https://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/gateway/plugin/WebFeedGatewayPlugin/atomActa Orientalia Vilnensia2020-09-18T09:00:13+00:00Audrius Beinoriusaudrius.beinorius@fsf.vu.ltOpen Journal Systems<p>Founded in 2000, published in English and dedicated to publishing empirical, theoretical and historical studies of the regions of the Indian Subcontinent, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Far East and Southeast Asia.</p>https://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/1096Godzilla and the Japanese after World War II: From a scapegoat of the Americans to a saviour of the Japanese2020-09-18T09:00:13+00:00Yoshiko Ikeda
<p>[full article and abstract in English]</p> <p>This paper examines how five Godzilla films illuminate the complicated relationship between Japan and the United States over the use of nuclear weapons. The United States dropped the first atomic bombs on Japan and created the first nuclear monster film, The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms (1953), which inspired the Godzilla series. The popularity of these Godzilla films derives from skilfully grappling with the political, social and cultural problems created by the use of nuclear weapons and science/technology, both inside Japan and in relations between Japan and the United States. This paper takes a historical perspective and shows how the Godzilla characters reflect these attitudes across time, moving from a scapegoat for the Americans to a saviour of the Japanese.</p>
2011-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) https://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3653In memoriam Linnart Mäll2020-06-18T09:11:18+00:00Märt LÄÄNEMETS
<p>Tartu University</p> <p>No one departs this world without leaving a trace. Every person or creature leaves behind a trace that is distinctive in terms of visibility, extent and influence. That trace may be ploughed into the soil of a field or carved in history by stone or the sword. It may, however, also at first glance be less noticeable but more influential than that recorded by plough, stone or sword—that is the case when the trace a person leaves is in the area of culture.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3654Books Reviews2020-06-18T09:10:47+00:00Valdas JaskūnasLeonid Kulikov
<p><strong>Heidrun Brückner, Gabriele Zeller (hrsg.), Otto Böhtlingk an Rudolf Roth</strong>: Briefe zum Petersburger Wörterbuch 1852–1885, bearbeitet von Agnes Stache-Weiske, Glasenapp-Stiftung 45, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008, pp. xxii+870. ISBN 978-3-447-05641-0 / 3-447-05641-X (hbk), € 98.00</p> <p><strong>Felix Otter.</strong> Residential Architecture in Bhoja’s Samarāṅgaṇasūtradhāra: introduction, text, translation and notes, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2010, pp. xi+299. ISBN 978-81-208-3447-7</p> <p> </p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3655Mimesis: Some reflections on bodhicitta verses in the second chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra2020-06-18T09:10:15+00:00Vladimir Korobov
<p>Vilnius University</p><p><br />Although the ultimate bodhicitta functions within a non-dual model of cognition where oppositions (good and evil, pure and impure, saṃsāra–nirvāṇa, etc.) do not exist, it is traditionally considered to be the wisdom cognising emptiness. In this paper I will try to explore the cognitive nature of the ultimate bodhicitta to answer the question ‘What kind of cognition is the cognising of emptiness?’ In the paper I also will make an attempt to describe the basics of ambivalent Tantric ethics in terms of the phenomenological category of imitation or mimesis. Verses on the ultimate bodhicitta in the second chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra are a subject of commentaries written by various Tibetan and Indian authors. The paper is supplemented with a translation of Bodhicittabhāvanā written by Ācārya Kamalaśīla. This short text is a commentary on verses proclaimed by Tathagāgata Vairocana in the second chapter of Guhyasamājatantra.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3656Candrakīrti’s theory of perception: A case for non-foundationalist epistemology in Madhyamaka2020-06-18T09:09:44+00:00Sonam Thakchoe
<p>University of Tasmania</p><p><br />Some argue that Candrakīrti is committed to rejecting all theories of perception in virtue of the rejection of the foundationalisms of the Nyāya and the Pramāṇika. Others argue that Candrakīrti endorses the Nyāya theory of perception. In this paper, I will propose an alternative non-foundationalist theory of perception for Candrakīriti. I will show that Candrakrti’s works provide us sufficient evidence to defend a typical Prāsagika’s account of perception that, I argue, complements his core non-foundationalist ontology.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3657Actuality and potentiality in Dignāga’s understanding of immediate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) according to his Pramāṇasamuccaya and Ālambanaparīkṣā2020-06-18T09:09:12+00:00Viktoria Lysenko
