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REFERENCES TO ISOCRATES IN ARISTOTLE'S
*ART OF RHETORIC*¹

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The connection between Isocrates and Aristotle, two outstanding educators and rhetorical theorists of the 4th century BCE Athens, is a matter of interesting long-lasting discussion dating back to Greco-Roman antiquity. There is an opinion, based on doxography and anecdotes (cf. Philodemus II, 50, 21 (Sudhaus), Cic. *De oratore* III, 141, Quintilianus III, 1, 13–14), that Aristotle, after he had arrived to Athens in circa 367 BCE, first attended the school of Isocrates, but later, under the priority of stylistics, moved to Academy and started his pedagogical career by giving public lectures on rhetoric; on the basis of these lectures the dialogue *Gryllus* (ca. 362 BCE, now lost) emerged, in which he supposedly attacked Isocrates². About ten years later (ca. 350 BCE), Aristotle wrote *Protrepticus* in defense of the Academic concept of philosophy as a response to the Isocratean view presented in *Antidosis*³. Biographical data recorded in ancient

sources testify their competitive rivalry and perhaps certain enmity to each other⁴. The latter assumption occupies even more attention in recent studies of early Greek rhetoric and education, focusing on the similarities and dissimilarities between educational programs, ethical and political views, attitude towards rhetoric and theory of style⁵. Both of them are credited origi-

1863), 116 sqq.; Anton-Hermann Chroust, “A brief account of the reconstruction of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*”, *Classical Philology*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1965 (October), 229, 238 n. 42; Brad McAdon, “Reconsidering the intention or Purpose of Aristotle’s Rhetoric”, *Rhetoric Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2004, 220, 227. A more detailed comparison of the two works (*Protrepticus* and *Antidosis*) is presented by Doug S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson in their document intended as a component of the forthcoming edition of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* “The *Antidosis* of Isocrates and Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*” published in the web: http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=0B432Ae6vnCJNZDU5OTMxZjQtZjkyZS00Y2RmLTlhINDUjZTE2YTFjZDgxMmY1&hl=en_US

⁴ Beside the Aristotelian dictum “it is shameful to be silent, while allowing Isocrates to speak”, there is one more frequently cited evidence concerning their rivalry in Numenius’ fragment (fr. 25 Places; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* XIV, 6, 9–10) which mentions Cephisodorus, a student of Isocrates, who made an attempt to attack Aristotle for his critique towards Isocrates, but instead attacked Plato with whom he didn’t wish to quarrel at all.

⁵ The early stage of the research of the dichotomy of the Isocratean and Aristotelian rhetorical tradition is briefly reflected in Friedrich Solmsen’s several times reissued article “The Aristotelian tradition in ancient rhetoric” (first published in *American Journal of Phi-*

¹ The article is prepared on the basis of my paper presented at the international workshop “Translating and interpreting Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*”, held on April 28–29, 2011 at University of Tartu.

² See, e.g., Keith V. Erickson, “The lost rhetorics of Aristotle”, *Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric*, ed. Richard Leo Enos and Lois Peters Agnew, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998, 3–6.

³ Jakob Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältniss zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin,

ality: Isocrates, for instance, for connecting rhetoric with ethics, emphasizing a well educated personality able to make proper decisions and contribute to the prosperity of the state (his idea that good speech reflects good soul later was picked up by Cicero and Quintilian)⁶, and Aristotle for paralleling rhetoric with dialectics, for emphasizing argument; for him, rhetoric is a counterpart and necessary completion of dialectics, which is “mostly absent in ordinary human communication”⁷. However,

logy 62 (1941) 35–50 and 169–190; our access to it was secured due to a photo-copy from the collection of articles *Landmark Essays on Aristotelian Rhetoric*, eds. Richard Leo Enos and Lois Peters Agnew, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998; I am very grateful to Dr. Janne Lindqvist-Grinde for lending this book). This trend of research based on the comparison of the two rhetorical traditions has recently intensified, especially since the last decade of the 20th century, when a number of American scholars concentrated on Isocrates, not Aristotle, as a focal figure and “a whetstone for our own reflections on contemporary humanistic education and its relation to the theme of civic virtue” (David Depew and Takis Poulakos, “Introduction”, *Isocrates and Civic Education*, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2004, 2). Articles by David Depew (“The inscription of Isocrates into Aristotle’s practical philosophy”, 157–185) and Eugene Garver (“Philosophy, rhetoric, and civic education in Aristotle and Isocrates”, 186–213) from the just mentioned book constitute a good introductory basis for the further study of the convergence and divergence of the views of the two Athenian thinkers.

⁶ Cf. George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C. – 300 A.D.*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972, 509 sqq.; Joy Connolly, “The new world order: Greek Rhetoric in Rome”, *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, 158.

⁷ Cf. Samuel Ijsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict: A Historical Survey*, (translated from Dutch by Paul Dunphy), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, 29. According to Eugene Garver, Aristotle “claims originality for his rhetoric’s emphasis on argument”; moreover, “Aristotle’s originality in the *rhetorics* extends to making deliberation the center, and therefore to the idea of rhetoric as *civic activity*” (cf. Eugene Garver, *Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, 45–46).

in his rhetorical theory, Aristotle inevitably makes use of inventions of previous rhetoricians, not excluding Isocrates. The same (the just mentioned reliance upon earlier authors) is true about Isocrates. However, the attitude of these two thinkers towards each other’s literary production is still relatively little explored. Therefore, the question follows: how much did Aristotle depend on Isocratean rhetoric and Isocrates on Platonic-Aristotelian dialectics?⁸ The purpose of the following discussion is not to answer this complex question; instead, it will contribute only to the first half of the question, dealing with the aspects of Isocratean quotations in the Aristotelian theory of eloquence as it is read in the three books of his *Art of Rhetoric*.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOPIC BY OTHER RESEARCHERS

Our research has been stimulated by several recent studies on the connection between the two teachers of rhetoric and their opposition. Ekaterina V. Haskins sees Isocrates and Aristotle as two original thinkers gravitating to different dialectical positions, the more socially oriented rhetoric being postulated by Isocrates and a primarily instrumental one represented by Aristotle⁹. Their views are also carefully juxtaposed by David Depew and Eugene Garver who, *inter alia*, arrive at such interesting statements as the inversion of

⁸ The latter side of the question is slightly touched upon by David Depew, 184, n. 7: “There are no allusions in Isocrates’ texts to Aristotle, although there are plenty of them to Plato’s Academy”.

⁹ Ekaterina V. Haskins, *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle*, University of South Carolina Press, 2004, 5–6.

Isocratean virtues into vices in Aristotelian ethics¹⁰ or “Aristotle’s separation and Isocrates’ unity of theory and practice”, generating different models of civic education¹¹. The difference between Isocratean and Aristotelian theories of rhetoric is even more emphasized by Manuela Dal Borgo in her recent article (“Philosophy or *Techne*”), whose abstract is available in the website of the American Philological Association¹². However, there is another approach to the two philosophers, which tries to reconcile their views, showing that Aristotle and Isocrates produced quite a number of similar ideas not only concerning philosophy and politics, but also in the field of theory of eloquence. Such an approach, although not a predominant one¹³ and usually silently lurking in margins and footnotes of various

studies and articles¹⁴, is a sort of *spiritus movens* of our research.

Among the articles that deal directly with the subject of Isocratean references in Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, there is one study which deserves special attention: Jeremy C. Trevett’s “Aristotle’s knowledge of Athenian oratory” (*Classical Quarterly* 46 (ii), 1996), which is perhaps the first attempt to systematically examine citations in Aristotelian *Rhetoric*, and it presents a useful background for further investigations. Trevett’s research discloses a very interesting fact that of all canonical orators only Isocrates is quoted both explicitly and implicitly. Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias and Isaeus are not mentioned by names¹⁵. Demosthenes and Aischines most probably are not the names of canonical orators here¹⁶. However, Trevett pays little attention to Isocrates himself and, to our view, accordingly fails to complete his argument concerning the circulation of forensic and deliberative speeches in Aristotle’s school. Trevett emphasizes Aristotle’s primary concern with epideictic rhetoric and promotes a rather bold assumption that Aristotle

¹⁰ Depew, *op. cit.*, 173.

¹¹ Garver, *op. cit.* (2004), 210.

¹² M. dal Borgo states enmity between the two teachers and enumerates fundamental differences between Isocratean λόγων παιδεία and Aristotelian τέχνη ῥητορική: for Isocrates, ἐπιστήμη is unattainable (thus, he stresses the reliability of δόξα), for Aristotle it is attainable; for Isocrates, the purpose of rhetorical education is to become an “able man of affairs”, experienced in grasping *kairos*; for Aristotle, *doxa* and *kairos* are merely tools to be used for the purpose of persuasion; for Isocrates, his παιδεία is indivisible into separate parts, while for Aristotle “rhetoric is an acquired skill”.

¹³ The usual characterization of Isocrates and Aristotle as the two rivals is also encouraged by William Benoit’s account, despite his concentration on both of the differences and similarities of their lives, training, views on rhetoric and knowledge. Cf. William Benoit, “Isocrates and Aristotle on Rhetoric”, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 1990), 251–259. The polemic aspect of the relations between the two pedagogues is also emphasized in some (scanty though they are) Lithuanian commentaries, cf. Antanas Rybelis, “Paaiškinimai [Nikomacho etika. Dešimta knyga]”, Aristotelis. *Rinktiniai raštai*, vertė Jonas Dumčius, Marcelinas Ročka, Vosylius Sezemanas; sudarė Antanas Rybelis, 418, n. 12.

¹⁴ Cf. Benoit, *op. cit.* passim; Stanley Wilcox “Criticisms of Isocrates and His φιλοσοφία”, 132, n. 49 (possibility of Aristotle’s silent abstention from criticism of Isocratean rhetoric); Исаева В. И., *Античная Греция в зеркале риторики. Исократ*, Москва: Наука, 1994, 102 (their consensus concerning the dependence of the power of persuasion on the orator’s character and reputation); Depew, *op. cit.*, 158: “in criticizing Isocrates, Aristotle pays him a backhanded compliment. He cooptively incorporates within his own philosophy of human affairs the meanings that Isocrates (but not Plato) assigned to key terms, notably *phronēsis*”.

