be said with justification that like the horsemen, it is nomadic. It cannot be continuously exercised without becoming exhausted. It seems plausible to suggest that emperors do not use power on every occasion, but only when necessary to inflict direct terror and then draw the power back in order to hold it in abeyance and thus maintain its awesome threat in withholding. The holding in abeyance does not exhaust the power and yet it makes it seem all pervasive and inescapable. In addition, it is also plausible that legitimation of power appears as one effort to conserve power. No rulers could continuously use power; hence legitimation is a maintenance of power by other means. Such a maintenance does not abolish direct power; rather power becomes concentrated for “exemplary” use not only to terrorize some segments of the colonized and domesticated population, but also to demonstrate that in its withheld state it remains awesome and vigilant. Legitimation is thus a means to conserve and yet to maintain the all pervasive although withheld presence of power.

Obviously, even legitimated and maintained power need not be eternal; it can be conquered, dissipated, abolished, or decadent. In this sense it is distinct from the strength of logos that is not nomadic, it does not come and pass, even if it is never at rest. At least this thought was pervasive among the settled peoples who endured the shifting, clashing, and transient powers of the colonizers and masters. Perhaps, the very mobility of the masters, their relative indifference to the places they ruled, in their own, and in the name of their divinities, lent them a peculiar distance, a transcendence, a position that was regarded as higher, prouder, nobler, perhaps even purer and less soiled than that of the eternal peasant, the proletarian, and the plebian who were steeped in the soil of labor, and bent to perform the lower tasks. These are not yet the so called “class distinctions” of the later age, but rather ontological dimensions constituting two different modes of comporting in the world: the enduring strength of logos and the transcendent, transient and colonizing powers. The ontological distinction does not signify a spatial and temporal difference. The two dimensions are inseparable, and neither would appear without the other.

These two modes seem to appear in the Brahmanic contrast between the all enduring and ruling KALA and the shifting powers of kings, whether legitimated or not. Just as the nomadic rulers cannot completely transcend the logos, so the kings with their powers cannot escape the verdict of time. Given this context, the subsequent legitimation efforts should not be identified with a particular ruler’s wish to justify his rule, but more basically with the effort to extricate from the strength of the all pervasive LOGOS and KALA, i.e. to make the transient power last and indeed become superior and transcendent to the strength of the Logos. We shall argue subsequently that the current cult of deconstruction is premised on this notion of abolishing the enduring strenght of logos, of “logocentrism.” And this means that deconstruction wants to continue the transcending nomadic rulership with the aid of the old, recouped, divinities and their suplicant servants. This effort to shift toward the superiority of the disattached, nomadic transcendence may constitute an effort to bend the rule of the logos, and if possible to exercise
will over it. It would be like Darius ordering the whipping of the stormy sea that was hindering the sailing of his ships to attack Greece.

The movement toward transcendence and the preeminence of the ruler's WILL over nature on which he not only dependents, but which could not be completely submitted - not even the peasant could be completely abolished - to his will and law, acquires most preeminent expression with the myths of creation, and later with the conceptions of a supreme-transcendent being. The former lends credence to the ruler's edicts stemming from his will in the sense that nature is not an independent domain with its own strength, but that rather it is a product of a will, a created realm. After all, the initial depiction of creation is imperative and verbal: by speaking the highest mythical figures make things happen, thus indicating that the word is the law and deed at the same time. The word could have been spoken differently and the world could be different. This abolishes the necessity in the LOGOS, and relocates it in the imperative power of the will. The latter point, reaching its culmination in the medieval west, and in current global phenomena of fundamentalisms, intimates a transcendence which is imitated by nature and is superior over nature. It is a "thought" that is purified from the imperfections of nature and the latter is an IMAGO of it. Nature is an image of and depends on thought that can turn into reality by the act of the will, such that even thought can become a result of the command of the will. In principle, this priority of the imperative power of the will appears in the prerogative of the supreme will to perform "miracles" and thus to disregard the order of LOGOS. While this is mythology of Will, subsequently it will appear as the metaphysics of the will, specifically in its modern Western guise. The result will be a second form of colonialism and its inevitable outcome in neo-colonialism.

THE REFLEXIVE DOMAIN

With the appearance of thought as transcendent over nature, and indeed being the determining factor of nature, there opens up a reflexive region that lends nature not only a secondary status, but above all a being that is dependent on thought. Thus in order to discover this dependence, one must turn to the composition of thought and how nature must correspond to, and become subsumed under thought and, in the final analysis, under projects of will. This calls for thought to reflect upon its own activities and content and to decipher its own standards by which nature becomes DETERMINABLE. The last term is selected to suggest that thought being prior to nature is not determined by anything and hence can determine nature in many ways, dependent upon the WILL. This is to say, if thought is the starting principle irrespective of the "height" of its transcendence, the nature is determinable by it in more than one way.

There appears a peculiar reversal: the logos, with its enduring strength against which all powers were temporary and contingent now is forced to be contingent and unnecessary, a being dependent on the transcending thought and the ruling will which is deemed to be necessary and incontestable. The latter is the stable power that can determine by its will the way that nature will be reconstructed, and will remain dependent on human designs. Here the emperor and its nomadic power, i.e. a will that needs not respect the logos, returns in a new guise, except now as a supreme ruler. Within this reflexive context the human finds itself in a position of transcendence over nature, in a position of being a source of all the law that, while not yet in total command of nature, is in a position to establish such a command. This is to say, nature can be regarded as dependent upon thought, not in some ontological sense, but perhaps more fundamentally, in a practical sense, i.e. in a sense of being "made" in human image.

