Entangled in the Net? 
Would Scandals function under the Conditions of the Internet alone?

Johannes Ehrat SJ  
PhD, Prof. extraord.  
in Communication sciences 
Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Roma  
Piazza della Pilotta, 4–00187 Rome (Italy)  
Pro tempore: Wade Chair, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
1250 W. Wisconsin Ave. Milwaukee, WI 53233  
Tel.: +39 066701 5226  
E-mail: ehrat@unigre.it

Abstract. Using semiotic method of consideration the article investigates judgement power of public sphere in traditional media and internet. The analysis reminds that news stories obey the narrative rules. They become an object for judgement only in a mediation that allows present public opinion. At the same time because of mediation and in accordance with functioning of meta-texts these stories become subject of moralising sanction to their heroes. For mass media, the mediation function creates the parallel universe of the public sphere. The aim of the article is to find an answer whether there exists something in the internet which produces a similar public universe.

Theoretical argument lets to conclude that the tribunal of public opinion is not just a meaning apparatus; it also has to be narrated. That means, that the question of justice, of right or wrong, has to be turned into a pragmatic question of performance (how well?) and competence (by whom?). As publicity is only an idea, a meaning apparatus, for normative purposes need to hide behind narrative plausibility. As soon as actors are seen as pragmatic
subjects, they are subject to sanctioning. Actually, a source is the direct will of the judging instance, which in the public sphere is the hypostasis of ‘all’.

When internet lacks direct mediation instance, it is unable to turn information into narratives. Without public sphere produced by traditional media the internet lacks the meaning. Such stating together with the example of Wikileaks let to conclude that when there is no legitimisation of power, then, no realisation of the pragmatic subject, and in consequence – there is no scandal.

**Keywords:** common sense, industrial meaning, internet communication, judgement, meta-text, meaning, meaning constraint, moralising, narrative, power (meta-text 1), pragmatic subject (meta-text 2), publicity, public opinion, public sanctioning, scandal, theatre meaning.

**Introduction: Nature of Public Opinion**

“Nasser was killed by poison, Sadat by a bullet and Mubarak by Facebook”, – placard at Tahrir square (Slackman, 2011). Public opinion is not what public opinion research is researching according to French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1980). This is not just a problem of methodology, also in the sense of the intrinsic research artefacts Bourdieu mentions. Public opinion is simply another reality, which happens to share the same semantic with the object of the survey industry. Public opinion has no interest in your or my opinion. It is not the aggregate of individual opinions, abstracted statistically into one. It is of a different nature.

Public opinion developed historically, as well as differently in different political cultures (Baker 1990; Chalaby 1996). Nevertheless, it is a meaning that has in common a number of features:

1. Public opinion is judgemental. It is a tribunal before which every power is legitimised or delegitimised.
2. The judge is a mythical, not a numeric, instance of ‘all’. The verdicts acquire a quasi-normative force not because they are true; after all they are only opinion. Only because they are the opinion of ‘all’ they have the authority of a truth-substitute.
3. The media are not judging, they merely mediate between those who are allowed to act on the stage of the *theatrum mundi*, and those who are in a position to issue verdicts, but must not act. In other words, journalism is not only detached, it is also objective (that is, on the side of the objects).

Public opinion as complex meaning apparatus is a fundamentally spectacular meaning. It derives its logic from Theatre, as it is handed down in Greco-Roman-European culture since at least 600 B.C. This meaning pattern is as complex as it is deeply engrained. It consists of both, a distribution of essentially different roles and of a logic differentiation turned into spatial arrangement, topical meaning. In particular, the ‘all’-ness has been prefigured perfectly in Theatre because the Choros as judgemental role and instance is all (excepting the actors). Only in Classical times was the archaic unity of Choros and theai (public) further differentiated. The Choros and its leader, the koryphaeis, became mediating instances, clearly set off from actors.

This mediation is crucial for an understanding of the press because it creates and at the same time serves public opinion.