¹⁵ Trevett, *op. cit.*, 371. The same remark concerns Aristotle’s contemporary anti-Macedonian orators Hypereides and Lykurgos.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 371–372.

didn't keep to hand any written forensic and deliberative speeches and that "most of the political and forensic quotations in the *Rhetoric* derive from oral tradition"¹⁷. In our opinion, Trevett neither did refute conclusively the opposite view stated by Kenneth James Dover¹⁸, nor did he affirm his own argument which could have been more convincing, had he built more on the evidence of Isocrates whose one of the forensic speeches is also quoted in Aristotle's treatise (see below, section 1.2. of this article). Moreover, the classification of Isocrates's works should not be oversimplified. The method of applying "the term *epideictic* in the Aristotelian sense to denote any speech that was not written to be delivered in the assembly or in court, even if it is deliberative or forensic in form"¹⁹ should be revised and supplemented by a couple of new suggestions: on the one hand, modern scholarship tends to classify Isocratean speeches in a more careful way²⁰; on the other, Aristotle never explicitly defined

the category of either *Panegyricus*, or *Philippus*, or *Antidosis*. The frequent quotation of speeches of "mixed" genre makes it seem possible that Aristotle usually referred to a collection of sample speeches and sayings designed for teaching purposes. Thus, *Panegyricus*, *Philippus*, or *Antidosis* could be also labelled as chrestomathic or exemplary speeches with the predominant political or forensic content. Aristotle and/or his closest successors were collectors of various written and spoken sources²¹, and there's no reason to deny the possibility that what was hypothetically said about his references to Iphicrates (that Aristotle had a collection of his sayings or excerpts from his speeches)²² the same could be true in case of Isocrates²³.

FIRST-SIGHT PICTURE OF ISOCRATEAN REFERENCES

There are twelve occurrences of Isocrates' name in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: one in book I, four in book II, and seven in book III. The real number of Isocratean references is significantly larger. Some works are

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 374.

¹⁸ On the discussion concerning the possible Lysian references (i.e. examples of written forensic speeches) in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see K. J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiaca*, Berkeley and L. A., 1968, 25–26 and Trevett, *op. cit.*, 373–374.

¹⁹ Trevett, *op. cit.*, 375.

²⁰ See, e.g. Niall Livingstone, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris* (Mnemosyne. Supplementum 223), Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2001, 10: [...] "the traditional rhetorical genres as defined by Aristotle in particular, are awkward tools for interpreting the writings of Isocrates". Cf. also Yun Lee Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates: Text, Power, Pedagogy*, Cambridge Classical Press, 46–47 (important observations about *Antidosis* as μικτός λόγος); Krystyna Tuszyńska-Maciejewska, *Izokrates jako twórca parenezy w prozie greckiej*. *Mowy Cypryjskie* w przekładzie Krystyny Tuszyńskiej-Maciejewskiej, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 2004, 96–99.

²¹ When dealing with this question, one should keep in mind that Aristotle's own contribution to *Corpus Aristotelicum* and the actual shape of his *Rhetoric* in his lifetime is a matter of discussion, on which see, e.g., Vita Papparinska, "Text tradition of Aristotle's on rhetoric: From post-Aristotelian Athens to Rome", *Literatūra*, 51(3), 2009, 16–17; Brad McAdon, "Reconsidering the intention or purpose of Aristotle's rhetoric", *Rhetoric Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2004, 216–234.

²² Trevett, *op. cit.*, 374.

²³ The early use of excerpts from the gnomic anthologies is traced back to the first sophists, and Isocrates in particular, as one of the authorities of the new system of education based on selective reading (John Barns, "A new gnomologium: with some remarks on gnomic anthologies, II", *Classical Quarterly*, 45, 1951, 4–7; Denis Michael Searby, *Aristotle in the Greek gnomological tradition* (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Graeca Upsaliensia 19), Uppsala 1998, 31).

referred to by their title, some by hint at the main character, some are quoted without any reference at all. There are a few references based on scholarly speculations on the differences between Aristotelian and Isocratean rhetorical theory. The majority of Isocratean references were identified by the 19th 20th century philologists. Overall, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* we can see around 40 (M. Dal Borgo counts 39) allusions to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Their concentration seems to be highest in Book III (20 definite references). The number of occurrences could be reduced to 10 groups according to thematic patterns which roughly coincide with the number of chapters of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. These, in turn, could be summarized according to the tripartite structure of Aristotelian work: as is generally held, books I and II deal with *heuresis*²⁴, chapters 1–12 of book III are basically devoted to *lexis*, and chapters 13–19 of the same book mainly treat the subject of *taxis*. After such a classification is done, we can cautiously assume that Aristotle refers to Isocrates in ten major places of his treatise: four times when discussing invention, three times in the sphere of elocution, and three times when dealing with the speech composition.

MAIN POINTS OF THE FURTHER ANALYSIS

The method of our analysis rests on the consequent description of each of the

²⁴ We take the term from the post-Aristotelian technical rhetoric where it usually denotes the part of rhetoric which is concerned with the invention of proper arguments for the given case. On the discussion of the origins of this tradition, see Friedrich Solmsen, *op. cit.*, 221–222 (and footnotes).

major ten groups of Isocratean references, examination of their main subject and establishment of their basic quality and value (accuracy of quotation, positive, negative or neutral in regard to the principle it describes); this analysis doesn't aim at thoroughness due to limitation in time, space and measures, but it could serve for future research as a sketch of a synthetical picture which could be later enlarged by various details. In this account, we'll concentrate only on the major occurrences of Isocratean references in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Many small and less evident ones, hidden throughout the text, will be left aside for now. A somewhat shortened version of our analysis could be found in the tables attached.

1. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF HEURESIS

This sphere, which covers various methods of discovering the sources of persuasion for different rhetorical situations, is represented by four or five clearly discernible references²⁵ to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Each reference, described below, is defined both according to its formal appearance (explicit or not, exact quotation or not; the abbreviated version of these data is also available in the tables attached) and according to its subject (theme). The thematic aspect is a decisive one in the following arrangement

²⁵ In order to make our discussion shorter, we take several references of the same chapter under one heading and treat them as a unit (block of references). This is how the first two references from the sphere of *heuresis*, the second and the third block of the references from the sphere of *lexis* and each factual group of references from the sphere of *taxis* are treated in this article.

of our material: each heading is named in accordance with the basic principle to which one or more Isocratean references could be ascribed.

1.1. Two tricks in the analysis of the subject and sources of epideictic discourse: conversion of advice into a praise and comparison for the sake of amplification

The first clear²⁶ encounter with Isocrates and his rhetorical art is in book I, chapter 9 (Arst. *Rhet.* I, 9, 1368 a. 5–7; 19–21) which is devoted to the analysis of the subject of epideictic speech and the most convenient methods of its treatment. Various aspects of beauty and a list of virtues mentioned by Aristotle have certain correspondences in Isocrates' works, but Aristotle is mostly attracted by the two Isocratean tricks used in epideictic works: first, the conversion of a symbouleutic advice (or precept, ὑποθήκη) into a praise (ἔπαινος); second, the comparison of a person, being eulogized with other famous people when there is a lack of direct information about the person and the skills of objective narration characteristic of forensic speeches are not sufficiently developed. The first trick, illustrated with a popular *topos* of Isocrates' speeches, has recently been clearly identified by N. Livingstone in the commentaries of Isocrates *Busiris*, although it was known in the 19th century²⁷, but not always

observed in German and French editions²⁸. N. Livingstone calls this literary device “the *τόπος* of taking pride in achievements rather than (solely) in good fortune” and finds it in four speeches of Isocrates²⁹. However, the place of *Evagoras* 45 most exactly corresponds to the example given by Aristotle; it may be reasonably regarded as a source of Aristotle's paraphrase³⁰. As regards the second trick – a comparison (σύγκρισις) – Aristotle does not illustrate it by Isocrates' text; instead, he gives some brief comments: Isocrates used a comparison because of the lack of proficiency in delivering speeches before the courts (where a comparison does not have any probative value)³¹, but in an epideictic speech this device reinforces the praise, especially when a comparison is drawn between a person and other famous people) (δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν): to show a person being eulogized as a better one than serious people

tion 36): “The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in *Panath.* § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in *Evag.* § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation”.

²⁸ See, e.g., Roemer's and Dufour's editions: Aristotelis *Ars Rhetorica*, iterum editid Dr. Adolphus Roemer [...] Lipsiae: B.G. Teubner, MCMXIV (1914); Aristote, *Rhétorique*, Tome premier (Livre I), texte établi et traduit par Médéric Dufour, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1960.

²⁹ Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 122–123.

³⁰ On the other hand, the use of the verb ὑπάρχειν, which is present in *Panath.* 32, suggests that Aristotle was aware of more than one version of the same *topos* and its context (Cope, *op. cit.* in comm. ad loc. even notices that Isocrates himself used the same *topos* for different purposes, both for praise and for advice), and it is also not improbable that Aristotle had a collection of such *topoi* at his disposal.

³¹ Cf. *Rhet.* I, 9, 1368 a19–21: κὰν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορήσῃ, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν [προσῆκει – T. V.], ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν.

²⁶ Less clear and dubious references are briefly reviewed in the last section of this article, just before the conclusions.

²⁷ Cf. Edward Meredith Cope, *Commentary on the Rhetoric of Aristotle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1877 (comment to Book I, chapter 9, sec-

is characteristic of epideictic speeches meeting the requirements of αὔξησις and aesthetics of beauty (αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων). To make this reference clearer, one could add that Isocrates compared Euagoras with Cyrus the Younger, paralleled Helen with Theseus, Philipp with Herakles (*Phil.* 109–112) and the like. As regards the true Aristotelian attitude towards Isocratean professional competence, expressed in this passage (whether Aristotle criticizes him as ignorant of the principles of the forensic λόγοι, or not), we cannot clearly establish it now in view of discrepancy both in ancient doxography and manuscript tradition³². However, we shouldn't doubt as regards the positive evaluation of the Isocratean practice in this particular case, i.e. in the discussion of epideictic speeches.

Thus, here we have one implicit paraphrase and one explicit, though not exact, remark. The other three references in this sphere are also explicit, but differ in the degree of accuracy.

³² According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aphareus, Isocrates' adopted son, reported that Isocrates composed no judicial speeches at all. On the other hand, Aristotle himself makes remark about the numerous bundles of Isocratean forensic speeches lying in the bookstalls (fr. 140). In our opinion, Yun Lee Too (*op. cit.*, 118) is right when suggesting the possibility of different motivations for such contrary statements (esp. that Aphareus maintained Isocrates' good reputation), but we cannot agree that Aristotle was primarily insisting on Isocrates' "identity as a logographer". The reconstruction of the original opinion of Dionysius is also important here: "What he does not believe of Aristotle is the hyperbolic extent, for he determines (on the authority of Cephisodorus, who lived with Isocrates, became his most sincere disciple, and defended him against Aristotle) that Isocrates had written such speeches, but not many (Is. 18)" (Thomas N. Winter, "On the Corpus of Lysias", *Classics and Religious Studies: Faculty Publications*, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, Classics and Religious Studies Department), 1973, 38).