A fascinating syndrome appears that usually remains if not hidden, at least unexpressed: the
very way that the human thinks first appears not as its own thinking and understanding, but as something cosmic and encompassing. The same could be said of the human positing of its own reflection as more fundamental than the logos of nature: the primacy of reflective thought is first attributed to a cosmic thought and only subsequently is there an admittance of the thought that turns back upon itself. Thus the discovery by modernity of the ego that thinks its own thoughts, and knowledge as identical to power, is a discovery of a composition that was already invented and, so to speak, waiting in the wings to be recognized and appropriated. The structure of the priority of reflective thought and the power of the creative will was accomplished in Western theological metaphysics before the human would accept and recognize this structure as his own.

The priority of an already taken for granted primacy of thought as the creative power also permits the priority of will as that which can choose what sort of creation occurs. Thus the once necessary nature, with its own logos, has to be subsumed under a power that is in principle capable of dominating and altering nature and in principle making nature contingent. This is to say the necessity shifts to the will and its creative power leaving nature exposed to arbitrary rule. Indeed, without an imposition of an order by the will nature would be without reason and form, without value and goodness. The composition here permits a direct translation into the domain where thought and will can have a direct influence and control over everything, and the domain that is controlled becomes contingent and dependent on will and thought. This distinction appears at the dawn of the modern age: it is claimed that while for some ultimate reality or being \(2 + 2 = 4\) need not hold, for us it is sufficiently certain, and resultantly we need not concern ourselves with questions for which answers are inaccessible. This is to say, the composition of the ultimate creation of nature by the ultimate will is at the same time excluded as irrelevant for the human knowledge and assumed by the human as his own composition of knowledge and will. Knowledge and will are taken, nonetheless, to be prior and transcendent to nature and hence capable of imposing an order on an otherwise irrational material nature. What comes along with this structure from the cosmic assumption of the absolute power and its creation of nature is the shift of power toward thought and will over nature. Thought and will, logic and valuation become the necessary conditions for the being of the world for man, while nature becomes, to speak with Kant, blind phenomena.

No doubt, this composition has an unavoidable consequence for theology. The latter is compelled to proclaim the remoteness of the divinity to such a degree that it becomes completely other and inaccessible. One could make a good case that it is no accident that by the nineteenth century claims were advanced that either the divinity is dead or it is so transcendent that for us it is completely incomprehensible: we neither know what it thinks, nor what it wants, hence we are left to ourselves to shift the best way we know how, i.e. to do anything we like with our environment and world, since no theological appeal can offer us any valid guidance. Any theological appeal could count as another WILLFUL effort by the human to establish another order for the sake of colonization, and indeed, for the sake of truth which, in this context, must be taken on faith. It means that we are to late to appeal to any other criteria apart from those we ourselves invent and either impose on others through material power or submit ourselves to the very inventions we posit as objective. It will not do to argue, as do the Marxists, that the reason for the elevation of the divinity to unreachable heights is an ideological ploy by the ruling class, capable of keeping the lower classes and the peoples of the world in fear of the unknown and infinite power. Such an argument presumes that only some select elite can see through the facade of the ruling class, while the population is subsumed under its spell. If it is a facade that dominates a particular age, then no one can escape its spell, since there is no recourse, no vantage point from which to regard such a facade. But if someone
can escape such a domination, then it would seem that the very system offers some recourse from which anyone can survey the system and be capable to be a willful master of it. This is to say, the latter option suggests a reflexive domain capable of surveying the determinant factors of any system. But this is modernity open to all.

First result is the appearance of the initial syndrome of arbitrary power with respect to nature, except now in the guise of the subject who is “everyman,” i.e. any individual is in a position to be the maker and master of his own destiny by his own thought, will and ability to make the surroundings into his own “image.” He neither has a nature, nor a nature to settle; he can become, with respect to the environment and geographic topography, nomadic. This is to say, he is free from any place and can remake nature in his own image anywhere he decides to settle - an image of the rape of Gaia has here become a reality. Yet here the thesis of the difference between the despotic east and the democratic west finds a reversal: the west is the nomadic power of the unchained rule over nature, appearing both in the guises of capitalism and marxism. The land of the peasant, the endurer of seasons and of natural rhythms, and the local settler, regardless of space-place, the peasant attuned to them, are now exposed to become raw material and labor power for the technological edicts controlled by unknown “emperors” in distant regions. Although such emperors are most interesting insofar as they seem to possess what the current designation would call “economic power,” the more interesting factor is this reversal. It has broken down the traditional legitimation of power by birthright and demanded legitimation by “the people.” But the latter are either “labor power” to be constructed in accordance with the needs of production, or are mobile individuals capable of settling where there are not yet exploited “raw materials” for production - this is to say colonization.

The appearance of the individual and his assumed right to be the master of his destiny, the ruling power, the government, whose inevitable centralization was triggered by equality under the law, led to what has been called colonialism. One major issue that had to be resolved was LEGITIMATION of the nomadic individual as the center of socio-political and economic life. The reason that this issue did not appear with modernity rests on the assumption that the democratic revolution will lead to the conception of power concentrated in the hands of the people. The dream of a completion of democratization by the second history, i.e. by the establishment of a material power over nature and thus by the freeing of the human from any chains of established authority, turned out to be unattainable, and specifically due to the very scientific technologization of all processes in the social arena. This is to say, with the dawn of scientific enlightenment, there emerged an ontology that allowed technologization that led to the establishment of vast bureaucratic machinery of experts comprising a privileged elitism.