The question with the internet arises on this level of basic meaning production. The question to investigate and pursue, therefore, is whether internet communication meets this condition of mediation, or not.

**The Function of Mediation**

When people say “internet” they do not mean a technology, but what that gives rise to, that is to a multitude of communication uses. In this regard, it would be preposterous to fall into a sort of internet media essentialism. Newer television studies, in an analogous way, have criticised the older ‘aesthetic’ school for defining an essence of television, its aesthetic form. On the other hand, however, internet technology is not innocent. While we can use it for essentially the same function as a telephone, for instance, its technology offers much more. This surplus in usefulness is constantly monitored and then turned into commercial products. For all practical purposes, these products, email,
skype, P2P networks, and all browser-based offers, are the ‘internet’ for the user. Browser-based products such as Facebook and other personal social networks, as well as search engines like Google, have become an enormous success. What is of particular relevance here is the function that was once played by the information, advertising, and entertainment media. Youtube has not only practically replaced certain television uses, e.g., ‘reality TV,’ but it has also created new uses which broadcast media could not have dreamed would be possible.

For mass media, the mediation function created the parallel universe of the public sphere. I shall concern myself more precisely with the question of whether there exists something in the internet, which produces a similar public universe. In and from this public sphere the existence of scandals depends. In other words, scandals are a product of news stories and scandals need to be narrated (1) by an explaining source (2) for a judging tribunal. Recall the Greek theatre and the koryphaios figure, where the source is a source of meaning, modelled after the spectacular or theatre meaning, i.e., for judgement. It is not the pragmatic meaning of an actor on the logeion because this is the exclusive reserve of the spectaculum stage.

**The Role of Meta-texts**

Going deeper into the problematics, it is evident that the mass media are not just a circumscribed technology of mass diffusion. They have turned into an industry of meaning, with industrial meaning production practices. These practices already tell a foundational story. They are a meaning fixture that we can technically treat as text. While the topic of the text is, as it were, always the same, modelled after theatrical meaning, industrial meaning has narrowed this topic to two general tasks, which means it treats everything as an action like Theatre, but selects specifically two aspects of action:

1. Competence
2. Performance
A novel, or story, by contrast, would be much wider, for example, dwelling on motivation and character. Because these texts need no longer be told in news stories, they may be called meta-texts. They are told before we yearn for the morning newspaper, or feel the need for an update on the television evening news. They are the primordial pull-factors and as pre-confections of meaning in texts, they stand for ‘media technology,’ like Gestelle’ in German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s sense of technique.

In communication studies, most of what was described above is approached through ‘frame analysis’. As it will be argued, this method does not have enough explanatory power to grasp the full meaning process of scandal. I want to enlarge this concept to what may be called meta-text or meta-story, setting it off from the frames of Entman-type ‘frame analysis,’ a term borrowed originally from cognition science and its ‘frame theory.’ American sociologist Erving Goffman’s ‘frame analysis’ might also relate to what American media theorist Robert M. Entman describes as: “Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” (1993: 52)

This “fractured paradigm” is admittedly vague and imprecise (1993: 51). Frames, it may be argued, are too general and not specific enough for these industrial meaning practices. Frames are like sunglasses, which colour or distort, whereas meta-texts are much more specific, derived from a pragmatic logic.

It is the central mediation instance in the spectacular meaning, called public sphere or publicity, which imposes pragmatic logic by narrating, as in news stories. Therefore the lack of such an instance, as in the internet, could mean the end of this type of meaning: no legitimisation of power, what in this article is called meta-text 1, no realisation of the pragmatic subject meta-text 2, and in consequence no scandal.

Strictly and semiotically speaking, meta-texts are latent interpretations upstream of a narrated text. Meta-texts are the logical frame
of news stories. This interpreting must remain latent within the narrated, it must not take place there. Meta-texts thus become the test case and focal point for public opinion, where sanctions are enacted.