1.2. Enthymeme based on a fortiori argument

The second reference to Isocrates, an explicit one, concerning *heuresis* (Arst. *Rhet.* II, 19, 1392b 10–12), deals with a discussion of the common sources of arguments (τὰ κοινά, sometimes called κοινοὶ τόποι)³³, in particular about the first of them, – a correlation between the possible and the impossible. In the long list of possibilities, an example from Isocrates emerges. It comes under the statement that what is possible for the inferior, weaker or less intelligent ones (τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις), the same is even more possible for their opposites. Presuming that he himself is better than Euthynus, Isocrates claims that it would be surprising if he himself wouldn't be able to come up with what Euthynus has invented. This piece of logical reasoning is indeed an enthymeme ("rhetorical syllogism")³⁴ based on the argument

³³ For Isocrates, *topos* is a "subject-matter indicator" or a "strategy of argumentation" (cf. Sara Rubinelli, *Ars Topica: The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*, Springer Science+Business Media, 2009, 69–70). The Aristotelian *topos* is rarely a "subject-matter indicator"; more often it is an "argument scheme of universal applicability"; when contrasted to *idia*, "indications of subject-matter" of special arguments, necessary in arguing the case. The Isocratean and the Aristotelian definitions converge in the three "common material topics": "The More or the Less"; "Past or Future Fact"; "Possible and Impossible". However, Aristotle is original in his theory of 28 "general *topoi*" (also called "formal topics"; cf. Jeffrey Walker, "The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of Enthymeme", *College English*, 56 (Nr. 1, January), 1994, 53–54).

³⁴ This definition is taken from James Allen's article "Rhetoric and Logic", *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, 355. For a more detailed discussion about the meaning of the term and its relation to *topoi*, see T. Ed Dyck, "Topos and Enthymeme", *Rhetorica: A*

(or *topos*) *a fortiori*³⁵, most probably on its version, which is called “a maiore ad minus”. It is possibly the only reference to Isocrates’ forensic speech (Πρὸς Εὐθύνου ἀμάρτυρος, No. 21 of the *corpus Isocrateum*) in Aristotelian *Art of Rhetoric*, although, on the other hand, the real source of the reference is not yet clearly identified³⁶. There is some evidence that both Isocrates and Lysias wrote for the same lawsuit, – one for the plaintiff and the other for the defendant³⁷. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius mentions an exercise in reply to Isocrates’ speech written by Antisthenes (Laert. VI, 15, 11). We don’t know which of these sources were available to Aristotle, thus it remains unclear where his argument concerning possibility comes from. In our opinion, the conjecture of Hermann Karl Usener³⁸ is the best for now as he presumes that Aristotle has in mind here an argument from another speech of Isocrates, namely *Demurrer*

against Kallimachos (Παραγραφή πρὸς Καλλίμαχον) (Isocr. *Call.* 15). On behalf of the defendant, Isocrates expresses his surprise at the naivety of Kallimachos’ reasoning: Kallimachos denies the possibility that he might have agreed to accept 2000 drachmae instead of 10000, and yet he naively believes that the defendant (had he intended to lie) wouldn’t have thought of the same thing and, therefore, would have asserted that he had given more. Here, the possibility is derived in a similar way as in the reference provided by Aristotle. Whether Usener’s conjecture is right or not, we should not ignore the fact that Aristotle quotes here a forensic speech which was written at least 40 years before Aristotle’s coming to Athens. (Both *Against Euthynus* and *Against Kallimachos* were written soon after the rule of the Thirty and deal with the Amnesty of 403 BCE). Thus, it appears highly unlikely that he could reproduce it from memory without looking at any written text. However, Trevett’s opinion concerning the fact that Aristotle used forensic examples, based only on oral tradition, is still probable if we recall that the case of Euthynus was popular, as was indirectly pointed out by Diogenes Laertius.

Journal of the History of Rhetoric, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Spring 2002), 105–117 (p. 111: “An enthymeme is a syllogism in which one or more premises are probable and a *topos* replaces implication”).

³⁵ On identification of this *topos* as *a fortiori* argument, cf. George A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980, 71.

³⁶ Cf. Mederic Dufour, *op. cit.*, comm. ad loc. (Vol. 2, 101 No. 3): “La phrase ne figure pas dans le texte actuel du *Contre Euthynous*; mais il est permis de supposer que le plaidoyer est mutilé à la fin”.

³⁷ See Larue van Hook’s “Introduction” to the speech in: *Isocrates in Three Volumes*, Vol. III, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd (The LOEB Classical Library), 1961, 350–351.

³⁸ Cf. “Lectiones Graecae”, *Rheinische Museum für Philologie* 25, 1870, 603; Adolphus Roemer in commentario ad B. 19, 1392 b11 in: *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*. Iterum edidit Dr. Adolphus Roemer, Lipsiae: B. G. Teubner, 1914, 132.

1.3. *Topoi and enthymemes based on previous judgement and accepted opinions*

The third explicit Isocratean reference is found in book II, chapter 23, where the sources of creation of argument-schemes (*topoi*)³⁹ and enthymemes based on

³⁹ Such a synonym we take from Sara Rubinelli, *op. cit.* (passim).

authoritative opinions or decisions of the past are discussed. Of the 28 Aristotelian *topoi*, here we deal in particular with the 11th one⁴⁰, illustrated by seven examples, three of them containing references to Isocrates' works that include authoritative assessments: Helen was serious and virtuous, because Theseus judged her in such a way; so was Alexander (Paris), since he was chosen by goddesses as a judge of their beauty; and so was Euagoras whose aid was chosen by Konon in the moment of fatal misfortune (his defeat at Aegospotami), turning down help from all others (cf. Arst. *Rhet.* II, 23, 1399a 1–6). Helen's assessment through Theseus is a very popular *topos* from Isocrates' speech *Helen*, which includes a large digression about the eulogy of Theseus. In this speech, Isocrates twice (Isocr. *Hel.* 22 and 38) explicitly states that a positive assessment of a famous person (Theseus) increases the reliability of the reputation of the eulogized person. Another version of this *topos* – infallibility of the goddesses in their choice of Paris as a judge of their beauty – is also found in Isocrates' *Helen* (Isocr. *Hel.* 46)⁴¹. Finally, the probity of the Cypriot tyrant Euagoras is supported by the authority of Konon and by the fact that after the Peloponnesian war it was the land of Euagoras that was chosen by Konon as a place of his exile. This example of Euagoras is the first case of the Isocratean work being explicitly quoted in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (and it is one of the total of 26

quotations *sensu stricto* of Isocrates' speeches). It is not precise and it doesn't fit the extant text of Isocrates. It seems that the author or composer of *Rhetoric* was not obliged to quote examples literally here because of the broadness of the material itself and not necessarily because of the lack of handwritten sources or due to the principle of objective pragmatism and economy in the exposition for the sake of clarity.

1.4. *Topoi based on identification of analogous antecedents and consequents*

The fourth reference, also an explicit one, appears in the same chapter 23, in the section which deals with the 17th *topos* out of the collection of 28 argument schemes (*Rhet.*, 1399 b5–13), namely with the analogy between antecedents and consequents (“the identity of antecedents following from the identity of results”). This reference was identified in the 19th century by Leonhard Spengel, and since then all editions follow his emendation “Ἰσοκράτους” instead of the possibly erroneous “Σωκράτους”, which is, nevertheless, preserved in all extant codices. Thanks to Spengel we have one more explicit reference to Isocrates and a pretty clear allusion to his words in *Antidosis* (*Antid.* 173). The *topos* is exemplified with Xenophanes' assertion that both sides are equally guilty of impiety, i.e. not only those who assert that gods are born, but also those who claim that gods die, since in both cases there seems to be an impious assertion that at some point gods do not exist. The reference to Isocrates appears as another example just

⁴⁰ Or 12th according to S. Rubinelli's classification (*op. cit.* 74).

⁴¹ Aristotle uses these examples (and most probably doesn't forget Isocratean *Helen*) also in *Rhet.* I, 6, 1363 a 18–19.

after the generalization of the *topos*: its essence is to grasp (λαμβάνειν) the result from each of its antecedent component (particular, not universal one) always as the same. The statement is illustrated with the hint at Isocrates' *Antidosis* (cf. Isocr. *Antid.* 173): "You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone, but about education generally, whether it is right to study philosophy" (translated by J. H. Freese). In other words, deliberation concerning Isocrates' profession (or pursuit)⁴² of philosophy (by most scholars identified as rhetorical education) should result in a general assessment of philosophy in terms of its public value; a single element of the common phenomenon results in the same final outcome. Aristotle here paraphrases the Isocratean thought and doesn't quote it exactly, thus once again evidencing his own concern with the subject-oriented narration. Moreover, Aristotle is very grudging in his comments here, despite his special involvement into a similar discussion in his *Protrepticus* ending with the conclusion that "one must do philosophy"⁴³.

2. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF LEXIS

The sphere of *lexis*, to which part of the third book is devoted, contains quite a considerable number of Isocratean references. In contrast to the first two

books, here implicit quotations prevail. The manner how frequently Isocratean examples are presented gives an impression of a deep impact of the Isocratean antithesis-based style on the Aristotelian theory of persuasive (enthymeme-based) discourse.

2.1. Timely use of poetic diction and rare words (in the state of enthusiasm)

The stage for the first occurrence of Isocratean references in the sphere of style is set by the discussion about *πρόεπον* and *εἶδη τῆς λέξεως* (*Rhet.* III, 7, 1408a10sq.). Aristotle considers three modes of or conditions necessary to persuasion: *τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον* (correspondence to the subject matter); *παθητικόν* or *παθητικὴ λέξις* (pathetic or emotion-based expression) and *ἠθικόν* or *ἠθικὴ λέξις* (character-based expression). All these conditions share the principle of rational relevance (appropriateness, *πρόεπον*): the manner of speech should fit the manner of the subject, the manner of the feelings experienced and the manner of the orator's character and habits. Aristotle stresses the importance of adequacy between occasion and stylistic measures (*Rhet.* 1408b1: *τὸ δ' εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι*). Here, he combines the theory of style with the guidance on performance, compares rhetorical devices with physiological and theatrical characteristics such as intonation and facial expression. In this context, the quote from Isocrates' *Panegyricus* sounds as an example of a rational use of more elaborate words in the right moment, i.e. at the end

⁴² It is interesting to note a certain variety of shades of meaning hidden in the word *ἐπιτήδευμα* here. Mèderic Dufour translates it as "une règle de vie", Freese puts it as "education generally", Rhys Roberts as "the whole profession".

⁴³ D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson, *op. cit.*, 11 and 22.

of the speech, in the state of enthusiasm, when the speaker has already made the audience overwhelmed with feelings and touched their hearts with praise, blame, anger, or friendliness. Such a pathetic moment approves of the employment of poetical devices, and a couple of Isocratean references serves as an example of their successful use. Aristotle's words "δὴ οὕτως δεῖ" (*Rhet.* 1408b19) could be interpreted as an indirect approval or even praise of the Isocratean device, but it is elegantly shadowed by an immediate reference in the same sentence to a variation of the same device based on other authorities: the timely evoked enthusiasm could also be softened with irony, as Gorgias and Plato in his *Phaedrus* have done (cf. *Rhet.* 1408b 20).

