BEING AND BECOMING IN NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA

Saulius Šileikis
Vilnius University

The article aims at analysing the semantics of Sanskrit verbs denoting being and becoming and their influence on the development of philosophical thinking, in particular the ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeśika. It is argued that in Sanskrit the durative aspect of the verb asti resulted in the development of the qualitative meaning of the present participle sat and the qualitative abstracts sattā and sattva. The process reached its peak in the concept sattva of Śāṅkhya philosophy. In Nyāya-Vaiśeśika sat preserved its durative existential meaning, and its derivatives sattā and astitva comprised the positive reality as universals. In the negative description of reality the verb bhavati and its derivative abhāva prevailed, and this fact conditioned the development of the dynamic and concrete conception of absence. As a consequence, Nyāya-Vaiśeśika created neither the universal concept of non-being nor the concept of empty space.

The texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeśika always challenged scientists to the interdisciplinary research linking philosophy, philology and logic. The core idea of the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika school was to provide the enumeration of entities and the means of the right knowledge, therefore, Nyāya-Vaiśeśika philosophy depends much on the Sanskrit language and its logical structure. As early as the beginning of the 20th century Faddegon underlined that the category system in Vaiśeśikasūtra “is closely connected with grammatical study”, however, this notice was taken into account only gradually. In most studies on Nyāya-Vaiśeśika the researchers preferred the systematic-functional approach to the philosophical texts and tried to reconstruct Nyāya-Vaiśeśika philosophy as a coherent conceptual system. In the recent years the hermeneutic approach and the reevaluation of the influence of cultural background and language on the philosophical thinking has refreshed Nyāya-Vaiśeśika investigations. In the latest studies by Halbfass and Lysenko more attention is paid to the historical development of philosophical concepts and philological analysis; Nyāya-Vaiśeśika is considered not as a closed system, but as a coherent part of the Indian intellectual discourse. In my methodology,

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1 Barend Faddegon, The Vaiśeśika-System, Amsterdam: Johannes Müller, 1918, 11.
I adhere to hermeneutic analysis of the philosophical texts and further I want to stress the importance of language for the development of philosophical thinking. In this article, I suggest that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concepts of being, becoming and non-being should be treated as a result of the development of the Sanskrit language. To prove the thesis, I will compare certain features of Sanskrit with the Greek language, thus trying to contextualize the Indian philosophical language in the IE linguistics.

Besides these philosophical studies, special attention to the relation between language and reality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was paid in the investigations on Navya-Nyāya logic. The works of Ingalls and Matilal are based on the assumption that although logic of Nyāya lacks certain features of Western formal logic (e.g., quantifiers) and has its own features (e.g., qualificand-qualifier relation), still Western logic and Indian logic are commeasurable and we can apply the first order predicate logic to its formalization. This assumption has been criticized by Nieuwendijk who insisted that the formal logic is too much committed to language while Navya-Nyāya logic tries to transcend language and "is intended to give an over-all theory of meaning within which a theory of meaning for human languages can be developed as a special case". The starting point of Nieuwendijk's theory is the assumption of Naiyāyikas that every guṇa is a non-repeatable entity. As ontologically jñāna belongs to the category of guṇa, Nieuwendijk insists that jñāna refers to a non-repeatable epistemic entity which itself has a meaning just as linguistic entities have. Inference is conceived in Nyāya logic as a succession of certain jñānas, therefore, the conclusion, i.e. recognition of vyāpti-relation (pervasion), depends not on the forms of expression, but on the circumstances of cognition. The language that is used in the inference has meaning in the contexts only. Nieuwendijk calls this kind of inference and language the situated inference and the semantically situated language. I think that Nieuwendijk's theory reveals an important feature of Naiyāyikas' epistemology and this theory can be applied to the interpretation of such context-dependent cognitions as the cognition of abhāva. As I will try to prove, the term abhāva for absence was chosen due to its correlation with a particular situation where abhāva is recognized.