To understand this elitism (at all levels of modernity), and its colonialism, it is necessary to give a brief indication of the ontological prejudices that structure scientific enlightenment. The modern ontology follows a specific intentionality concerning the nature and purpose of knowledge: construction of the environment in accordance with human needs. This is to say, the notion of scientific reason is primarily instrumental. The so called scientific research and discoveries are not designed to reveal the truth about the world, but more basically to focus on the aspects of the world as material to be shaped for human, and indeed, human material fulfillment. This movement of scientific enlightenment had to reject the “old” Western tradition premised on such concepts as “natural types” each having an inherent “logos” that comprises a limit imposed by nature itself. The logos shapes all things into specific forms and their qualitative®essential characteristics. These characteristics provide the criteria for the distinction among different things of the world. In this context, to speak of humans is to recognize that they are different from puppies, cucumbers, apes, etc.. Modernity
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rejects such criteria as unscientific, something to be discarded. With this move, one must abandon that there are qualitative characteristics that would give an identity to an invariant concept of “the human.” This implies that the perceived-qualitative composition of things of the world cease to be definatory. All such characteristics are to be deemed unnecessary for science - indeed they may be regarded as subjective prejudices. Thus the question arises: what would comprise the world of objectivity that is equally colonial?

Across numerous arguments, there emerge two major components: first, whatever is real, will have to correspond to scientific method, and the latter is founded on quantification. This means that only what is measurable will be allowed into the sacred circle of reality. Thus mathematics determines what will and what will not be included in this circle. Second, what will be included is designated as “material” whose characteristics are extension and size, is either a part, or a sum of parts. This syndrome is known as “atomism.” All things are sums of smallest parts, and such things can be analyzed into such parts. This implies that the qualitative characteristics of the whole thing are scientifically irrelevant. In principle, all levels of the world must, then, be regarded as either separate individuals having only external relationships, or a sum-aggregate of individuals. Thus, even a society is a sum of separate individuals - atomic entities - each having its own way irrespective of any other atomic individuals. At this level, there emerges modern individualism, claiming that all individuals are equal. This claim will be regarded as scientific and hence universal. Under the scientific guise of universality, such an individualism is regarded to have a global validity, i.e. it is globalized and offered to any culture as a standard. All members of such cultures, who become “educated” in Western modern sciences and politics, will carry this conception into their own cultural worlds and thus become neo-colonialists. Meanwhile, social and cultural characteristics are, thus, scientifically irrelevant, since they are characteristics of wholes and not of parts. Indeed, such characteristics may hinder the members of cultures to understand themselves and their “true” interests objectively. In this case, such peoples must be taught by those who are armed with objectivity. It is to be noted that this is “the new truth” that replaces the old truth of faith. It is the burden of the West to propagate this new truth to those who do not yet possess it. By now the result is well known under the guise of scientific-technical help. The latter is not offered as colonialism, but as a benefit, and in turn purports to help the indigenous peoples to become versed in the new truth and hence “freely” become neo-colonials. As we shall see, this is one significant level of modern colonialism that becomes neo-colonialism in most diverse ways, inclusive of cultural neo-colonialism.

The composition of this objectivity is equally dependent on an indifferent and transcendent method that cannot be derived from any conception of human nature and, by extension, any culture with its qualitative characteristics. The method must be able to treat all things and events as universally homogeneous and hence independent of cultural qualities. This method is deemed to be a construct, i.e. mathematical and can be “applied” at will to all things and events to the extent that one either exclude all characteristics that are not measurable, or must reduce them to measure. But in this sense, the very method constructs the requirements of objectivity: all events must correspond to the dictates of the method. To speak more directly, the objective world must be read as a sum of measurable parts, and all things and events must consist of and be aggragates of such parts. If this is objectivity, then all qualitative components, whether of nature or of culture, are excluded a priori. They do not belong to material objectivity, and hence have no universal claim.

Epistemologically speaking, modernity claims, in principle, that what is experienced perceptually of nature, such as various creatures, plants, humans, with their qualitative differences (regarded once as essential differences - logocentric), their beauty and
value, must be reduced to subjectivity and some subjective impressions or psychological states. In this sense, neither the homogeneous material stuff nor the mathematical theory/method belong to the perceptual domain. They comprise domains that “transcend” experience. One domain, the material, functions mechanically, i.e. as cause and effect, while the other domain, the mathematical, belongs to the mind. Here we have a strict distinction between what is experienced and what is real. The materially real is contingent, i.e. it could be otherwise than it is, while the mathematically real is necessary. Its rules are repeatable forever.

We must be clear that although this scientific enlightenment is “Western,” as a specific reading of what the nature of the world and the human is, was equally imposed on the Western populations. Here one can immediately notice the transformation of human relationship to the environment. The material environment has no value; hence value must be added by the human, specifically by human labor; from this emerged the well known comprehension of property as a result of a labor theory of value. In this sense, the entire environment becomes an arena for property acquisition. Those who work and are frugal, will acquire greater property, and those who still regard the environment as having some sort of qualitative value of its own, some sort of Logos, will be left behind. As one can see, this form of colonialism requires that anyone who does not literally do something with the material environment will not be able to call any of it his/her property. Once the Europeans began to be colonized by this new truth, they discovered that they too became neo-colonials to the extent that they embodied this new truth in their consciousness and practice. Resultantly, they became colonizers of other geographical regions. If the indigenous peoples of those regions were not giving value to the material environment by their labor, then they cannot make any legitimate claim to it. The frugal European settlers will give value to the lands by making them workable and by using the indigenous peoples as means to obtain the lands. Obviously, the implicit assumption here is this: the indigenous peoples do not have either the appropriate awareness of the methods and techniques to be applied on the environment, or they are part of the environment that too has to be “reworked.” One of the legitimations for such reworking goes under the rubric of education. The indigenous peoples will learn the new truth, while the colonizers will be burdened with the duties to insure that the truth is carried out practically by the local labor. This form of colonialism spread across the globe and became of neo-colonialism to the extent that indigenous peoples had to incorporate the new truth as scientific/technical. The indigenous peoples either had to participate by becoming in their own practice neo-colonial all the way to spreading the message to other indigenous peoples how to do things right, or were deemed inadequate, underdeveloped to keep up with global history. It is obvious that this form of colonialism and neo-colonialism must be nomadic.