2.2. Examples of disjunctive and antithetic clauses of the periodic style

The second reference to Isocrates in the sphere of *lexis* is the largest one and, according to the number of quotations, deserves some different designation, e.g., **a block or a cluster of references**. In contrast to the majority of the above discussed references, it consists of bare quotations without mentioning either the title of the work cited or its author. This is the famous passage on rhetorical periods in book III, chapter 9 (1409b.33–1410a.23). It deals with the types of the clauses of the periodic style – the disjunctive clauses (διηρημένη λέξις) and the adversative / antithetic clauses (ἀντικειμένη λέξις); the latter are subdivided and illustrated with nine examples from Isocrates' *Panegyricus*; to these, a statement of the

anonymous author about Peitholaos and Lycophron is attached. In contrast, λέξις διηρημένη is provided only with one example.

The subdivision of λέξις ἀντικειμένη is quite simple, although the formulation is somehow obscured with the use of neutral adjectives and a number of datives. Thus, the first group of antithetical clauses consists of a pair of cola in which opposites are brought close together (*Rhet.* 1409b36–1410a1: ἐν ἣ ἑκατέρω τῶ κώλω ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίω ἐναντίον σύγκειται); the second group comprises a pair of cola in which opposites are coupled with the same idea or word (*Rhet.* 1410a1–2: ἢ ταῦτὸ ἐπέξευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις)⁴⁴. (In these descriptions, one could notice a trace of the concepts that a modern scholar could call dialectical dyad and triad, respectively: thesis and antithesis in the first group, and thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the second). These examples are concluded by the assessment of the periodic style, which is an indirect praise of Isocrates. "Such style is pleasant" (ἡδεῖα δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη λέξις, *Rhet.* 1410a 20–21); since antitheses and parallels are easily discernable and intelligible (τὰναντία γνωριμώτατα καὶ παρ' ἄλληλα μᾶλλον γνώριμα, 1410a 21–22), they are similar to syllogism or denunciation (ἔοικεν συλλογισμῶ ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συναγωγὴ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἐστίν, 1410a 22–23).

⁴⁴ This is our literal translation of the just cited passage: "in which in regard to the two members (*kōla*), either a contrary thing / meaning is attached (lies close) to a contrary one or the same thing / meaning is appended to the contraries". Thus, in the first case one member (*kōlon*) simply contradicts the other, and in the second case both members (*kōla*) share some general idea.

As we see, Aristotle is interested in the examples of Isocratean clauses primarily from the stylistic and aesthetic points of view. The assessment of their inner (ethical, political or philosophical) content is almost absent and has no clear allusions in this passage (although we can speculate upon some of them indirectly). The manner *Panegyricus* is cited indicates a rather strict pragmatism of the author of *Rhetoric*: the quoted clauses often belong to longer periodic sentences, but since these clauses are intended to illustrate a particular sentence structure, the rest of the Isocratean period is excluded from consideration. Thus, less understandable excerpts are accompanied by short comments of *Rhetoric*'s author. For instance, having quoted the excerpt from *Paneg.* 41 (ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις) (*Rhet.* 1410a 5–6), Aristotle adds a brief explanation: ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται (“consumption [or “enjoying”] is opposed to acquisition”) (*Rhet.* 1410a7).

In the mentioned chapter, only four quotations out of the total ten exactly correspond to the extant Isocratean text. The remaining ones have varying degrees of change: abridgements, lexical variations or an inverted word order.

2.3. Pretty enthymemes based on antithesis, metaphor, liveliness and witty expressions

The third block of Isocratean references expands in the 10th and 11th chapters of book III. Here, quotations from the works of Isocrates and other authors serve to illustrate several modes of creating

stylistically (κατὰ τὴν λέξιν) pretty (or urbane, elegant) enthymemes (ἀστεῖα ἐνθυμήματα): antitheses, metaphors, liveliness and salt expressions (word puns). These devices satisfy one's intellectual desire and thus are most pleasant⁴⁵. In these chapters, we find eight references to Isocrates (five in chapter 10 and three in chapter 11); his name is mentioned only twice (once in each chapter), and the rest bundle of references consists of anonymous quotations. As regards the main source of references, in these chapters there prevail two Isocratean works – *Philipp* (five references) and *Panegyricus* (three references).

According to Aristotle, stylistic (κατὰ τὴν λέξιν) enthymemes may be created in two ways: either on the basis of the form of a sentence structure (τῷ μὲν σχήματι) or on the grounds of the selection of words (τοῖς δ' ὀνόμασιν). The first – “figurative” – way is most effective when an antithesis is used (ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται). This statement is illustrated with the Isocratean quotation from *Philipp* 73 concerning the opposition between war and peace, which is briefly explained: ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ. This explanation should be supplemented with one more opposition, namely the one between public and private interests, since here the general consensus on peace is opposed to the opinion of individual orators engaged in anti-Macedonian propaganda⁴⁶.

⁴⁵ It is said in the very beginning of the analysis of these devices: τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἢ δὲ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὥστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἥδιστα (*Rhet.* 1410b10–12).

⁴⁶ The picture as painted by Isocrates in *Philipp* 73 contains a paradox: according to the contextual mean-

Aristotle particularly distinguishes two ways to make speech pretty through the use of words (τοις ὀνόμασιν): the use of metaphors (ἐὰν ἔχη μεταφοράν, *Rhet.* 1410b31–32) and the method of “bringing-before-the-eyes” (ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ, *Rhet.* 1410b33–34), which elsewhere is almost identified with the concept of ἐνέργεια (translated as “actualization”, “vividness”, “activity” or “liveliness”)⁴⁷. The latter two devices, together with the above discussed antithesis, constitute the triad of the main devices of a pretty (urbane) style⁴⁸.

The further discussion of the metaphors and the method of visualization (“bringing-before-the-eyes”) presents one more group of Isocratean references. Having emphasised one of the four types of metaphors⁴⁹, namely metaphors based on analogy, Aristotle becomes generous with examples (1411a2–1411b20); some of them are pro-

ing, the concept of peace is replaced by the concept of war. Isocrates criticizes contemporary orators who agitate the citizens of their own πόλεις to go to war against Philipp, and notices that for each of them peace, which is common to all Greeks, seems to be a war against themselves.

⁴⁷ Sara Newman identifies the “bringing-before-the-eyes” device as “a lexical species of *energeia* and one whose outcome is essentially sensory” (Sara Newman, “Aristotle’s notion of “bringing-before-the-eyes”: its contributions to Aristotelian and contemporary conceptualizations of metaphor, style, and audience”, *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Winter), 2002, 20).

⁴⁸ Cf. *Rhet.* 1410b35–36: δεῖ ἄρα τούτων στοχάζεσθαι τριῶν, μεταφορᾶς ἀντιθέσεως ἐνεργείας.

⁴⁹ A more detailed classification of metaphors appears in *Poet.* 21, 1457b 7–9: transference from genus to species; from species to genus; from one species to another species; transference according to analogy (μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους ἐπὶ εἶδος ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον).

vided with additional notes, e.g.: τοῦτο γὰρ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (*Rhet.* 1411a26), καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (*Rhet.* 1411a 27–28), μεταφορὰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων (*Rhet.* 1411b8–9). Among the examples of metaphors based on analogy, four examples belong to Isocrates: one to his *Philipp* and three to *Panegyricus*.

All Isocratean metaphors found in the mentioned section of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* could be summarized in the following four statements: 1) Isocrates referred to the participants of public festivals as “rushing together” (“co-runners”, “contestants”?)⁵⁰, perhaps alluding to their lust similar to such phenomena as race, battle or accumulation of liquids; Aristotle doesn’t specify that, and he dismisses the whole Isocratean discussion concerning the public performances; this is one more case of a free quotation in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*; 2) in the first of the three mentioned quotations from *Panegyricus*⁵¹, Isocrates attached the verb μελετᾶν, denoting training and education (or acquiring something through training, e.g., knowledge, cf. αὖξειν τι, *Rhet.* 1411b11), to the sphere unrelated to training (or accumulating knowledge), μικρὸν φρονεῖν (cf. μικροφροσύνη coined by Plutarchus,

⁵⁰ Cf. *Rhet.* III, 10, 1411a29–30: καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν [cf. *Isocr. Phil.* 12]. This example is in close relation with the preceding metaphor taken from Cephisodotus: Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ πολλάς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομάς [ἐκκλησίας] (*Rhet.* 1411a28–29).

⁵¹ Cf. *Rhet.* 1411b11–12: καὶ „πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες“ [*Isocr. Paneg.* 151]: τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὖξειν τι ἐστίν.

which means “pettiness”, “littleness of mind”); 3) the second quotation from *Panegyricus*⁵² illustrates a metaphor based on an analogy between the truce and the postponement of war (armistice is a metaphor of temporal peace); 4) the third reference to *Panegyricus*⁵³ alludes to Isocrates’ analogy between the two signs of victory – a trophy erected after a battle and a peace agreement; the latter was considered by Isocrates as a much more important and beautiful commemoration of victory. Isocrates used this metaphor to highlight the victory of the Persian king and the humiliation of entire Greece after the Peace of Antalcidas (387/386 BCE)⁵⁴. However, Aristotle doesn’t mention the subtlety of such a paradoxical use.

Finally, one more pair of Isocratean citations comes after the definition of visualization (“bringing-before-the-eyes”)⁵⁵, which deals with the connection between metaphor and actualization, or liveliness (ἐνέργεια). Aristotle gives some examples of live and lifeless metaphors: to refer to a good man as a quadrangle is a metaphor, but it doesn’t express liveli-

ness, whereas such metaphors as found in Isocrates’ *Philipp* are much livelier. This time Aristotle mentions neither the author nor the title of the work quoted; instead, he provides only short excerpts that illustrate liveliness (ἐνέργεια): ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμὴν ἐνέργεια, καὶ τὸ ἄσπερ ἄφετον [ἐλεῦθερον] ἐνέργεια (*Rhet.* 1411b27–29). In both examples, taken from Isocratean *Philipp* (§10 and §127, respectively), liveliness is highlighted through the meanings of actions: the action of flowering (ἀνθοῦσαν) and relaxation or releasing from work and worries (ἄφετος particularly refers to the sacred animals devoted to gods and released from labour; it also refers to the persons who are released from public duties; also, to a loose sequence of things, uncontrolled drift or vacant time-span). The use of such short excerpts and the author’s neglect of a more detailed explanation possibly mean that the reader of *Rhetoric* is well aware of either the context (that in both cases the portrait of the physically strong and free-minded Philipp II of Macedonia is implied) or the popularity of the expressions quoted.

3. REFERENCES FROM THE SPHERE OF TAXIS

All references to Isocrates in this small section (chapters 13–19 of book III) devoted to the arrangement of rhetorical material are mainly either paraphrases (not citations) or even broader references to the Isocratean rhetorical technique. Some examples of it have certain resemblance to the examples presented in the first two books of Stagirate’s treatise, and this

⁵² Cf. *Rhet.* 1411b13–15: „οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα“ [Isocr. *Paneg.* 172]: ἀμφω γὰρ ἔστιν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη.