For semiotic, the continuous interpretation of one sign by another is one of the basics. However, meta-texts fix their meaning through convention, as social practice, so that it becomes highly recognizable, while appearing effortless, almost self-evident. Many social practices presume unconsciously. Social science calls these phenomena frame, or symbolic generalization. Here the focus will be turned to the two meta-texts found in the presently practiced publicity, in our cultures.

Meta-texts function more in the manner of American philosopher George Herbet Mead's Symbolically Generalised Media than as simple 'selections & saliences' with frames theory.

Systems’ theory, on the other hand, made the ‘medium’ the pivotal concept to their theorizing. But focusing on meta-texts this exaggerates their purchase, and easily inflates the term into functionalism.

It is indeed important to provide a semiotic equivalent to a ‘meaning constraint’ associated with systems theoretical media. In a certain way, every state of an epoch’s knowledge is a constraint, which became American semiotician Charles S. Peirce’s topic under the heading of Critical Commonsensism. Every common sense appears or pretends to know; even though, in hindsight, it may not have cognized correctly. This presupposes, however, that we have not done away with truth in cognition because then there would be no standpoint from which to criticize anything.

Common sense fixtures can certainly also derive from an ideology. In this case, values are fixed in a determinate manner of solving a problem of society. The solution ‘contains’ as it were many ideas or assumptions about society, about power in society, about its abuse, etc. Strictly speaking, these are not real general truths, but ideas of a whole. Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli, for example, changed the medieval idea of a just prince and a justice-based exercise of power into the modern version of an interest-based power. His ‘principe’ might be unjust or criminal, what counted was his success. His insights contrast
strongly with those of an enlightenmental Universal History, as German philosopher Friedriech Schiller conceived it, but are not more than contingent ruminations of an exiled Florentine. The contrary hope, by analogy, calling it democracy, where absolute power is absolutely checked and thus prevented from turning into abusive power, may be constructed for entertainment.

This common sense turns into a canonical narration with reality effect and emotional overtones. In other words, the Symbolically Generalised avails itself of the teleology of narration and turns this logic into the parallel universe of the public sphere.

Meta-texts are fixed both as genre conventions but also as a scaffolding of the industry of mass media meaning production. Upstream of any text, these meta-texts are a strong predetermination of downstream textual meaning. They can be discovered in those texts not as quotations, but as logical presuppositions. Symbolical generalization translates into this. Meta-text I is quintessentially realized in ‘investigative’ news stories. Journalism has come to consider this its royal discipline, intimated full of reverence and unanimously by industry practitioners, a pride passed on to consumers. Meta-text II is practiced more often and quintessentially in ‘soft news,’ or ‘lifestyle’ magazines. We should be aware, however, that none of these two basic models of press actually exists in its pure form. What we read and see on a day to day basis is always mixed together, for instance, as infotainment, as ‘human interest story,’ etc.

Meta-text, then, is tributary to two logical constraints:

1. The meaning apparatus of publicity or public sphere,
2. Narrativity

Both are upstream, and in that order. It was decisive that the history of public opinion assumed from its beginning, around 1750, the literary form of a pamphlet, and thus of stories (remontrances). Narrative logic alone is not enough to explain news stories. There have been attempts to overemphasise the import of this logic. Jewish scholar Itzhak Roeh even brought it into the neighbourhood of Schiller’s Universalgeschichte, the historiography from the viewpoint of achievements of the human spirit. Such attempts are not convincing (pace Roeh, 1989) and oversee
the difference of essence between publicity and history. The tribunal of public opinion is not just a meaning apparatus; it also has to be narrated. But how? The question of justice, of right or wrong, has to be turned into a pragmatic question of performance (how well?) and competence (by whom?).

This different currency of meaning, because it lacks a natural appeal, needs a strong convention in order to be readily applied. German sociologist Niklas Luhmann showed how topicalisation works: that public opinion has the capacity to impose something as a topic and so connects with other systems.