No doubt, the new truth, coming from the transcendent heights of scientific-instrumental reason, is not something that was forced on the populations. In most cases it was accepted on two counts: first, on the all pervasive ideology of scientific power to fulfill human wants in the material domain and thus to fill the gap of insecurity, to offer guarantees of well being that could not be otherwise attained. But as was seen in the case of mass opinion, the material incrementation of well being demands, in its own right a submission of the population under the control of bureaucratic technocracies. The management of complexities created by the efforts to attain power over nature, creates its own material power that cannot be disloged by political edicts. This is to say, the population’s demand for material fulfillment, leads to a greater concentration of bureaucratic-technical power and hence a continuous diminishment of the importance of the once autonomous and free individual as a law giver. Thus we reach a material paradox: the more the individual strives to secure his material well being vis-a-vis the appointed or self appointed social powers, the more he surrenders his power to
have any say in the increasingly centralized fabric of bureaucracies. At this juncture we seem to stress the principle of equality for all individuals in the material domain with a complete disregard to freedom. The meaning here is quite clear. An aim at democratic laws that would be equal to all members of a society tends to centralize the appointed law makers charged with establishing and maintaining laws deemed equal for all. This same tendency could well be present in the efforts to equalize material well being; centralized bureaucracy functioning under the guise of technical expertise is the way of securing equal fulfillment of well being. But the price must be paid: the experts are to rule by virtue of their scientific and technical sophistication. Although we are not contending that this is necessary or inevitable; rather, the very conception of scientific-technical expertise in modernity carries with it the view that it is in a position to “make” progress for the material benefit of the population, and the population takes for granted the mystique of science as a power capable of more or less divine intervention in all material affairs for the good of the human. The point is this: the scientific/technocratic globalization as a modern mode of colonialism becomes incorporated by various indigenous peoples who become neo-colonial in practice. Now, those among the indigenous populations who venture out to acquire more of the new truths and become more sophisticated technocrats, return to their people as neo-colonials extending colonialistic rule. They become the possessors of “expertise” that can master the environment and thus assume ruling - colonial - positions.

While this form of modernization comprises the ontological ground of colonialism, the acceptance of it by indigenous peoples through educational processes, comprises neo-colonialism. This is to say, the universal effort by the “underdeveloped” nations calls upon their youth to attend Western universities and become versed in the instrumental-technical reason in order to transform local conditions toward progress and development. Thus, the local peoples become inadequate and must be brought into “universal” material world history and hence be treated as a homogeneous labor power to be shaped technically by “education” to become adequate producers of commodities for the “world market.” In this sense, the elites, the local “bright lights” who get their “superior” technical knowledge in the West, the knowledge that is at base colonial, become neo-colonials by imposing this acquired knowledge as a standard for their own populations. They must lead the ignorant masses toward a materially fulfilling future, and thus impose the very structure of colonialism on their own populations. This type of imposition is deemed to be a way of dealing with indigenous issues “objectively.” In this sense, the West need not engage in exporting its colonial structure; it is imported by the educated elites as neo-colonial masters.

At the first glance it might be possible to argue that some of the forms of the acquisition of material well being through the modern establishment of instrumentalism allow the individual almost unrestricted freedom of choice to produce the Western style of material well-being without abolishing the notion of homogeneity of all things and, as a result, the equality among all humans. There are two forms of such homogenization and equalization: capitalism and communism. Both are Western modes of modernity vying for the most efficient ways to restructure the environment and the peoples in accord with the novel instrumental rationality. Indeed, we can well argue that this modern rationality has equally colonized the West and was a basic logic of colonizing Russia and Eastern Europe via the communist revolutions. Granting the current elation that capitalism has defeated communism, and thus the most implausible proposition that capitalism somehow promotes freedom of choice, it makes no sense here to speak of freedom as autonomus. Freedom of choice, compelled by the material forces, i.e. by the constant pressure to maintain one’s material edge, is reduced to the struggle for the management of instrumental means in order to secure one’s constantly vanishing position. Indeed, the more
one engages in this “freedom of choice” in material domain, the more one is exposed to the determinations of its necessities, and the more one neglects the public arena where local concerns are addressed due to “lack of time” for irrelevancies in face of “real concerns.” In this sense the very notion of freedom is subverted and is paraded merely as an ideology to attract the unsuspecting and the innocent as a way of achieving power over them.