⁵³ Cf. *Rhet.* 1411b16–19: καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι τροπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων [cf. Isocr. *Paneg.* 180]: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὐταὶ δ’ ὑπὲρ παντός τοῦ πολέμου· ἀμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα.

⁵⁴ Peace of Antalcidas, signed in 387/386 BCE. The terms of peace were very unfavourable to Athens: Ionia and Cyprus were abandoned to the Persians, and the Athenians were compelled to cede their newly-won territories in the Aegean.

⁵⁵ *Rhet.* III, 11, 1411b24–25: λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει.

contributes to the problem of the interface between an spheres of *heuresis* and *taxis*⁵⁶ which, however, won't concern us for now.

3.1. *Methods of composing epideictic proems: initial digression and psogos*

The first reference to Isocrates appears in connection with a discussion concerning the composing principles of the initial part of the speech, the proem (Gr. προίμιον, Lat. *exordium*), which is the subject of chapter 14 (*Rhet.* 1414b19–1416a3). The proem of rhetorical speech is not only paralleled with the preludes of poetry and flute music (ἐν ποιήσει προλόγος καὶ ἐν ἀυλῆσει προαύλιον), but also put into a universal “technological” system: πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταῦτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποιήσις τῷ ἐπιόντι (*Rhet.* 1414b20–21) – “all these are the beginnings (ἀρχαί), as if paving the way for what follows” (in speech or in melody). The term ὁδοποιήσις, used metaphorically, is borrowed from the sphere of handicrafts and non-verbal arts. The orator, like ἀυλητής, is presented on the same level as an ordinary craftsman who cares about the beginning as an essential condition for the good issue. Aristotle adds a detailed explanation of the resemblance between προαύλησις and epideictic προίμιον: “for as flute-players, after they started (προαυλήσαντες) playing whatever they can execute skilfully, they attach it to the key-note (συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ), so also in epideictic speeches should be the

composition of the exordium; the speaker should say at once (εὐθὺ) whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach the main subject (ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι); this is what all [speakers] do”⁵⁷. This description implies the division of the proem into at least two parts: improvisation of any kind and ἐνδόσιμον (a key-note or some hint at the main theme of the following composition); one may even think that the third, transitory, part is also implied here. The example of Isocrates *Helen* is quite instructive. As Aristotle notes, “the eristics and Helen have nothing in common” (οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένη, *Rhet.* 1414b27–28). Indeed, at the beginning of *Helen*, Isocrates extensively (§1–13) criticises his contemporary rhetoricians and philosophers, both practitioners of eristics (ἢ παρὰ τῆς ἐρίδας φιλοσοφία) and unpractical rhetoric based on paradoxical subjects; according to Aristotle’s division, this is actually the improvisatory part of προίμιον; only in passage 14 the main theme, a short praise of Helen, appears. This is ἐνδόσιμον. A digression from the subject in the proem is approved by Aristotle, since it rescues the speech from monotony (μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι).

Some scholars had claimed that Aristotle criticised the Isocratean proem⁵⁸, but this can hardly be true. When Aristotle

⁵⁶ On the Peripatetic and non-Peripatetic content of *taxis*, see interesting observations by Solmsen (*op. cit.*, 221–223).

⁵⁷ This is the a literal translation by Warren Kirken-dale from his article “Ciceronians versus Aristotelians on the Ricercar as Exordium, from Bembo to Bach”, *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 32, 1979, 3.

⁵⁸ Cf. Terry L. Papillon, “Isocrates”, *A Companion to Greek Rhetoric*, ed. by Ian Worthington, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2007, 73, n. 8.

generalizes the principles of composing the proems of epideictic speeches, he states rather clearly: “δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ” (“these exordia may be either foreign or intimately connected with the speech”)⁵⁹, Aristotle actually approves the Isocratean technique. It is worth noting that here the term τὰ ἐνδόσιμα is used not in the meaning of a key-note, but rather is synonymous to the term προοίμιον.

Before generalizing the principles of an epideictic proem, Aristotle gives one more reference to Isocrates. It serves to confirm Aristotle’s statement that proems of epideictic speeches are composed either of praise or of blame. The former case is exemplified with the reference to Gorgian Ὀλυμπικὸς λόγος and the latter with the Isocratean *Panegyricus* (cf. *Rhet.* 1414b.30-35). Aristotle paraphrases the main thought and merely states the fact: Isocrates censures the custom of awarding the athletes for brilliance of their physical strength and corporal excellence and giving no prize to those who excel others by their intellectual abilities⁶⁰.

⁵⁹ Full quotation: τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν λόγων προοίμια ἐκ τούτων, ἐξ ἐπαίνου, ἐκ ψόγου, ἐκ προτροπῆς, ἐξ ἀποτροπῆς, ἐκ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατὴν· δεῖ δὲ ἢ ξένα ἢ οἰκεῖα εἶναι τὰ ἐνδόσιμα τῷ λόγῳ (*Rhet.* III, 14, 1415a5–8).

⁶⁰ According to E. M. Cope (and Sandys) comm. ad loc., “the problem here proposed by Isocrates – the omission of the institution of prizes for intellectual competition – is solved by Aristotle, *Probl.* XXX 11”. The lack of judges for the wise, potential hatred for the judges, and the lack of the prize for the wise other than wisdom itself are among the chief arguments in this solution. However, there is no sound reason to suspect that Aristotle criticises Isocrates in the mentioned passage of *Rhetoric*. Moreover, the problem is older than Isocrates: the contrast between the respect given to the physical strength of athletes and ἀγαθὴ σοφίη was already stated by Xenophanes (fr. 2 West; Athen. X 6, 1–24).

Sometimes one more indirect reference to Isocrates is being discerned in this chapter. After a remark that the proem of epideictic speech could be drawn from advice (ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς)⁶¹, Aristotle gives two examples which an anonymous commentator ascribes to Isocrates⁶². Phrases “αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ” and “οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει”⁶³ refer to a speaker or an author of speech, but it is not necessarily Isocrates, although he was mentioned in the previous example. Modern translators translate these words neutrally, since the source of this quotation has not yet been established: no work from the Isocratean corpus praised Aristeides or Paris in the proem.

3.2. *Employment of accusation in deliberative discourse and using witnesses in praise*

Another two references in the sphere of *taxis* appear in chapter 17 which focuses

⁶¹ *Rhet.* 1414b35–36.

⁶² *Anonymi Rhetoris In Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentarium*, p. 229, v. 15–28: [b35] ἢ γίνεται τὸ προοίμιον <ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς> ἢ τοῦ συμβουλευτικόν, οἷον συμβουλεύει εὐθὺς ἐν τῷ προοίμιῳ ὁ Ἴσοκράτης τὸ δεινὸν <τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν>· ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστείδης ἀγαθὸς, ἐπαινετέον αὐτόν· <διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς> ὁ Ἴσοκράτης <ἐπαινεῖ> τὸν <Ἀριστείδην> ὡς ἀγαθόν. ἢ <τοὺς τοιοῦτους> ἐπαινεῖν δεῖ, οἵτινες <μήτε εὐδοκίμοισι> φανερώς καὶ ἐπιδεικνύονται τὴν οἰκεῖαν ἀρετὴν <μήτε φαῦλοι> εἰσιν, <ἀλλ’ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες> κρύπτουσιν ἑαυτοὺς καὶ λαθεῖν σπουδάζουσι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ συμβουλῆς προοίμιον. καὶ ὁ Θεολόγος Ἀθανάσιον ἐπαινῶν ‘ἀρετὴν ἐπαινέσομαι’. [b38] καὶ ὁ <Ἀλέξανδρος> πρὸ τοῦ ἀρπάσαι τὴν Ἑλένην ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐν ὄρει ἐκρύπτετο, ὡς μὴ δόξη τοιοῦτος. καὶ γὰρ καὶ <οὗτος> ὁ Ἴσοκράτης <συμβουλεύει> ἐν τοῖς προοίμοις ἐπαινεῖν <τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ τοὺς τοιοῦτους, οἱ μὴτε εὐδοκίμοισι μὴτε φαῦλοι> εἰσι. γράφεται τὸ <οὕτως> καὶ μέγα, <οὕτως γὰρ> καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὁ Ἴσοκράτης <συμβουλεύει> ἐπαινεῖν <τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς> ἐν τῷ προοίμιῳ.

⁶³ See *Rhet.* 1414b36–37.

on argumentation (*pisteis*), the third part of the popular fourfold partition of forensic speech. Examples of Isocrates are referred here to illustrate the principles and means of argumentation relevant to deliberative and epideictic speeches (accusation and praise, respectively). After asserting that political speeches are more complicated than forensic ones⁶⁴ because of their subject matter (aimed at future and not at past events) and because of the lack of special auxiliary means (such as referring to law alone or making many digressions)⁶⁵, in order to escape a sticky situation, Aristotle suggests following the practice of Attic orators (οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες) and Isocrates: using accusation in a political discourse and praise in epideictic one. Of political discourses, two – *Panegyricus* and *Symmachicus* (usually identified as Περὶ εἰρήνης) – are mentioned, in which Isocrates attacked Lacedaemonians and Chares, respectively. Isocratean epideictic discourses are not specified; it seems plausible that the mentioned Isocratean practice of “bringing in” (ἐπεισοδιῶν) people to praise as if using witnesses⁶⁶ was very well known in Aristotle’s epoch and didn’t require any explanations.

3.3. Indirect self-characterization (self-defence or self-praise) through the words of another person

Finally, in the same chapter, one more device of persuasive argumentation from

⁶⁴ Cf. *Rhet.* 1418a21–22: τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι.

⁶⁵ cf. *Rhet.* 1418a.27–28: οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς.