This is still too general. There is no doubt that media practices can claim topics as political agenda, issue framing (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Jacoby 2000), prime definers (Ferguson, 1990), spin doctoring, etc. For framing (putting into, and covering with, a frame) is in reality driven by a purpose. A purpose, however, is easily predestined to be changed into narrative telos. American sociologist of culture Joshua Gamson coined the term ‘Institutional Morality Tales’ (Gamson, 2001). Moralising, according to American historian Hayden White’s (1980) narrativistic theory of history, is inherent to narrativity as such. For publicity, though, the moral criterion is derived from sanctioning public’s judging over powerful actors.

Judgement and public sanctioning need not to be explicit. This can also be narrated as crisis of a societal institution. Such institution is then a kind of intermediate normativity, and as ‘institution for power checking’ it becomes the postulate of public opinion. “What is revealed in sex scandal discourse is not simply societal norms – sexual or other, institution-specific, or not – but also the institutional operations and relations of news media“ (Gamson, 2001: 187).

If we do not want to understand this moral institution solely in terms of a metaphor, it certainly needs to translate into something tangible. There is no such institution, in the formal sense, of course. There are only stories, and nothing – no formal authority, no tribunal – stands behind them. Publicity is only an idea, a meaning apparatus. This, however, does not amount to a reduction of news stories to the sole auctoritas in
the literal sense of the term to the author. A journalist is not a literary author. So upstream of the news story itself we clearly need a meaning constraint, tantamount to an institution. The news story develops not to literary or poetic rules, but rather obeys procedures of judgement as its prime purpose.

Narrative teleology is constrained into the normative determination of publicity, all that under the technically common denominator ‘purpose’. It is a logical mimicry. This is the reason why public opinion inevitably comes in the form of stories, news stories, and drama in the literal sense. For normative purposes need to hide behind narrative plausibility. Otherwise it would become apparent that the norms of public sphere do not have any authority, no logical necessity other than the truth-equivalent of being the opinion of ‘all’. This shaky foundation is shrouded from the news story itself. It is a higher story, a meta-story, or meta-text.

Methodologically there is an advantage to precipitate this logic into a layer of meaning separated from the news story layer. Then we can see that this is the truly canonical story, which is retold in the plethora of news. It is a very simple but compelling story of a tribunal over performance and competence. The re-designation of the narrative aim into juridical norm, of telos into jus, is taking place at this level. For telos, narrative ending, is getting utilized by and for an end, a higher end. The ‘frames’ of news frame analysis are too innocuous. They are oblivious of their DNA linking them to their descent from publicity; whereas meta-stories carry this DNA if not in their name, so at least in their determination and qualification. As stories they have narrative DNA, as meta – they indicate the higher end.

This ‘meta’ meaning stratum is the true fulcrum: it pries open the natural moralism of narrativity. This already reduces the finalistic temporality of a telos into a pragmatic one of human pursuit. Thus it is indeed mimesis praxeos and not the imitation of movement, of passing time. Now this pragmatic logic can be extended beyond its narrative bounds. It posits publicity as another praxis, whereas as such the public sphere is merely a mechanism to control whatever power. Such
mechanism contains no inherent telos, but rather holds something more like equilibrium, a permanent back and forth of particular interests. It is only the idea of a State having a reason, raison d’état, which originally subsisted in the acts of the Monarch, and this reason instils the one aim into the battle of the many aims of private interests.

Meta-texts relate to texts, and meta-stories relate to stories, in the manner of a grammatical subordination, or hypotaxis, as in subordinate clauses. Just as the meaning of a subordinate clause is modified by the superordinate clause, the news story is modified by the canonical meta-texts of judgement. In a meta-text I (‘power control’) everything that is done in the subordinate is granted, or deprived of, the right to act. For simplicity’s sake it may be called „legitimization of power“, because the opinion of ‘all’, equivalent to truth, vests actors with power. As soon as actors are seen as pragmatic subjects, they are subject to sanctioning. Meta-text II is therefore a different aspect. The Self needs to realise itself. In a philosophical perspective we might call it the ‘hedonistic meta-text’.