The ideological solicitation of the individual to “freedom” is quite transparent with material nomadism and, in case of the underdeveloped world, neo-colonialism. The public opinion is not only shaped, but has already taken for granted that “other freedoms follow” from the “freedom” of materialism, specifically in its economic form. Two consequences seem to follow from this state of affairs. First, the public arena, such as local councils, the communal gatherings, are neglected unless everyone’s material interests are at stake; but such interests can no longer be decided by these councils and communities; they will be designed by the educated technical experts who bring “objective” knowledge. Second, the collapse of the public and the social into the material sphere of interests, making the public arena of freedom exposed to the possessors of greater material power, i.e. economic, technical, and scientific. But in case of neo-colonialism, this power will be distributed among those who possess the technical, instrumental rationality. Their skills are a condition for the running and/or “progressing” the entire society. This includes pedagogical retransformation of the local populations toward productivity and ability to “humanize” the homogeneous environment. But this also means that the population will be released from its “logocentric” land culture, its belonging to a region, an environment, and will become nomadic - in search of materials for use and consumption. One outcome of this colonial neo-colonialism is the well known language of commodification and consumption.

The concern with material fulfillment excludes other quests and “freedoms.” In this sense, if one is so bold as to call for freedoms in the public arena that are not concerned with the material well being, one is seen as a disruptor of order, a threat to job security or the hope of improving one’s material lot. As Luhmann so aptly states, the modern public arena is reduced to a common denominator: material interest. Capitalism and communism become coextensive. Thus the battle between the two systems at this level cannot focus on the maintenance of freedoms and the public arena, but a battle concerning as to who will maintain or possess the controls over the material processes. There is very little consolation for the population to discover that it is subservient to a party that determines the wages, the production, the health, or working for a corporation that sets efficiency quotas, prices and wages. Both function under the necessities of materially created forces and hence any talk of freedom on either side has only a soliciting attraction, i.e. an effort to win the minds of the population for one or the other side. One would have to be a more or less blind person to accept the view that once the material necessities are fulfilled, we, as well as all the peoples of the globe, shall somehow achieve freedom.

Capitalism and communism, completely enmeshed in scientific technocracies and bureaucracies, cannot permit any other conception of the human apart from efficient producer, colonizer, and a nomad that is calculating and calculated. The qualitative worlds of various communities around the globe, what they have to offer, are of local and not global value, specifically if such qualitative aspects cannot become circulated for global consumption. The technocracies of both ideological camps believe that the only moving force of history is material and in principle any other view, such as the autonomy of the individual, or the qualitative aspects of a life of a given community, have no bearing on reality and thus cannot be used. In this sense both would have to maintain that any worthwhile future is a continuous material fulfillment. Thus neither of these systems are compatible with the political enlightenments conception of
autonomy, although this conception was a catalyst that unchained the material mastery of nature and in turn got lost in this very “labor” through history toward self-liberation from the material power, a self-liberation that set up the conditions for the opposite: self-enslavement through the incrementation of material power and thus the reduction of the very arena that would guarantee one’s self-liberation to the pervasive forces of material needs. The result of this peculiar paradox is the resurgence of man ruling over man and not of laws posited by freedom and freely accepted by the very creators of the laws. It is self-colonization that begins to be a global passtime. No doubt, the temptation to be included in this self-colonization is overwhelming.

POST-COLONIALISM

This temptation shall be discussed after we look into the issue of post-colonialism. Post colonialism comprises a qualitative difference from, and resistance to, the globalizing colonialisms and neo-colonialisms to the extent that it is varied, unique, communal, unmediated by massification and commodification, and participatory. The latter is also varied and unique to the extent that each community has its qualitative self expression through and as an aesthetic body. To have some indication what comprises this aesthetic body as both communal and participatory we shall first focus upon spontaneous corporeal expressivity that, second, allows us to understand participation as expressive inter-corporeity. Then, we shall show the ways that qualitative communal spaces are constituted; these will include technically non-transferable creations of expressive, intercorporeal syn-aesthetic mood colorations and tonalities, inclusive of spontaneous expressivity and its spontaneous inter-corporeal resonances. Again, we must emphasize that all these aspects cannot be mediated by colonial and neo-colonial techniques and hence cannot be nomadized. The globalizing means, the superhyways of internets and webs, the digitalizers and synthesizers, the amplifiers and mikes, would be a disruptive intrusion and an irrelevant logic and media.

What needs to be accomplished first is the extrication of a “worldly logic” that is capable of accessing the phenomena of cultural practices which have not yet become differentiated as “culture” in contrast to other communal activities. This is to say, a worldly resistance to absorption by “transcendent” logic that deems itself to be sui generis and thus moving in a nomadic way around the globe. What we shall seek out are cultures that cannot be plucked out from their world, from their region, and from their uniqueness without becoming something else. This type of culture we shall call integral to the extent that it is lived without being “performed” as an added attraction by “artists.”

Our first research will focus on how community constitutes its inter-corporeal space, time, and comportment, and what such a comportment is as expressive phenomena. What is required here is a clear understanding of the intercorporeal expressivity that is both, encompassing-pervading, and lived in direct awareness. The expressivity is prior to meaning, signification, interpretation, and indeed construction. It is prior to, and makes all other phenomena comprehensible. One could say that it is the unmediated medium comprising a direct corporeal presence to the world and an intercorporeal attunment. Some researchers have called this attunment a corporeal style that in its dynamics transgresses physiological body by extending its expressive presence across other bodies, drawing them in its wake, but in such a way that the others too comprise a co-extensivity of the very style as a spontaneous awareness. This spontaneity will be investigated in relationship to the possibility of “artists” of indigenous communities “performing” either on the neo-colonial technical media or by traveling to other locations to visit immigrant communities.