The terms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that denote being and becoming are of IE origin, therefore, their semantics is determined by the IE means of expression. The PIE verb *es- 'to be' had several aspects of meaning which influenced the development of philosophical language in Greece and India. Most IE languages show that the PIE *es- had the primary existential

8 Ibid., 409.
concrete meaning ‘to be here, at hand’. This verb primarily indicated only the durative present, therefore in some languages it got the suppletive root *bheu-. The durative aspect of the root *es- is especially evident when we compare it with non-IE languages. For example, in Hebrew the verb hayah has the meanings ‘to happen, to occur, to become’ and a resultant meaning ‘to abide, to exist’. In Hebrew, durative ‘existence’ is a result of dynamic ‘becoming or occurring’, while the PIE root *es- had no such dynamic component. This lack of dynamics resulted in the fact that IE verb ‘to be’ got a qualificative meaning in its derivatives. By qualificative meaning I suppose the meaning that implies not only the fact that ‘something exists’ (this would be the existential meaning), but also that ‘something is correct; it is the way it should be’. In some IE languages, the present participle, besides verbal meaning ‘being’, got the adjectival meaning ‘true, real, good’. This qualificative meaning is especially reflected in Sanskrit sat ‘daseiend, vorhanden; wie Jmd. oder etwas sein sollte: recht, wirklich, gut’. Its feminine form satt ‘faithful wife’ and derivatives satya ‘true, good’ are evident examples of the qualificative meaning of sat. In Greek we also find traces of the development of qualificative meaning, but the Greek ἔων remained closer to the primary verbal meaning of existence and almost did not transform into adjectival usage. Among earlier authors, the qualificative meaning is found mainly in Herodotus who used ἔων as ‘true, right’. In contrast to Sanskrit, the Greek εἴμι did not produce derivatives with qualificative meaning. Although Brugmann suggested that ἔτεος, ἔτυμος ‘true’ and ὁσιος ‘pious’ are derived from the root *es-, this conjecture was rejected by Frisk. The early Greek language, preserving the primary ‘concrete’ existential meaning of εἴμι “to be at hand”, developed the meaning of participle ὄν by using it in the substantival construction. Thus τό ὄν got the

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12 Hdt. 1, 95; 1, 97; 1, 116; 1, 30; 9, 11.  
meaning 'what is at hand; resources'.

In Sanskrit, the qualificative meaning of *sat* influenced the conception of cosmogony. Asat, the contrariety of *sat*, was perceived not as an ontological but as a qualitative negation. According to the reconstruction of Ṛgvedic cosmogony in the works of Kuiper,17 in the first stage of cosmogony there was neither *sat* nor *asat*,18 then *asat* appeared and from it *sat* was born.19 After generation of *sat*, *asat* remained in the background until they would be unified in the highest heaven.20 In Ṛgveda, *sat* and *asat* do not exclude each other and their relationship is not contradictory. This relationship in Ṛgveda is called *bandhu* 'connection, relation, kinship'.21 *Sat* and *asat* are the coexistent forms of the world and their difference is qualitative: *sat* represents a more developed stage of the world, 'the world as it should be'.22

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\text{sad eva somayed agra āśīd ekam evādvitiyam} \backslash \text{tad dhaika āhur asad evadam agra āśīd ekam evādvitiyam} \backslash \text{tasād asata sad ajayati} \backslash \text{kutas tu khālu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovācā} \backslash \text{katham asata saj jāyeta} \backslash \text{sat tv eva somayed agra āśīd ekam evādvitiyam} \text{“In the beginning, my dear, there was}
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15 τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἔργου καὶ τὸν προσόντων τοῖς θεῖς “the money on hand (belonging) to the gods and also the money coming to them” (Inscr. Gr. I. ed. Minor 91.24).
18 nāsad āśin no sad āśīt tadānīṃ nāśi rajo no vyomā para yat “Then was not non-existent nor existent: there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it” (RV. 10, 129, 1).
19 devāṇām pārvye yuge 'sata sad ājāyata “Existent, in the earliest age of Gods, from non-existent sprang” (RV. 10, 72, 2).
20 asad evadam agra āśīt \tat sad āśīt \tat samabhavat \tat āḥdam nirvarvata “This world was non-being in the beginning, this [non-being] was being, it appeared, then developed an egg” (Chānd. 3, 19. 1. 3–6).
21 sato bandhum asati nir avindan bṛhi pratiṣṭayā kavyayo maniśā “Sages who searched with their heart’s thought discovered the existent’s kinship in the non-existent” (RV. 10, 129, 4).
22 tatāp. Br. 6, 1, 1, 1. Taitt. Br. 2, 2, 9, 1.
23 asad evadem agra āśīt \tat sad āśīt \tat samabhavat \tat āḥdam nirvarvata “This world was non-being in the beginning, this [non-being] was being, it appeared, then developed an egg” (Chānd. 3, 19. 1. 3–6).
only the existent, one only, without a second. Others say that in the beginning there was only the non-existent, one only, without a second; and from the non-existent the existent was born. But how could it be thus, my dear? he said, 'how could the existent be born of the non-existent? No, my dear, only the existent was in the beginning, one only, without a second' (Chāṇḍ. 6, 2, 1).