The two meta-texts are evidently complementary in their pragmatic logic. This is not by chance.

They control in different ways the two logically different areas of public opinion: the mandate (identity – meta-text II), and execution or performance (power – meta-text I). Both controls are always co-present in any public opinion text, but news stories can also emphasise only one of them. Different emphases might produce either an investigative plot with a compelling dramatic thread (‘faire faire’), or might lead to a celebrity story, wherein basically nothing happens except that the exemplary character of a star is displayed (‘faire être’).

Meta-text I is not merely canonical story, providing the meaning pattern and its outer limits. What is important in meta-texts is that they are both telling stories of judgement over an action. There is a meta-story subjecting a dependent story to a meaning constraint consisting of judgement and sanction. Thus it confines meaning as it compares, in judgement, this performance (of the dependent story). Judging always refers to a source of its value. This value is not so much a standardized,
ideal course of action. This would be no more than a canonical story, or a genre. Instead, source is the direct will of the judging instance, which in the public sphere is the hypostasis of ‘all’. What is the will of ‘all’, then, not as to its content, but as to its subject expression? We might as well ask: What is performance? The term per-form, in its etymology, hints at this will, because in its ‘furnish’ part it indicates a utility for some subject. There is a will and there is a result.

Volition binds a subject to its other, a vis-à-vis, where its will is objectively realized; the will of ‘all’, of public opinion, binds the actors on the stage of the theatrum mundi to their latent remit from ‘all’. The manner in which this is achieved is the establishment of narrative purpose for the action. On the news story level the overall purpose appears to come from nowhere, whereas the meta-story establishes explicitly what ‘all’ want.

‘Performance’, then, stands for the will over its object. The two poles in this vis-à-vis can, however, vary significantly, and to such a degree that the impact on meaning becomes obvious. Thus, the subject side can assume a quasi impersonal nature, the subject becoming robot-like. Or it can assume a purely relational subjectivity. If we qualify a subject as father or mother, its only nature is a relation to a child. These qualifying descriptions are so ubiquitous that we take them for granted. They serve as narrative shorthand for psychological motivation. Only when personal subjects lose their personal nature do we notice that ‘The Economy’, ‘Science’, ‘The Law’, and the like have a will, and in the narrative a kind of motivation.

The same applies to the (dependent) object side, which can also be impersonal and purely material. In that case the will impregnates dead, mostly physical, objects as in sheer manipulation. However, a will can also relate to a personal object, showering love upon it, as in the mother-child relation. In the case of publicity, the will of ‘all’ can very well target personal objects. An exemplary case is the fandom genre, where the competence or personal qualities of a star or celebrity are judged (positively). The performance of personal objects is judged in a similar way, assuming that ‘love’ or ‘hate’ have a narrative course of
action. Scandal is precisely this sort of hate or delusion of love, and we know that it comes in many shades. Of course it is also possible that an amateur public can express its will also on material objects, such as a Harley-Davidson magazine will test the performance of the newest model. This, however, is already bordering (slightly) perversity.

Of greater relevance for mass media than personalisation is de-personalisation. Under the purview of the judging will, first actors turn into institutions. While the perpetrator of a child sex abuse scandal might be in reality a single priest, it only takes little to judge The Church as an institution as the failing object. At a further level of de-personalisation institutions are seen and judged as ‘apparatuses’. This is also important for narratability, because it is certainly much more difficult to foist a complex psychological motivation on an apparatus. The secret police of dictatorial regimes is a case in point. Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck’s film ‘Das Leben der anderen’ (2006) treats the STASI apparatus exactly the opposite, personal way. When ‘seminary education’, however, is identified as the culprit of CSA, we engage in the apparatus thinking.

Conversely one can glorify, if this operates in a quite analogous way. Only, this time, paradigmatic figures of light and goodness are shown (in the Church, i.e., televangelists, popes) and thus acquire an outsize moral authority.