⁶⁶ cf. Livingstone, *op. cit.*, 119–120: “The use of ‘witnesses’ may be seen as exemplifying another Isocratean practice on which Aristotle remarks, that of ‘bringing in’ people to praise [...]”

the Isocratean practice emerges: self-characterization of the speaker (especially the one who makes a defence against his prosecutor’s charges) through the words of another person. According to Aristotle, while speaking of himself directly, the orator is at risk of bringing jealousy upon himself, receiving reproaches for speechmaking, arousing adverse opinions, and while pointing directly to others he can evoke charges of being rough and abusive. Examples of indirect positive self-characterization are reported in brief: “This is what Isocrates does in *Philippus* and in *Antidosis*” (ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, *Rhet.* 1418b 26–27). While referring to *Philipp* (cf. Isocr. *Philipp* 4–7), Aristotle has in mind the beginning of this speech, where Isocrates makes an indirect boast of his own work (a speech addressed to the Macedonian king with carefully selected arguments on peacemaking) which won recognition from the Athenian public: they were debating over its content, thus commending not so much stylistic embellishments of it, but primarily the subject matter as a reflexion of the excellence of the author’s mind and his sincere involvement in the actual state of affairs⁶⁷. In *Antidosis*, Isocrates mentions himself, twice simulating an imaginary conversation with his own disciples and associates, among them with the famous Athenian commander Timotheus (cf. Isocr. *Antid.* 132–139; 141–149). By the end of the chapter, these considerations about saving the orator’s repute are

⁶⁷ Isocrates also mentions a favourable public reaction to his own speech in his *Areopagiticus* (*Areop.* 56–57).

supplemented by one more advice aimed at the orator's "self-defence", namely the change of enthymemes into maxims (*Rhet.* 1418b33–39). The example employed by Aristotle on this occasion is identified as a paraphrase of Isocratean *Archidamas* (*Archid.* 50), although it is quite loose and has no indications of authorship. Nevertheless, at least an indirect argument for the authorship of the Isocrates could be drawn from *Rhet.* 1368a.5–7, where an implicit quotation of *Euagoras* serves as an illustration of the change of an advice into a praise (see our discussion above, in section 1. 1. of this article).

4. OTHER INDIRECT REFERENCES

The total number of Isocratean references in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* doesn't confine to those clear occurrences where the name of the orator, the title of his work or a clearly definable quotation appear. One could find various indirect allusions and references to the Isocratean teaching principles, theory of style, ethical concepts and anonymously rendered loose paraphrases, but these are not the main subject of the present section of the paper. What concerns us at present is a seemingly derogative aspect of Isocratean references⁶⁸. There are at least three such instances in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* where scholars discern Stagirite's enmity towards contemporary rhetoricians, not excluding Isocrates. First of all, in the beginning of *Rhetoric* (*Rhet.* I 1, 1354b16–22; 1355a19–20), where the factors influ-

encing the decision of the judge are treated, Aristotle lays stress on the concentration on the matter of dispute and remarks that all those who occupy themselves with the definition of the content of each part of speech actually deal only with the questions "beside the subject" (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν). This remark, made twice in the mentioned passage (*Rhet.* 1354b16–22; 1355a19–20), is usually interpreted as an implicit attack on contemporary rhetoricians-technographers, sometimes including Isocrates as one of them⁶⁹. A more specific remark on a similar subject (the precept of the brachylogy required for the second part of the speech, the narration), found in book III (*Rhet.* III, 16, 1416b30: νῦν δὲ γελοίως τὴν διήγησίν φασι δεῖν εἶναι ταχεῖαν), strengthens the probability of the Isocratean criticism in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, since it is referred to by Quintilian (IV, 2, 32) in similar words (*praeceptum brevitatis irridens*)⁷⁰. According to E. M. Cope, "this is one of Vettori's evidences (perhaps the best) of Aristotle's dislike of Isocrates"⁷¹. Cope tries to reduce the probability of this hypothesis to a minimum and makes quite an opposite statement: "If they ever were

⁶⁹ See e.g. Solmsen., *op. cit.*, 216.

⁷⁰ Quint. *Inst. orat.* IV, 31–32: [31] Narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio, vel, ut Apollodorus finit, oratio docens auditorem quid in controversia sit. Eam plerique scriptores maximeque qui sunt ab Isocrate uolunt esse lucidam brevem verisimilem. Neque enim refert an pro lucida perspicuam, pro verisimili proba-[32]bilem credibilem dicamus. Eadem nobis placet divisio, quamquam et **Aristoteles ab Isocrate parte in una dissenserit**, praeceptum breuitatis irridens tamquam necesse sit longam esse aut brevem expositionem nec liceat ire per medium, Theodori quoque solam relinquunt ultimam partem, quia nec breviter utique nec dilucide semper sit utile exponere.

⁷¹ Cope, *op. cit.*, comm. ad loc.

⁶⁸ As we can infer from E.V. Haskins' account of Isocratean references from book 3 of the *Rhetoric* (Haskins, *op. cit.*, 65–66 and 79).

enemies – as is likely enough in Aristotle’s early life – after the death of Isocrates, by the time that this work was completed and published, all traces of *hostility*⁷² [...] must have long vanished from Aristotle’s mind”⁷³. In either event, we should agree that “to maintain that the Isocrateans organized their entire material under these headings [i.e. four parts of speech – T. V.] would be hazardous [...]”⁷⁴: one should always keep in mind the differences between the conception of the Isocratean school and that of the other sophists⁷⁵.

Finally, there is one more reference possibly (but not necessarily) unfavourable to Isocrates⁷⁶. In book II, chapter 24 (*Rhet.* 1401a8–12), which is devoted to seeming or fallacious enthymemes (τὰ φαινόμενα ἐνθυμήματα), also called paralogsms, and their sources or τόποι (argument schemes), an example of one kind of such τόποι (namely ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν [τόπος]) appears where a series of conclusions enumerated one by one in the same sentence create an impression of

a consequent reasoning. The Aristotelian example of such quasi-enthymeme has no reference to its source, and thus it is open to various interpretations. It consists of three parallel statements of the conclusions of unrelated syllogisms (*Rhet.* 1401a10–12: [...] τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δ' ἐτέροισ ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δ' Ἑλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίνεσθαι) which were identified by L. Spengel as a recapitulation of several long sections of Isocratean *Euagoras* (Isocr. *Euag.* 65–69)⁷⁷. However, there is no clear evidence that Aristotle really meant particularly the deeds of Euagoras here. In the Isocratean passage, which is preferred by Spengel and his followers, we find none of the verbs (ἔσωσε, ἐτιμώρησε, ἠλευθέρωσε) used in Aristotle’s quasi-enthymeme. It is true that we can discern some conceptual resemblances between the two texts: the tyrant of Cypriot Salamis **saved** his people and country from ferity (cf. Isocr. *Euag.* 66–67; this could be compared with the statement in *Rhet.*: τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε), he **revenged** (if really?) his enemies, perhaps, Persians in the Cypriot war (cf. *Euag.* 67) or Lacedaemonians in the battle

⁷² Italicization is ours.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Cf. E. V. Haskins, *op. cit.*, 79, who though she admits that “the arrangement of examples from Isocrates in the *Rhetoric* presents Isocrates as a “parts of speech” teacher”, nevertheless makes a plausible remark that “Isocrates explicitly distinguishes his teaching from both *tagmenē technē*, with its implication of precise arrangement of discursive elements, and abstract intellection”.

⁷⁶ M. Dal Borgo, *op. cit.*, asserts that “Aristotle rejects that rhetoric produces better citizens, but forwards rather that it is an amoral tool and cites Isocrates’ *Evagoras* to exemplify an invalid enthymeme (*Rhet.* 2.24.1)”. However, I find no particular repugnance against Isocrates in the mentioned passage, unless we attach to him the general Stagirite’s remark concerning the profession of sophists like Protagoras, made in the end of the chapter (*Rhet.* 1402a20–28).

⁷⁷ Spengel’s words ending his prolonged footnote in pp. 20–21 of his *Über die Rhetorik des Aristoteles*, München: Verlag der k. Akademie, 1851: “Aristoteles meint die Recapitulation in Isocr. *Euagoras* §. 65–9” don’t sound convincing enough. Nor does Cope’s commentary *ad loc.*: “this is from Isocr. *Evag.* §§ 65–9, as Spengel has pointed out, *Tract. on Rhet.* in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle gathered into these three *heads* of the contents of Isocrates’ five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course *Evagoras*, the hero of the declamation. The same speech was already referred to in II 23. 12”.

at Knidos (cf. *Euag.* 68 and *Rhet.* 1401a 9–10: τοῖς δ' ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, and he greatly contributed to the autonomy of Greek countries after the same battle (cf. *Euag.* 68 and *Rhet.* 1401a10: τοὺς δ' Ἑλληνας ἤλευθέρωσε). To these we could also add an argument from the earlier passage, *Euag.* 56, where the deeds of Konon and Euagoras are summarized (cf. “[...] Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν κατεναυμαχήθησαν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπεστερήθησαν, οἱ δ' Ἑλληνας ἤλευθέρωθησαν, ἡ δὲ πόλις ἡμῶν τῆς τε παλαιᾶς δόξης μέρος τι πάλιν ἀνέλαβεν [...]”). Keeping this in mind, one may also suggest that Aristotle’s quasi-enthymemes are derived from another Isocratean speech, namely *Philipp* 63–64, where the phrase about the liberation of Greeks (“τοὺς δ' Ἑλληνας ἤλευθέρωσεν”) more accords with the Aristotelian phrase. In this case, the main hero whose deeds are presented in a recapitulated manner is Konon.

On the other hand, there are still some uncertainties concerning the other two statements in Aristotelian quasi-enthymeme: neither *Euag.* 65–69, nor *Phil.* 63–64 give a clear explanation for the second statement concerning the subject of revenge (τοῖς δ' ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε). For this and some other reasons⁷⁸ we prefer to abstain from a more decisive attribution of the discussed reference to the main body of Isocratean references, but we still include them among the results of our

analysis, presented in Table 1 (under the heading “Dubious references”).

CONCLUSIONS

The value of the conclusions of the present research is only tentative because of the limitations of time, place and measures. Our analysis of the Isocratean references shows that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is indebted to Isocrates in several points. First of all, Isocratean works provided Stagirite himself with useful references for his analysis of the treatment of rhetorical material. They helped him to verbalize and visualize his own insightful observations. We may say that Isocratean references provided the Aristotelian theory with a certain degree of liveliness.

The majority of Isocratean examples in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* are taken from the most popular speeches concerning social, political, moral and educational questions. This could have contributed to Aristotle’s major concern with the deliberative aspect of rhetoric and to the original idea of rhetoric as a civic activity.

From our analysis, a tentative synthetic picture may be derived. All these unbound references, if arranged in a more concise order, constitute a tiny collection or catalogue (or “community” if we may use a metaphor) of about 40 constituents (“members”) governed by the three general rules or duties, *officia oratoris* – *heuresis*, *lexis*, *taxis*. The number of adherents to each of the duties is different. The sphere of *heuresis* has four small units of Isocratean quotes, the spheres of *lexis* and *taxis* have three larger units (or clusters)

⁷⁸ To illustrate his idea, Aristotle not always refers to a particular authority, but sometimes gives his own example. Cf. *Rhet.* 1410a31–36.

each, but units of the *lexis* sphere are the largest ones. Here we find 20 references to Isocratean works. They imply that it is the stylistic aspect of the Isocratean rhetoric that left the brightest stamp in Aristotle's theory. On the other hand, Stagirite's rather frequent concern with the thematic and structural variations taken from Isocratean speeches significantly broadens his original conception of rhetoric as a "counterpart" ("differing sister") of dialectic.