In this excerpt, the meaning of *sat* and *asat* differs from the earlier cited text (Chāṇḍ. 3, 19, 1, 3–6) where *sat* was used as a predicate. In Chāṇḍ. 6, 2, 1 *sat* and *asat* are used only in subject and object positions. Further, *sat* and *asat* have their own predicates ekam ‘one’ and advitiyam ‘without other’, so it is evident that here *sat* and *asat* are used not as participles, but as substantives. Although participles with a qualificative meaning could be regarded as stages of the same substratum (world, Brahma), the substantives *sat* and *asat* were parted by negation ontologically. This text shows that the substantivation of *sat* and *asat* led to their incompatibility.

The substantival and qualificative meanings of *sat* were integrated in Chāṇḍogya Upaniṣad by developing an influential teaching of being (*sadvidya*), based on the absolute primacy of *sat*. The cosmogony from *sat* is described by a metaphor of the root and offshoot. *Sat* is called mūla ‘root’, āyatana ‘place, home’ and pratiṣṭhā ‘support, foundation’. Everything is completely dependent on and resides in *sat*. In this metaphor *sat* is used both in the substantival and qualificative meaning. *Sat* is understood as a foundation of everything and also it permeates into everything and imparts the quality of *sat*.

The cosmogenies in Rgveda and Upaniṣads also influenced the development of the two main theories of causation in Indian philosophy: *satkārya-vāda* (according to the theory, the effect (kārya) is existent (*sat*) in the cause) and *asatkārya-vāda* (according to the theory, the effect is non-existent (*asat*) in the cause). There were two main conditions that facilitated the influence of early cosmogenies on the philosophical thinking. First of all, the common focus of attention in the mentioned cosmogenies and the causal theories is the matter out of which something is produced. Bhartṛiya maintains that it was a common feature of all Indian thinkers to treat the material cause as the main cause, although they accepted the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) as well. Both *satkārya-vāda* and *asatkārya-vāda* treated the cause as material. On the other hand, the cosmogonic query for the primary *sat* or *asat* was reinterpreted in the terms of the cyclical framework of time. In this framework, the origin and destruction of the world are recurrent events, therefore, as Halbfass puts it, “the old mythical question: What was all this in the beginning? is translated into the question: What is it, in the ultimate analysis?” In this reinterpretation the analysis of the present was substituted for the reconstruction of the past. Due to this change the participle *sat* partially regained the existential meaning, which had been lessened by the qualificative meaning in the Rgvedic

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25 Chāṇḍ. 6, 8, 4.

26 Mahesh Chandra Bhartṛiya, *Causation in Indian Philosophy (with Special Reference to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika)*, Ghaziabad: Vimal Prakashan, 1973, 27.

usage. In the following I will try to compare the usage of *sat* and its derivatives in the texts of two *darśanas*: Śāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The main proponents of *satkārya-vāda* were the Śāṃkhya school who inherited *sadvidya* arguments on the primacy of *sat*. In defence of the thesis, Īśvaraκṛṣṇa in *Śāṃkhya-kārikā* adduces the following argument:

> asadakarānaṁ upādāna-graha-vāḥ sarva-sambhavābhāvaḥ √aktasya śākyā-karanāṁ kāraṇa-bhāva-vac ca *sat-kāryam* “The effect subsists, for that which is non-existent cannot be produced, and effects come from appropriate causes. Everything is not by any means possible, as capable causes produce only what they can and the effect is of the same nature as the cause” (SK. 9).