It is quite unusual for an actor to develop into being an actor. In the real social world subjects are what they are. As pragmatic subjects they simply do what corresponds to their person. The source of their action is in their will. Only when this source is situated in a separate, superordinate will, pragmatic subjects are not, but become subjects. So, for the public sphere, the normal pragmatic subjectivity relation is too simple: a subjective will infusing itself into an object by manipulating it. Such a simple model provides no space for judgement and sanction, which is the purpose of publicity. Only changing subjects can become roles in a teleological narrative programme.

If a Self needs to be realized, to become real, logically it starts as unreal, virtual. So the technical question is how a subject grows through
the narrative tribunal of publicity. It is an existence or a growth only in judgement. We might call it reputation, glamour, glory, condemnation, fall, demonization. Public narratives do not simply attribute subjectivity once and for all. It is through a persistent feed-back and bind to a judging will that subjectivity is acquired and defended. It is not identity: I am who I am, but alterity: I am whom you take me for.

The technique of making a subject real is nothing unheard of Russian formalist Vladimir Propp’s fairy tale functions provide the basic idea. Notably, these are functions of a literary taxonomy, even though Propp does not explain how ‘heroisations’ of exemplary figures originate from the narrating act. Also, George Herbert Mead makes us understand that the transformation of an I into a Self is a logical process of generalization.

Propp’s hint is important for an understanding of the becoming of pragmatic subjects. The public sphere provides the narrative purpose, or model, for a ‘successful life’ when it tells the stories of stars, celebrities, or moral monsters. This ‘exemplary relationship’ can again vary between two extremes. One is complete resistance, which is the case when a subject mirrors only itself and is impervious to other models. This Narcissus-like pattern is not really foreseen in dependent stories, because the verdict and sanction can only be drastically negative. Stubborn actors in this vein, who have a ‘backbone’, would have a short half-life. Among public Church actors, however, they still can be found as the ‘upright hierocrat’ responsible only to his own God. The opposite extreme, complete transitivity, is more at home in the media: as an example can be taken the relation of fandom to stardom, and of celebrity to the superordinate story of an ideal subject. Here stars or celebrities are already accomplished subjects, who have fully become what they should be.

**Concluding Example**

Could the absence of a direct mediation instance in the internet mean that it is no public sphere, that this type of meaning is lacking? No legitimisation of power, then, no realisation of the pragmatic subject,
and in consequence no scandal. The facts of the Wikileaks affair seem to confirm this assumption, deduced from the logic of the public sphere. It is not enough to dump an enormous amount of documents on some server and make it accessible on the internet. A database is not a story, even if the documents were in themselves stories or contained narratives. While ‘leaking’ is a nice metaphor of a broken container, in its public use it designates a completely different course of events. The ‘container’ is an organisation that attempts to contain its information, to turn it into secrets with restricted, privileged access. From the external view-point, from public opinion, these secrets can only be wrested from an unwilling owner. To this owner one supposes a motivation of hiding, of an interest in keeping something secret which can only be something evil. Only now does leaking become a noble action. This place of pride has been occupied strenuously by ‘investigative journalism’, the royal discipline of the trade. Leakers, who in the eyes of the organisation to which they belong are traitors, become heroes of honesty to the public. It is the public’s right to snoop into anything which by its very discovery becomes evil.

Wikileaks ‘leaked’ only because it made use of the services of the traditional media, of clear mediation instances. The leaker did not just make known documents in a database, but assumed the public role only by providing material for stories with judicative purpose. Only through this quasi-normative quasi-authority did the diplomatic papers of a very powerful state betray an evil intention of power abuse. Thus they were positioned as delegitimisation of power. Outside of this perspective, they are documents of excellent social and political analysis, with a view to being used as basis of intervention for the better (be that the own political or economic interest, or the interest of a more general norm or even human right). Here we see clearly the hidden hand of the first meta-text. It turned the Wikileaks documents into simple sources for news stories, and thus integrated them into the meaning apparatus of the tribunal of public opinion.