Aristotle's explicit remarks on Isocrates are usually positive. This points to a certain degree of reverence towards his former teacher. Reproaches and critical assessment are not evident but only implicit. In this respect, Isocrates holds a rather high position among other rhetoricians mentioned in *Rhetoric*, perhaps higher than his master Gorgias⁷⁹ and other sophists.

Quotations of Isocrates' works are of various degree of accuracy. Aristotle preferred to paraphrase him than to quote precisely (only eight precise quotations out of the total of 26 quotations *sensu stricto*). Perhaps, this could be explained in terms of objective pragmatism and the principle of economy of narration aimed at the main stylistic virtue – clarity. This fact also supports the idea that Aristotle used to quote from memory. However, it is too strong to say that he didn't use any written text of court and assembly speeches. At

least one reference to an Isocratean forensic speech and the very fact of the existence of the Aristotelian library slightly contradict this assumption. It is more cautious to state that Aristotle and his pupils, who wrote down his lectures, were not accurate enough to verify all the quotes according to their originals.

The analysis of Isocratean quotations shows the early stage of the reception of this rhetorician. Aristotle certainly values him as an authority of epideictic prose and a user (if not originator) of certain *topoi*, methods of argumentation, stylistic devices (especially periods and antitheses) and principles of composition relevant to this genre. However, Isocrates is never regarded as the first, the only or the best practitioner of any of the mentioned devices. We find no laudatory epithets of Isocrates in *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, the mere fact of quotation and reference to stylistic devices is indicative of Aristotle's favourable attitude, his implicit admiration and praise of the Isocratean rhetorical practice.

Our observations present neither a complete nor a perfect picture of the reception of the Isocratean rhetoric in the context of the Aristotelian tradition. The above analysis should be supplemented with further research based on the evidence of more sources and more personalities (including Isocratean disciples and enemies).

⁷⁹ He is criticised more sharply, especially concerning frigidity resulting from the usage of far-fetched metaphors (cf. *Rhet.* 1405b–1406b).

APPENDIX

Table 1. List of Isocratean references in Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* (E – exact quotation, NE – not exact quotation, EXP – explicit reference in which Isocrates is mentioned by name, IMP – implicit reference without mentioning Isocrates, DUB – dubious reference in which Isocrates is either implied or not)

I. ⁸⁰	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> I, 9, 1368a.5-7	Cf. Isocr. <i>Ev.</i> , 44–45; Cf. item Isocr. <i>Panath.</i> 30–32; Cf. item Isocr. <i>Busiris</i> 10; <i>De bigis</i> 29.	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> I, 9 1368a.19–21	Cf. Isocr. <i>Ev.</i> 37–39 (Euagoras and Cyrus)	NE, EXP
II.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 19, 1392b.10–12	Cf. Isocr. <i>In Callimachum</i> 15 (?)	NE, EXP
III.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 23, 1399a.1–3	Cf. Isocr. <i>Hel.</i> 18–38	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 23, 1399a.3	Cf. Isocr. <i>Hel.</i> 41–49	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 23, 1399a.4–6	Cf. Isocr. <i>Ev.</i> 51–52	NE, EXP
IV.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 23, 1399b.9–11	Cf. Isocr. <i>Antid.</i> 173	NE, EXP
V.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 7, 1408b.14–16	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 186	E, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 7, 1408b.16–17	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 96	E, EXP
VI.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1409b.34–36	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 1	E, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.2–5	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 35–36	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.5–7	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 41	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.7–9	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 48	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.9–10	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 72	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.10–12	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 89	E, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.12–13	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 105	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.13–14	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 149	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.15–16	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 181	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 9, 1410a.16–17	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 186	E, IMP
VII.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 10, 1410b.29–31	Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 73	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 10, 1411a.29–30	Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 12	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 10, 1411b.11–12	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 151	E, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 10, 1411b.13–15	Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 172	E, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 10, 1411b.16–19	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 180	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 11, 1411b.27–28	Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 10	NE, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 11, 1411b.28–29	Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 127	E, IMP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 11, 1412b.6–7	Cf. Isocr. <i>De pace</i> 101; Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 60-61	NE, EXP
VIII.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 14, 1414b.24–28	Cf. Isocr. <i>Helen</i> 1–15	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 14, 1414b.33–35	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 1–2	NE, EXP
IX.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418a.29–32	Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 110–114	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418a.32–33	Cf. Isocr. <i>De pace.</i> 27 (?)	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418a.33–34	Cf. Isocr. <i>Hel.</i> 22–38 (laus Thesei); <i>Busiris</i> 12–29 (laus Aegyptiorum); <i>Panath.</i> 72–84 (laus Agamemnonis)	NE, EXP
X.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418b.23–27	Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 4–7	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418b.27	Cf. Isocr. <i>Antid.</i> 132-139; 141-149	NE, EXP
	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 17, 1418b.33–36	Cf. Isocr., <i>Archidamas</i> , 50	NE, IMP

⁸⁰ Running number of reference or referential unit.

Dubious references			
i.	Arst. I, 1 , <i>Rhet.</i> 1354b.16–22; 1355a19-20	[?]	NE, DUB
ii.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> II, 24 , 1401a.8–12	Cf. Isocr. <i>Ev.</i> 65–69 (?); <i>Philipp.</i> 63–64 (?)	NE, DUB
iii.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 14 , 1414b.36– 1415a1	[?]	NE, DUB
iv.	Arst. <i>Rhet.</i> III, 16 , 1416b.30	Cf. Quint. <i>Inst.</i> IV, 2, 32	NE, DUB

Table 2. Isocratean quotations in comparison with extant texts from *Corpus Isocrateum*

I. Two tricks in the analysis of the subject and sources of epideictic discourse

1) Conversion of advice into praise

Excerpt from Aristotle's text (ed. W. D. Ross)	Corresponding Isocratean passage (ed. G. Norlin)
<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1368a1–8: ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποιῶν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέμεναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δ' ἔπαινον „μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ <ἐπὶ> τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν". ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινῶν βούλη, ὄρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὄρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσεις.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Ev.</i>, 44–45: ἅπαντα γὰρ τὸν χρόνον διετέλεσεν οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἀπάντων ἀρχῶν, νομίμως δὲ τοὺς ἐξαμαρτόντας κολάζων· [...] μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δι' αὐτόν γιγνομένοις; τοὺς μὲν φίλους ταῖς εὐεργεσίαις ὑφ' αὐτῶ ποιούμενος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ καταδουλούμενος· [...]</p> <p>Cf. item Isocr. <i>Panath.</i> 30–32: Τίνας οὖν καλῶ πεπαιδευμένους, ἐπειδὴ τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἀποδοκιμάζω; [...] [32] τέταρτον, ὅπερ μέγιστον, τοὺς μὴ διαφθειρομένους ὑπὸ τῶν εὐπραγιῶν μηδ' ἐξισταμένους αὐτῶν μηδ' ὑπερηφάνους γιγνομένους, ἀλλ' ἐμμένοντας τῇ τάξει τῇ τῶν εὐφρονούντων καὶ μὴ μάλλον χαίροντας τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρξασιν ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς διὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν καὶ φρόνησιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένοις.</p> <p>Cf. item Isocr. <i>Busiris</i> 10; <i>De bigis</i> 29.</p>

2) Comparison for the sake of amplification

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1368a16–22: καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὐρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη, καὶ εἰς τοῦτον πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἴππόλοχον, καὶ <εἰς> Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι ὁμοίως δὲ [1368a.19] καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κἂν μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸν εὐπορῆς, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαιῶν βελτίων.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Ev. 37–39 (Euagoras and Cyrus)</p>
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II. Enthymeme based on argument *a fortiori*

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1392a8: Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦ λέγωμεν. [...] <i>Rhet.</i> 1392b10–13: καὶ εἰ τοῖς χεῖροσι καὶ ἤττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὐθύνοσ ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὐρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἀδυνατοῦ δηλόν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. In Callimachum [!] 15: Θαυμάζω δ’ εἰ αὐτὸν μὲν ἱκανὸν γινῶναι νομίζει ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀντὶ μυριάων δραχμῶν διακοσίας ἐθελῆσαι λαβεῖν, ἐμὲ δ’ οὐκ ἂν οἶεται τοῦτ’ ἐξευρεῖν, εἴπερ ἠβουλόμην ψευδῆ λέγειν, ὅτι πλέον ἔδει φάσκειν τούτων δεδωκέναι.</p>
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III. *Topoi* and enthymemes based on previous judgement and accepted opinions

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1398b28–1399a4: ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφῶ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν· ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἀρίστιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰπόντα, ὡς ᾤετο· „ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ’ ἑταῖρος ἡμῶν”, ἔφη, „οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον”, λέγων τὸν Σωκράτη, καὶ Ἥγησίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κεχηρμένος Ὀλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ τὰ αὐτὰ δοκεῖ ἄπερ τῷ πατρί, ὡς αἰσχροὺς ὄν τὰναντία εἰπεῖν, καὶ περὶ τῆς Ἑλένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν, καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὅτι αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν,</p> <p><i>Rhet.</i> 1399a4–6: καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησὶν „Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντα τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν”</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Hel. 18–38</p> <p>Cf. Isocr. Hel. 41–49</p> <p>Cf. Isocr. Ev. 51–52: ὦν [= Ἑλλήνων] τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ὀνομαστὶ διελθεῖν πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη, [52] Κόνωνα δὲ τὸν διὰ πλείστας ἀρετὰς πρωτεύσαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι δυστυχησάσης τῆς πόλεως ἐξ ἀπάντων ἐκλεξάμενος ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἦλθεν, νομίσας καὶ τῷ σώματι βεβαιοτάτην εἶναι τὴν παρ’ ἐκείνῳ καταφυγὴν καὶ τῇ πόλει τάχιστ’ ἂν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι βοηθόν.</p>
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IV. *Topoi* based on identification of analogous antecedents and consequents

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1399b5–14: ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸ συμβαίνει ἐὰν ἢ ταυτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἐξ ὧν συμβαίνει ταῦτά· οἷον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεοὺς ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαίνειν ἐξ ἐκάστου λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ αἰεὶ „μέλλετε δὲ κρῖνειν οὐ περὶ Ἰσοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρῆ φιλοσοφεῖν” καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίδοναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ προσταττόμενον. Ληπτέον δ’ ὀπότερον ἂν ἢ χρῆσιμον.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Antid.</i> 173: Ὡν ἐνθυμουμένους χρῆ μηδενὸς πράγματος ἀνευ λόγου κατα-γιγνώσκειν, μηδ’ ὁμοίως διακεῖσθαι δικά-ζοντας ὥσπερ ἐν ἰδίαις διατριβαῖς, ἀλλὰ διακριβοῦσθαι περὶ ἐκάστου καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν, μεμνημένους τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν νόμων καθ’ οὓς συνεληλύθατε δικάσοντες. Ἔστιν δ’ οὐ περὶ μικρῶν οὐθ’ ὁ λόγος οὐθ’ ἡ κρίσις ἐν ἢ καθέσταμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων· οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἐμοῦ μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψῆφον διοίσειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ᾧ πολλοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν.</p>
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V. Timely use of poetic diction and rare words (in the state of enthusiasm)