While the four arguments in this statement deal with the observational facts, the fifth argument reveals the relationship between cause and effect. Literally, *kāraṇa-bhāva-vat* means “because of the nature of the cause”. It is maintained that the essence of the effect cannot differ from that of the cause. The conception of *sat* as the essence resembles much the Upaniṣadic *sadvidya*. Although in the whole argument of Īśvaraκṛṣṇa *sat* is used in an existential rather than in a qualitative meaning, in the Śāṃkhya system the qualitative conception of *sat* prevails. This tendency is especially evident in the usage of the derivative *sattva*. In the Śāṃkhya system, *sattva* is one of three properties (*guna*) of the manifested (*vyakta*). *Sattva* itself has qualities: it is considered to be buoyant (*laghu*) and luminous (*prakāśakam*). The qualitative character of *sattva* is also manifested by the fact that it is a scalable quality. These features of *sattva* show that *sattva* has lost any connection with the existential meaning of *sat*.

The way of coining abstracts in Sanskrit enhanced the qualitative usage of *sat*. The common way of creating an abstract is Sanskrit was by adding a substantive suffix *-tva* (*-ta*) which indicates the quality of the underlying word. An important feature of this derivative process is in the fact that all the underlying words are treated as adjectives, despite their formal characteristics: “Let us call a term an ‘adjective’ if it is possible to abstract a property or *dharma* from it by the usual substantive suffixes *-tva* or *-ta* (‘-ness’, ‘-ity’) or by using such phrases as ‘the property of being such and such’. Thus, even terms like ‘man’ or ‘pot’

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29 SK. 11.

30 SK. 13.

31 “Intellect (buddhi) is for ascertainment. Virtue, wisdom, dispassion and lordliness are its faculties when goodness (sattva) predominates, and the reverse is true when darkness (tamas) predominates” (SK. 23).

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will be called adjectives under this convention”. The Sanskrit language permitted to treat ‘pot’ as a locus (āśraya) where ‘potness’ resides. This way of abstraction was quite contrary to the Greek way of abstraction. Instead of extracting the essential property of a noun, Greeks substantivized adjectives and participles by adding the definite article. In Sanskrit, abstracts are properties which reside in certain loci, while in Greek all abstracts are ‘objects’. The Greek substantivation enabled the philosophers to speak of qualities as things, and we find such treatment in Anaxagoras’ fragment: “the mixture of all things, the wet, the dry, the hot, the cold, the bright, the dark, since there was much earth in it and an infinite number of seeds”. Contrary to the Greek properties-objects, the Indian properties-abstracts are dependent on the locus in which they reside. Similarly to the substantivized adjectives, the Greek participle with the definite article was recognized as an object per se, while the Sanskrit abstracts sattva and sattā were considered as properties of sat.

Although Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika used similar words (sattva and sattā) to denote being, their meaning differed. In the language of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, sat and sattā preserved more the durative existential meaning and accepted less qualitative meaning. A better articulation of being was provided by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s opposition to satkārya-vāda of Sāṃkhya. Instead of considering the world as a gradual evolution of prakṛti, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assumed the plurality of entities which come into being and perish. Therefore, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sensed better the difference between being and non-being.

In Vaiśeṣikasūtra, there are three words that denote being: sat, sattā and bhāva. The latter is derived from the verb bhavati ‘to become, to be (as a result of coming into being)’ and denotes ‘coming into being, being’. Bhāva in the Vaiśeṣika system is a universal (sāmānya) which does not differentiate among the entities. Bhāva is a recurring universal attached to every sat.

Besides bhāva, Kaṇāda also uses sattā, which is formally equivalent to Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s sattva. The main difference between Kaṇāda’s sattā and Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s sattva is that sattā is a non-scalable quality. Sattā is described as something different from dravya, guna and karman. Due to the presence of sattā one can say that a substance, quality or action is sat. Praśastapāda in Padārthakharmasamgraha identifies sattā with Kaṇāda’s bhāva and calls it

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33 Matilal, The Nava-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, 33–34.
35 ὡ κάθεπται ὁμοίως πάντως χρημάτων, τού τε διερού καὶ τοῦ ἔρημο καὶ τοῦ ἂρημο καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ, καὶ γῆς πολλῆς ἐνεύοσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἄπειρων πλήθος (59 DK B 4, 33–37).
36 VS. 1.2.4.
37 VS. 1.2.17.
38 dravyagunakarmabhyo 'rthaṅkaram sattā (VS. 1.2.8).
39 sad iti yato dravyagunakamasu sa sattā (VS. 1.2.7).
'the higher universality'. This usage of sattā as a non-scalable property shows that sat in the Vaiśeṣika school was perceived in the existential rather than in qualificative the sense.