The very Australian editor Julian Assange, instead, became a celebrity and a moral monster. Here the second meta-text becomes judicative,
judging the performance of a pragmatic subject. Only in this public role-play did the character Assange receive the verdict of either a hero, or of a zero, failure of self-realisation as a human being. This ambivalence is normal and built into the public role as such.

References


Įsipainioję tinkle?
Ar skandalų kyla veikiant vien internete?

Johannes Ehrat SJ

Santrauka

Panaudojant semiotikos metodo instrumentarių straipsnyje analizuojama viešumo teisiamoji galia. Visuomenės nuomonės fenomenas lyginamas su choro funkcija antikiniame teatre – būtent šis „veikėjas“ įkūnijo tarpinko tarp aktorių (scenos pasaulio) ir publikos (kasdienybės pasaulio) vaidmenį. Medijavimas – reikšminga tradicinės žiniasklaidos savybė: medijuojant generuojamas reikšmės srautas sukuria vadinamąjį virtualią erdvinę, kurioje iš-
sakomi vertinimai. Daugiafunkcijas internetas panašus į įvairiabalsį antikinio teatro chorą. Vertinant naudos aspektu, akivaizdus interneto technologijos perteklius. Tačiau, ar internetas – medijuojantis atlikėjas? Straipsnyje ieškant atsakymo į šį klausimą analizuojama, kaip veikia žiniasklaidos reikšmės indus-

Pastebėtina, kad masinė komunikacija kaip reikšmės industrija yra ne vien technologija. Jei klasikos tekstuose kuriant reikšmę svarbu personažas ir motyvacija, žiniasklaidos istorijose prasmę generuoja veiksma (kompetencija ir atlikimas). Vertinamoji dimensija atsiranda metatekstuose, kurie laikomi žiniasklaidos reikšmių industrijos pagrindu ir yra fiksuotas konvencinis žan-

Teorinių darbų apie įrėminimą kritikos apžvalgoje pastebima, kad visuomenės nuomonė turi galią atskirą pasakymą paversti dienovarkės tema ir taip pavienę ištarmę įtraukti į reikšmės generavimo procesą. Tikslai kaip pragmatiško subjekto programos siekiniai greitai įgauna naratyvo formą. O viešumas be metatekstų visada lieka tik idėja, reikšmės aparatas. Todėl metateksto normimo tikslais būtinas tokis naratyvo efektas kaip gebėjimas įtikinti. Metatekstus įrašytos vertinimo normos paslėptos po pasakojimo skraiste.

Apibendrinant teigtina, kad kol viešosios erdvės veikėjai suvokiami kaip pragmatiški subjektai, toli jie yra vertinamieji objektai. Vertintojas yra šaltinio valia, kuri viešojoje erdvėje dangstosi visuomenės nuomonės – „visų“ bendro galvojimo – šydu. Tai viešoji erdvė pateikia naratyvinę skandalą programą ir tikslą, kai joje pasakojamos garsenybių ar moralinių pabaisų istorijos. Jei internetas neatveria viešosios medijinės erdvės, o funkcionuoja tik kaip duomenų saugykla ar informacijos saugojimo serveriai, neįmanoma galios legitimi-

Esminiai žodžiai: galia (metatekstas I), industrinė reikšmė, internetinė komunikacija, metatekstas, moralizavimas, naratyvas, originali reikšmė
(prasmė), pragmatiškas subjektas (metatekstas II), reikšmė, reikšmės apribojimai, sankcija, skandalas, sveikas protas, vertinimas, viešumas, visuomenės nuomonė.

About the author

Dr. Johannes Ehrat is professor of Semiotics and Philosophy of Communication at Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. He is also professor in Residence at Marquette University (USA). The German Jesuit, Professor Dr. Ehrat has written two science books: “Cinema and Semiotic: Peirce and Film Aesthetics, Narration, and Representation (Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication)” (2005) and “Power of Scandal: Semiotic and Pragmatic in Mass Media (Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication)” (2011).