While our research is focusing on the indigenous post-colonial communities that comprise “resistance” to neo-colonialism and its nomadic technocracy and media, indeed its globalizing life style, we also shall address
questions of the intersection of mediated syn/aesthetic phenomena, such as the ways the presentation of indigenous communities by global mass media might disrupt or transform these phenomena. Since for us the aesthetic and above all syn/aesthetic is inseparable from participatory inter-corporeity, then the mass mediated presentation might constitute a detraction of such a participation. This is to say, the very mediation may, by dint of the globalizing technologies, present the syn/aesthetic as an objectified performance and not as a lived praxis.

Another aspect of our research will attend to the possibility that “resistances” by communities via their aesthetic self presence may well incorporate the styles and even the means against which the resistances are pitted. There is no judgment on our part whether such intersections are valuable or not; what may be of interest is the way that the mutuality of two different styles, one, the globalizing and mass-mediated, the other indigenous, may constitute “spontaneously” new modes of syn/aesthetic awareness. This will require a careful investigations into the possible inter-corporeal attunement - even “at a distance” due to mass mediation. This is an issue of translatability of mediated syn/aesthetic awareness into intercorporeal sensivities, styles, and attunments. Given this question of “attunment at a distance” and “translatability,” we must also consider to what extent the mediation of various indigenous communal aesthetics can offer a mutual intersection, thus creating novel post-colonial -integral-styles. By “integral” we do not mean some sort of universal unity; rather, it means an opening for mutual incorporation and thus transformation of given styles, offering novel inter-corporeal communities and participations. Indeed, there will appear numerous mutual intersections and hence numerous novel options for the formation of communities, such that the latter might become styles that are open to other mutual inter-corporations and creative transformations.

Certain Western modern terminologies and their ontological prejudgments will have to be excluded. One major term, that seems to hang on, is “representation.” Hence one is apt to say such things as “this aesthetic style represents a Mayan community.” For us, representation is an embodiment of Western modern duality between things and language, signifier and signified, thought and reality, proposition and fact. This mode of talk was possible when one still held on to the assumption that there is one-sole reality depictable in one universal language. Even sciences have dropped the one-language prejudgment. This means that each discourse is its own communal way - whether the community is one of specific scientific discipline, or one of aesthetic praxis. In this sense, then, any performance is not a representation of a community, but is its very presence, its style, its expressivity, its attunment and synaesthetic inter-corporeity. Given this, we must also point out that there is no “mis-representation.” All we shall claim that there are differences in styles, and, given a mutual permutation and intercorporation, creation of other communal aesthetic praxis. This simply confirms our notion that the expressive domains present in the intercorporeal communal aesthetic, are not signified, are not meant, but are coextensive with syn/aesthetic awareness. To “misrepresent” is to give an inappropriate meaning, while in the synaesthetic world of inter-corporeity there are spontaneous inter-corporations and mutual reattunments that cannot be specified in terms of signifying, singular components.

While our notion of presence might go counter to the current mode of “thinking” of deconstruction, it is the case that various postcolonial communities wish to maintain their “presence” despite the theoretical-methodological prerogatives of deconstruction. This is to say, we do not claim that there is some universal, global “given” that ought to be maintained as central; rather, each community, and those who participate in it, cannot question its aesthetic style extended in and through syn/aesthetic performances as present. Quite bluntly, we are saying that the community sings and dances its troubles, joys, and desperations, and does not sing, dance etc. about them.
The issue here is somewhat complex. The so-called material forces of history are regarded as conditions, causes, necessities to which one must adhere, submit, and even use as basis for the construction of "objective" theories of socio-economic and political life. In turn, such forces are structured in accord with human designs and rules of functioning, and hence possess a "subjective" base. Moreover, with political enlightenment, there were posited principles for adjudication in the material sphere and the possibility of realignment of this sphere for the benefit of a consensual public. Although one might argue that numerous founding fathers of various modern national entities, were most concerned with the maintenance of property discriminations and perhaps even the security of material wealth among the possessors of such a wealth, this very concern indicates that there was no longer any necessity to regard material force as preeminent. It appeared in its vulnerability and in principle required political adjudication. Hence all the arguments between those who stressed democracy, and those who opted for republic, present a disrupted necessity. It is possible to adjudicate the material domain by the public by raising the question of rational legitimation of the appearance of material power in the hands of some against other members of society. This is to say, if laws are to rule, then any inequitable distribution of material power, leading to a rule of the human over the human, is a contradiction. Such a misdistribution precludes the free positing and following of laws and introduces necessities in the arena of inter-human relations. As we have already noted, the only viable POLIS is rational and free, and hence the introduction of material-irrational component is counter to the concept of a political society. No doubt, one may offer rational justifications for the inequities, but it should be noted that such justifications are either efforts to legitimate an established inequity by positing an irrational factor in human life, or means to explain human activities by constructing reasons for such activities, reasons which do not coincide with the activities. Such justifications, in principle, accept irrationality as the base of political life; given such a base, one then becomes "free" to justify one's actions by any arbitrarily constructed reason in the guise of ideology.