Although Praśastapāda identified sattā with Kanāda's bhāva and this identification was taken for granted in the later Vaiśeṣika tradition, in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra this synonymy is not absolute. Halbfass suggested that these terms probably reflected different sources of Vaiśeṣika ontology. In order to understand the meaning of the words, we should not neglect the fact that in Vaiśeṣikasūtra these terms have correlates: sattā is related to sat and asat, while bhāva correlates with abhāva. In Kanāda’s vocabulary, the usage of (a)bhāva prevails over the usage of (a)sattā with the ratio 83 to 28. The frequent usage of (a)bhāva resulted from Kanāda’s way of reasoning. In most cases Kanāda uses (a)bhāva in ablative or locative ‘because of (non)existence (of something)’ and draws a certain conclusion. Sat is not used in ablative to denote a logical cause, it appears only in locative three times in the same construction, sāti sannikarse + Gen. ‘when there is a close contact (of something with something)’. yet in this case it denotes circumstance rather than cause. Sat and asat either occur in the sentences without a cause–consequence structure or appear only in the consequence as a predicative participle or substantive. Does this usage imply the semantic difference between (a)sat and (a)bhāva? In my opinion, the usage of (a)bhāva as a cause is probably related to its primary meaning ‘(non)appearance, (non)manifestation’. In this case, (a)bhāva is a particular act of being or manifestation that serves to draw a certain conclusion. On the contrary, (a)sat preserves its durative meaning, therefore, it is more convenient to use it in general statements. It was quite logical that in Padārthadharmasamgraha sattā, was substituted for bhāva as a higher universality. But since sattā was applicable only to the three categories (dravya, guna and karman) Praśastapāda had to describe the ontological status of the other three categories (sāmānya, višeṣa and samavēya). Here he also resorted to the verb asti and derived the abstract astitva as the highest universality. Although it is difficult to define the difference between sattā and astitva, it can be assumed that astitva means a more general being. As Praśastapāda ascribes to all the six categories not only astitva, but also jñeyatva ("knowability") and abhidheyatva ("nameability"), I think that Halbfass rightly interprets astitva relating it with the enumeration of the world: "astitva can be applied to anything that is

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40 tatra param sattā mahāvisayatvāt sā cānuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva “Existence is higher universality for it belongs to the largest number of things and is a cause of extensive intellection” (PDhS. 2.2(21)).
41 Halbfass. On Being and What There Is. 142.
42 VS. 2.1.15; 2.2.1; 3.2.6.
43 E. g., kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvād asat “[an effect is antecedently] non-existent, inasmuch as there is non-existence of actions and qualities” (Kaṭ 9.1). asati cābhāvāt “there is non-existence [of exaltation] when [eating of pure food] does not exist” (Kaṭ 6.2.11). Other examples of thematic usage of asat “absence” are VS. 9. 1–7.
44 PDhS. 2.3(17).
45 PDhS. 2.3(16)
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an enumerable and classifiable ingredient of the world, including reality itself". It can be assumed that astitva describes what has its identity in the most general sense of being.

Although Praśastapāda used the verb asti and its derivatives to denote general being, in Kanāda's usage of (a)bhāva and (a)sat one can see an attempt to unify 'becoming' and 'being' and to treat both words as synonyms. This is evident in his thematic usage of abhāva and asat as 'absences'. In Vaiśeṣikasutra's first adhyāya of the ninth book Kanāda exposed his theory of four varieties of absences. He argued in favour of asatkāryavāda on the basis that one cannot ascribe actions and qualities to an effect before it comes into existence. In this statement he uses asat as a predicate to kārya, while in 9.7 he also speaks about prior non-existence and uses abhāva as a term to antecedent non-existence. Here we may see the primary meaning of abhāva as 'non-appearance, non-manifestation'. However, Kanāda tried to assimilate abhāva with asat, therefore he maintains that "Is not (nāsti) designates nothing else but what has not come into being (abhāta)" (VS. 9.9).