<p>Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences</p><p><br />On the one hand, Dignāga supposes in his Pramāṇasamuccaya (part 1) that immediate perceptual experience at every given moment has as its object something that never goes beyond its own actually present content and thus may characterise only itself (svalakṣaṇa). In that respect, svalakṣaṇa appears as a kind of mere presence, sheer momentary actuality. It cannot undergo any external influence or exercise its own influence on other svalakṣaṇas. In other words, it cannot be extended to things other than itself, as is the case of mental constructions. First, I would like to ask whether there is a potentiality in the act of immediate perception according to the Pramāṇasamuccaya. On the other hand, in the Ālambanaparīkṣā, cognition is an entirely interior process manifests itself as a sense organ to an internal cognisable form. Second, I would like to dwell on the question concerning whether an immediate perception of svalakṣaṇas, free from mental constructions, is still possible in the Ālambanaparīkṣā.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3658Sa skya Paṇḍita on the defining characteristic and variegation of direct perception (based on his Tshad ma rigs gter with his auto-commentary and Go-rams pa’s sub-commentary providing contextual and subtextual clarification)2020-06-18T09:08:40+00:00Bruce J. Stewart
<p>Independent scholar</p><p><br />The present study focuses on the defining characteristic and variegation of direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) as laid out by Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’ rgyal-mtshan (1182–1251) in the first eight verses of the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter in his Tshad-ma rigs pa’i gter. As is well known, direct perception along with inference (rjes dpag, anumāna) make up the two means of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) according the Buddhist system of epistemology initiated by the renowned Buddhist philosopher Dignāga (circa 480–540) and expanded and further developed by his indirect follower Dharmakīrti (mid-7th century). Each of these means of valid cognition<br />is restricted to its respective objects (prameya, gzhal bya); the specifically characterised object (rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa) is the object of a direct perception and the generally characterised object (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) is the object for an inference.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3659Śāntarakṣita on veridical perception2020-06-18T09:08:09+00:00Marie Louise Friquegnon
<p>William Paterson University</p><p><br />Śāntarakṣita, an 8th century Indian Buddhist philosopher, united the Cittamātra and the Madhyamaka views into a single system. Consistently following Nāgārjuna, from the point of view of absolute reality he proclaimed all things to be empty and beyond conception. From the point of view of the conventional, he stated that we should understand everything as awareness. Nevertheless, when analysing Cittamātra views on perception, he found them all to be inadequate. Buddhism is usually described as based on two pillars, direct experience and inference. Given Śāntarakṣita’s sharp critique of the veracity of perception, upon which inductive premises are based, how are we to make sense of knowledge on the conventional level? I will attempt to answer this question through an analysis of the ideas of the 11th century philosopher Rongzom and the 19th century philosopher<br />Mipham. I will also show the relevance of Śāntarakṣita’s critique of perception today, by comparing it with contemporary Western cognitive science.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Presshttps://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3660The authority of the Buddha: The limits of knowledge in medieval Indian Buddhist epistemology2020-06-18T09:07:39+00:00Richard Payne
<p>Institute of Buddhist Studies at the Graduate Theological Union</p><p><br />The Indian religious traditions, including Buddhism, are generally characterised by an understanding of the problematic character of the human condition as ignorance (avidya) instead of sin, as in Christianity.1 The centrality of ignorance in defining the problematic character of the human condition creates a dramatically different religious dynamic—a religious dynamic that is fundamentally concerned with epistemological issues rather than with moral ones. In Indian discussions of the limits of religious knowledge, the shared intellectual framework was the idea of means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). While other religio-philosophic traditions in India accepted testimony (śabda) as an autonomous (i.e., irreducible) means of valid knowledge, Buddhist epistemologists rejected it. Having rejected the idea that testimony is an autonomous means of valid knowledge (śabdapramāṇa), an alternative explanation for the authority of the Buddha had to be created. Against this background of epistemological discussion, particular attention is given here to Dharmakīrti’s views on the authority of the Buddha as a means of valid knowledge regarding the ground of human existence, the path of religious practice, and the goal of awakening.</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) https://www.journals.vu.lt/acta-orientalia-vilnensia/article/view/3661Introduction: Towards the understanding of the role of cognition in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism2020-06-18T09:07:07+00:00Vladimir Korobov
<p>SPECIAL THEME: THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS OF THE BUDDHA-MIND: STRATEGIES OF COGNITION IN INDO-TIBETAN BUDDHISM</p>
2010-01-01T00:00:00+00:00Copyright (c) 2010 Vilniaus universiteto leidykla / Vilnius University Press