At any rate, the legitimation of the production of increased material power through science-technology conjunction is offered by the lure that such a power is for human benefit. More things, more benefits, more enjoyment, more health, more... more.... One could even say that this power incrementation becomes self-legitimating in face of the public's demand for more securities in the material sphere. But this raises an immediate question concerning the legitimation of the POLIS. What must constitute its "arena?" The free discourse for the public benefit is not an issue; the issue is material well being - private. Hence, the public domain, in order to be legitimate, must be reduced to the sum of private material interests. The political parties must shift their operations toward the fulfillment of material wants. But once this shift is made, there is no turning back, since in order to be legitimate, the political parties must fulfill the material promises. Failing this, they cease to be regarded legitimate. This is what constitutes the legitimation crisis of the political domain in modernity. In order for the political parties to maintain themselves in power, they must possess material power capable of satisfying the demands of the masses. If not in practice, at least in mass propaganda, the two systems vying for "the minds of the masses" offer their lines of wares in terms of material fulfillment. Both econologize every facet of socio-cultural and political life. The populations, in turn, take the economicalization for granted and exert pressure on the systems to produce visible results. Failing such results, one can justifiably argue that the system has no legitimation. The system responds by either military power to keep the populations working, or by promises of future improvements, or finally, by political theatre in various forms, inclusive of rituals and above all, ideological incantations. As Ricoeur suggests, there is a credibility gap between political rule and its legitimation. Since the gap cannot be filled by
material means, i.e. neither system can fulfill its promises of material well being, then it must fill the credibility gap. Ideology is one preeminent mode of filling this gap and, at the same time, of providing an inexpensive way of obtaining legitimation.

It is important to note that the filling of the gap is not offered by some purely conscious structure, i.e. ideality which would be distinct from materiality. Rather, the promises are of direct material fulfillment in the multi-leveled modern sense. The first principle that rules such a fulfillment is the final "ideal" of modernity: man is the maker of himself; the second principle is: man is on the way toward fulfilling this state of affairs. Thus ideological incantations and theatre constantly stress human self-realization, fulfillment, material security, in an everyday language. The ideal self is already taken for granted by the modern man: material power to enhance oneself and to make of oneself what one wills. And the "ideals" of the ideological structure of consciousness are directly perceptual, sensuous, bodily, offering everyone the means to achieve those ideals in any corner drug-store, beauty parlor, grocery outlet, and exercise places. Moreover, there is a skin-deep equalization in numerous domains lending the appearance of increasing material equality. Everyone can have similar foods, spices, drinks, even similar looking clothing - despite differences in quality - and hence the promises seem to be approximated. While there might remain vast differences in social class distinctions, economic and political power inequities, at the surface level there seems to be an apparent equitable fulfillment. Everyone is "enjoying" an apparent equality in terms of the socially proliferated ideals and looks. "She looks like a million" and this despite the fact that she is working on an assembly line and is not the manager of production or an owner of the means of production. This seems to be an ideology of the ruling class inscribed in the commodities for the subservient classes consumption, lending the appearance that the working class is fully participating in the "style of life" of the ruling class. The saturation of all domains with the images, tastes, sounds, conceptualities of the good life, the working class is completely submitted to the power of ideology in "flesh." Semiotically speaking this constitutes the trick of codification of the lower classes with the signs of the power of the upper, ruling class.

If ideology is to function at all, it cannot directly display power. Rather, it translates power into significance, and makes it "rational." We can no longer think of ideology in terms of nineteenth century when it was deemed that ideology expresses the interests of a dominant economic class. Semiotics has dispelled this view by pointing out that economic power is not for the sake of economy, but for the sake of numerous socially coded important positions. This is to say, ideology prescribes signs of prestige and significance and, with the material power of transforming all events into a humanly designed image, it also imposes the coded bodily "look" both "on the skin" and as an attire. Images of an ideal female, ideal male, ideal body, from toenails to hair, are proliferated for the consumer. This is to say, ideology is no longer a matter of consciousness reflecting the material-economic or technical conditions, but is an inscription in the body, in the images, the passions and desires appearing through the images and on the body. The idealities of the ideologies in the late capitalism and state-corporate systems are coextensive with the daily discourse, daily imagery, mass-media, sounds and tastes, architecture, popular arts carried by vast systems of circulation thus making any art-form accessible and "popular," and mimetic activities of the SUBJECTS in Foucault's sense. Subjects in his sense have become "subject" to the codes.

The question must now be raised concerning the credibility of the political incantations, the verbal depictions of the good life, the material fulfillment and equality. It seems that the political promises, which would be merely depiction of conscious ideals reflecting the position of the ruling class, should have very little impact on the population. Yet it is to be recalled that the modern magic of language is
one of power, an ability to transform words directly into deeds, indeed words having become deeds and material facts; hence there is a credibility of speech in all “educated” domains. And it is to be recalled that the political incantations are not dealing with such high and noble principles as autonomy, rights, dignity, liberality of the human but in a language of materiality, interest, incomes, shoes, cars, washing machines, crops, and “decent” incomes. And it is precisely this sort of discourse that is taken for granted by the public opinion: capacity to produce. Add to this sort of discourse some hints, veiled suggestions of utopian imagery, and the result will be a believing public. After all, the stress on materiality is already granted by the public opinion.

We are now in a position to connect the public opinion and its assumed wish for material fulfillment with the appearance of modern bureaucracy. According to Weber, the power of bureaucracy claims legitimation on the basis of its rationality. The ground of this claim is not offered by Weber, and must be sought in the construction of modernity. It was already noted that the sources of power in the modern age rest on the arbitrariness of thought and will with respect to the environment. Thus this very source leads to a demand that in principle everything should be makable, producible, and the production of the human into an ideal image. This source of productivity is, in brief, irrational. Given a complex social fabric composed of irrational wants and their fulfillment, there must emerge a social class in the service of the state and capable of adjudicating the material resources of a society in a rational way. No doubt, this rationality is not to be confused with any presumed natural reason, with logos, but simply with a calculative distribution of states resources in accordance with ideologically designated rules. What is unique about a bureaucracy is that it is capable of adjudicating such a distribution by interpreting the rules in accordance with specific situations and unique settings. In this sense the bureaucracy is given a direct power over the distribution and hence over the material well being of the population. In turn, the same bureaucracy is instrumental in writing the rules, since it is staffed by experts on whom the inexperienced political figures are completely dependent. Hence bureaucracy guarantees for itself a position and, with increasing material complexities, it also demands for increasing staffing and expansion of power.