Although Kanāda accepted the synonymy of abhāva and asat, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors were not so consistent in the assimilation of the two terms. Gotama in Nyāyasūtra uses asat to refer to a thing which hasn't come into being, yet we can establish it by our understanding (buddhisiddham) (NS. 4.1.49). But to him the terminus technicus of absence is abhāva which he understands as an absence of a mark (lakṣaṇa) that marks out an object from the objects that have this mark (NS. 2.2.8). As a mark always belongs to a certain object, so abhāva is also related to a particular object. Matilal underlines that it was the common assumption of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to treat absence only as the absence of something. Also in epistemology Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejected the opinion that abhāva is a special means of right knowledge (prāmāṇya) and considered it to be an inference (anumāna). Therefore, one can be aware of absence only after analysis of a certain situation and only of a particular object. I think this close relation between absence and its counterpart (pratītyogin) explains why Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika chose abhāva rather than asat as the terminus technicus for absence. Abhāva in non-thematic usage always described a condition of something, so its philosophical usage did not essentially modify its meaning. On the other hand, abhāva had a dynamic, while asat had a durative aspect of meaning, therefore abhāva could better render the meaning of prior absence (prāgābhāva) and posterior absence (dhvamsābhāva).

The semantics of the termini technici influenced the conception of reality in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The positive description of the world was unified under sattā and astitva, while the negative conception of reality was split into on infinite number of abhāvas. The multiplicity

46 Halbfass, On Being and What There Is, 144.
47 VS. 9.1.
48 tathābhāve bhāvapratyakṣaḥṣatvāc ca "likewise in the [case of antecedent] non-existence, [the perception that a thing is existent results ] from perception of existence" (VS. 9.9).
49 Matilal, The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation, 52.
50 NS. 2.2.1. PDhs. 8.12.2.2.A(225.14)
and reality of abhāvas prevented the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas from creating the absolute conception of negation, comparable to the Greek τὸ μὴ ὁν. In Greek philosophy, absolute negation was a starting point for creating the concept of empty space. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika such a concept was not perceived. This is clearly seen in Gaṅgeśa’s, founder’s of Navya-Nyāya, treatise Tattvacintāmaṇi. The first part of this treatise is titled Abhāvavāda and is dedicated to the discussion of abhāva. In the discussion of Naiyāyika with an opponent, the sentence bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti “there is no pot on the ground” is analysed. According to Naiyāyikas, the sentence denoted a substratum–superstratum relation between the absence of the pot and the ground (ādhrādheyabhāva).51 The objector contradicts Naiyāyika and insists that in this case there is no such relation but only the ground.52 What remains ‘unnoticed’ in this discussion is the empty space left by the removed pot.

Being unable to create the concept of space out of the absence, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika developed positive concepts to denote the container or place of the things. There were two main concepts, ākāśa and diś, pretending to denote space. However, neither of the concepts developed into a homogeneous space. Ākāśa was conceived as an all-pervading substance which bears sound as its guṇa.53 Ākāśa preserved its physical characteristic, therefore, as Lysenko puts it, for Vaiśeṣikas “ākāśa is not an emptiness (empty room) suggestive of some motion, either mechanical or mental, but rather a ‘fullness,’ because it fills up the universe”.54 The concept diś was related to spatial localization of things. According to Kaṇāda, diś is inferred from statements like “this [is remote, etc.] from this”.55 In a similar way Praśastapāda originates from diś the notion of quarters of space.56 Yet this function of relating things is the only function of diś. The characteristics of size (parimāṇa) and distance (being prior to paratva and posterior to aparatva) are regarded as qualities of things57 and diś doesn’t account for the qualities. It is evident that the positive concepts ākāśa and diś vaguely resembled the concept of space: ākāśa functioned as a container of things, while diś accounted for the positional relations. I think that the multiplicity of abhāvas was the reason for the inability of Vaiśeṣikas to develop one negative conception of reality.

To summarize, the main features of the Sanskrit verb asti and its derivatives were to convey the durative and the qualitative meanings. The qualitative meaning was enhanced by the coining of abstracts with the suffix -tva (-tā), and this meaning prevailed in Sāṁkhya philosophy. In the texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the derivatives from asti to a greater extent preserved the durative existential meaning that led to a universal conception of being. As asti
lacked the dynamic content, it was complemented by the derivatives of *bhavati*, but only in a negative description of reality. This led to a non-unified conception of negative reality or non-being.

**Abbreviations:**


**BŪTIS IR ATSIRADIMAS NJAJOS-VAIŠEŠIKOS FILOSOFIJOJE**

**Saulius Šileikis**

**Santrauka**


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