What this means is that the arbitrary demands of the modern man must be rationalized, and with the increased demands, greater and more extensive rationalization must be instituted. In this sense bureaucracy enters the same logic of modernity: increased material power, controls, reshaping of the environment for human consumption is coextensive with the increased demands for the bureaucratic controls of distribution, effects, side effects, and interrelationships among the materially achieved results. One could speak here with Madison concerning political state as means for controlling effects of human “evil” actions. Scientific and political technocracies, stressing the increased fulfillment of human want rush to produce numerous “miracles” and the latter bear with them numerous and unforeseen effects. The more demands the population places on the scientific-technological production and on the political establishments to guarantee for everyone an access to the products, the greater risks will arise with respect to increasing effects. Hence the bureaucratic management of the results calls for a greater concentration of power and functional incrementation of bureaucracies. After all, the populations not only want material welfare, but are incapable of dealing with the results and side effects, and hence places demands on the political domain to guarantee the control of results. This pressure inevitably leads the political arena to be dominated by bureaucratic power. Hence bureaucracy performs two opposing functions: first, it is structured to enhance the expansion of material power and the distribution of its products, and second, it is called upon to control the effects of such production.

It is irrelevant whether the societies are nominally “free enterprise” or “state
enterprise,” basically their modern direction of increasing material power and controls demands the appearance of vast bureaucracies as a faceless government that cannot be held responsible, although they have a direct power of adjudicating the political edicts. Bureaucracy could be called “material hermeneutics” since its interpretation of the political edicts is coextensive with an application of material means and material power. It is a hand that can give or withhold, liberate or suppers, and thus determine directly the levels of survival of a given social group. Bureaucracy is forced into a material interpretation of social events, and by accepting this necessity, it inevitably acquires increasing material power. It is by now well noted that the efforts to liberalize society in Russia are running into a solid wall of bureaucratic power. In the West, the willful productions of the “free” enterprise system call for the increased controls of its results and effects and, coupled with the popular opinion that the political institutions should enter the arena of offering material fulfillment, bureaucracies are an unavoidable medium.

Although the economic power was mentioned in passing, we should consider the economic explanations leading to the views that the human is a HOMO ECONOMICUS. No doubt, since the dawn of the nineteenth century, there appeared numerous theses making a claim to an economic explanation of all socio-historical and even cultural phenomena. This view is so pervasive that to challenge it would be equal to waging war on all the prejudices of the last two centuries with regard to the BASIS of all human sciences and engagements. Hence our task is not to oppose each economic explanation separately, but to decipher in principle the reason and the source of such explanation.

While discussing modernity, we have noted that the priority is given to reflection. The reflective domain has been unbound from any natural constraints and has been set up to be the source of any criteria and justification. But this means that any effort at explanation, specifically the prevalent economic explanation of social life is not a discovery but a design. To understand this state of affairs we should offer a strict investigation of the constitution of economy and its relationship to power.

First, the economic reading of the socio-political fabric claims to be scientific. Science, by its own insistence, must give a true account of facts. Hence each domain of scientific discourse must obtain univocity. Yet what we find in the domain of economic explanations by nineteenth century are three theories of economic facts, each distinct from the other, and yet each claiming to be the sole “objective” reading of the economic data. This leads us to pose the Nietzschean question: if we have not discovered THE theory, if we have a diversity of contrasting and even contradictory theories, then it is plausible that the theories do not reflect reality but are designed for some other purpose, and that the economic mode of explanations serves other than economic interests. Such interests are an incrementation of power by way of economy.

Second, we have already noted that the very composition of modern ontology lends itself to a constant intervention in and incrementation of power over nature. Thus power is assumed at the outset as a given. Resultantly, every function, including the economic, is a means in the struggle for power. Indeed, while it is argued that economy fuels the drive of technical inventions and scientific break-throughs, it can be countered that both, technology and economy are inevitable tools for power. In this sense power is a more fundamental domain and can be regarded as an explanatory hypothesis of the functions of other domains.

Third, the economic explanation does not constitute total explanatory hypothesis, specifically with respect to the proponents of this hypothesis. It is claimed that the reflective domain is a mirror of the economic forces and interests; hence all thought, all theories and models, are reflections of these forces. But this would mean that the very theses presumed to be explanations of all events, should be included in the explanation and should constitute the mirroring of the precise economic setting of a
given time. But this would have to mean that there should be either one economic thesis mirroring the given period, or there should be various equally valid theses during a given period. The latter case could be argued to mean that since there are precise economic conditions for precisely delimited groups or individuals, then there should be numerous valid thesis. But in this sense, no thesis should be counted as THE all encompassing.

Fourth, the various economic theses also suggest a reflective domain that is free to design and hence transcend any economic determinants and hence to escape the economic hypothesis and explanation. This is obvious from the numerous revolutions, each promising a grand plan to solve the "economic" problems, and each providing "experts" that constitute a reflective domain, leading back to the previously discussed problems of political technocracy.

In the final analysis, all this technocratic expertise, the numerous revolutions, continuously create the nomadic life and hence colonialism.