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1408b.1–2: τὸ δ’ εὐκαίρως ἢ μὴ εὐκαίρως χρῆσθαι κοινὸν ἀπάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστίν. [...] <i>Rhet.</i> 1408b9–16: ἐὰν οὖν τὰ μαλακὰ σκληρῶς καὶ τὰ σκληρὰ μαλακῶς λέγεται, πιθανὸν γίγνεται. τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τὰ διπλὰ καὶ [τὰ] ἐπίθετα πλείω καὶ τὰ ξένα μάλιστα ἀρμόττει λέγοντι παθητικῶς· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ κακὸν φάναι οὐρανόμενες, ἢ πελώριον εἰπεῖν, καὶ ὅταν ἔχη ἤδη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καὶ ποιῆση ἐνθουσιάσαι ἢ ἐπαίνοισι ἢ ψόγοις ἢ ὀργῇ ἢ φιλίᾳ, οἷον καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Πανηγυρικῷ ἐπὶ τέλει „φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην”</p> <p>1408b16–20: καὶ „οἴτινες ἔτλησαν”· φθέγγονται γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὥστε καὶ ἀποδέχονται δηλονότι ὁμοίως ἔχοντες. διὸ καὶ τῇ ποιήσει ἤρμωσεν· ἐνθεον γὰρ ἢ ποιήσις. ἢ δὴ οὕτως δεῖ, ἢ μετ’ εἰρωνείας, ὥσπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρω.</p>	<p>Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 186: Φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῃν τινὰ χρῆ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας;</p> <p>Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 96: Καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἐκείνων ἄνδρες ἀμείνους ἢ μάλλον φιλέλληνας ὄντες ἐπιδειχθεῖεν οἴτινες ἔτλησαν ἐπιδεῖν, ὥστε μὴ τοῖς λοιποῖς αἰτίοι γενέσθαι τῆς δουλείας, ἐρήμην μὲν τὴν πόλιν γενομένην, τὴν δὲ χώραν πορθομένην, ἱερὰ δὲ συλῶμενα καὶ νεῶς ἐμπιπραμένους, ἅπαντα δὲ τὸν πόλεμον περὶ τὴν πατρίδα τὴν αὐτῶν γιγνόμενον;</p>
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VI. Examples of disjunctive and antithetic clauses of the periodic style

<p>1409b33–36: τῆς δὲ ἐν κώλοις λέξεως ἡ μὲν διηρημένη ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ ἀντικειμένη, διηρημένη μὲν, οἷον „πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων”,</p>	<p>Isocr. Paneg. 1–2: Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων εὐτυχίας οὕτω μεγάλων δωρεῶν ἠξίωσαν, τοῖς δ’ ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἰδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτω παρασκευάσασιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι, τούτοις δ’ οὐδεμίαν τιμὴν ἀπένειμαν, [2] ὧν εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ποιήσασθαι πρόνοιαν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀθλητῶν δις τοσαύτην ῥώμην λαβόντων οὐδὲν ἂν πλέον γένοιτο τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἑνὸς δ’ ἀνδρὸς εὐ φρονήσαντος ἅπαντες ἂν ἀπολαύσειαν οἱ βουλόμενοι κοινωνεῖν τῆς ἐκείνου διανοίας.</p>
<p>1409b36–1410a.5: ἀντικειμένη δὲ ἐν ἡ ἑκατέρῳ τῷ κώλῳ ἢ πρὸς ἐναντίῳ ἐναντίον σύγκειται ἢ ταυτὸ ἐπέξευκται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, οἷον „ἀμφοτέρους δ’ ὤνησαν, καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πλείῳ τῆς οἴκοι προσεκτήσαντο, τοῖς δ’ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι κατέλιπον”· ἐναντία ὑπομονὴ ἀκολούθησις, ἱκανὸν πλεῖον.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 35–36: ἀμφοτέρους δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἀκολουθήσαντας καὶ τοὺς ὑπομείναντας ἔσωσαν· [36] τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἱκανὴν τὴν οἴκοι χώραν κατέλιπον, τοῖς δὲ πλείῳ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐπόρισαν.</p>
<p>1410a5–7: „ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι βουλομένοις”· ἀπόλαυσις κτήσει ἀντίκειται.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 41: Τὴν τοίνυν ἄλλην διοίκησιν οὕτω φιλοξένως κατεσκευάσατο καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας οἰκείως ὥστε καὶ τοῖς χρημάτων δεομένοις καὶ τοῖς ἀπολαῦσαι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀμφοτέροις ἀρμόττειν καὶ μήτε τοῖς εὐδαιμονοῦσιν μήτε τοῖς δυστυχούσιν ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀχρήστως ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἑκατέροις αὐτῶν εἶναι παρ’ ἡμῖν, τοῖς μὲν ἡδίστας διατριβάς, τοῖς δ’ ἀσφαλεστάτην καταφυγὴν.</p>
<p>1410a7–9: καὶ ἔτι „συμβαίνει πολλάκις ἐν</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 47–49: Φιλοσοφίαν τοίνυν, ἢ πάντα ταῦτα συνεξεῦρε καὶ συγκατεσκεύασεν [...] ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοῖς δ’ ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσιν, [48] συνειδυῖα μὲν ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν ζῶων ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αὐτῶν διηνέγκαμεν, ὁρῶσα δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας πράξεις οὕτω ταραχώδεις οὔσας τὰς τύχας ὥστε πολλάκις ἐν αὐταῖς</p>

ταύταις καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας κατορθοῦν”.

1410a9–10: „εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον”.

1410a10–12: „πλευσαὶ μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἄθω διορύξας.”

καὶ τοὺς φρονίμους ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἀνοήτους κατορθοῦν, τῶν δὲ λόγων τῶν καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς ἐχόντων οὐ μετὸν τοῖς φαύλοις, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς εὐ φρονούσης ἔργον ὄντας, [49] καὶ τοὺς τε σοφοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀμαθεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ταύτῃ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διαφέροντας, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρίας καὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσκομένους, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνωμένους [...].

cf. *Isocr. Paneg. 71–72*: Καλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πρόποντα τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ἀδελφὰ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ τοιαῦθ’ οἷά περ εἰκὸς τοὺς ἐκ τοιούτων γεγονότας οἱ πρὸς Δαρκεῖον καὶ Ξέρξην πολεμήσαντες ἔπραξαν. Μεγίστου γὰρ πολέμου συστάντος ἐκείνου καὶ πλείστων κινδύνων εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον συμπεσόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν πολεμίων ἀνυποστάτων οἰομένων εἶναι διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τῶν δὲ συμμάχων ἀνυπέρβλητον ἡγουμένων ἔχειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, [72] ἀμφοτέρων κρατήσαντες ὡς ἐκατέρων προσήκεν, καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κινδύνους διενεγκόντες, εὐθὺς μὲν τῶν ἀριστείων ἠξιώθησαν, οὐ πολλῶ δ’ ὕστερον τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἔλαβον, δόντων μὲν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων, οὐκ ἀμφισβητούντων δὲ τῶν νῦν ἡμᾶς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ζητούντων.

Isocr. Paneg. 89: Ὅς εἰς τοσοῦτον ἦλθεν ὑπερηφανίας ὥστε μικρὸν μὲν ἡγησάμενος ἔργον εἶναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα χειρώσασθαι, βουληθεῖς δὲ τοιοῦτον μνημεῖον καταλιπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεώς ἐστιν, οὐ πρότερον ἐπαύσατο πρὶν ἐξεῦρε καὶ συνηγάκασεν ὃ πάντες θρυλοῦσιν, ὥστε τῶ στρατοπέδῳ πλευσαὶ μὲν διὰ τῆς ἠπείρου, πεζεῦσαι δὲ διὰ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸν μὲν Ἑλλήσποντον ζεύξας, τὸν δ’ Ἄθω διορύξας.

cf. *Isocr. Paneg. 104–105*: Οὐ γὰρ ἐφθονοῦμεν ταῖς ἀξανομέναις αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ταραχὰς ἐνεποιούμεν πολιτείας ἐναντίας παρακαθιστάντες [...], ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν συμμάχων ὁμόνοιαν κοινὴν ὠφέλειαν νομίζοντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς νόμοις ἀπάσας τὰς

<p>1410a12–13: „καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως στέρεσθαι.”</p>	<p>πόλεις διωκοῦμεν, συμμαχικῶς, ἀλλ’ οὐ δεσποτικῶς βουλευόμενοι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅλων μὲν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες, ἰδία δ’ ἐκάστους ἐλευθέρους ἔωντες εἶναι, [105] καὶ τῶ μὲν πλήθει βοηθοῦντες, ταῖς δὲ δυναστείαις πολεμοῦντες, δεινὸν οἰόμενοι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπὸ τοῖς ὀλίγοις εἶναι καὶ τοὺς ταῖς οὐσίαις ἐνδεεστέρους, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα μηδὲν χεῖρους ὄντας, ἀπελαύνεσθαι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔτι δὲ κοινῆς τῆς πατρίδος οὔσης τοὺς μὲν τυραννεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μετοικεῖν καὶ φύσει πολίτας ὄντας νόμῳ τῆς πολιτείας ἀποστερεῖσθαι.</p>
<p>1410a13–14: „οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλοντο, οἱ δ’ αἰσχροῦς ἐσώθησαν.”</p>	<p>cf. Isocr. Paneg. 149: Κεφάλαιον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων· ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ λείαν ἐλθόντες, οὐδὲ κώμην καταλαβόντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα στρατεύσαντες, ἀσφαλέστερον κατέβησαν τῶν περὶ φιλίας ὡς αὐτὸν πρεσβευόντων. Ὡστε μοι δοκοῦσιν ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τόποις σαφῶς ἐπιδεδείχθαι τὴν αὐτῶν μαλακίαν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ παραλία τῆς Ἀσίας πολλὰς μάχας ἠττηνται, καὶ διαβάντες εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην δίκην ἔδοσαν, – οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κακῶς ἀπώλονθ’, οἱ δ’ αἰσχροῦς ἐσώθησαν, – καὶ τελευτῶντες ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καταγέλαστοι γεγόνασιν.</p>
<p>1410a15–16: „καὶ ἰδία μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις χρῆσθαι, κοινῇ δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν δουλεύοντας.”</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 181–182: Ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀξιὸν ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως τῶν τε γεγενημένων δίκην ληψόμεθα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα διορθωσόμεθα. Καὶ γὰρ αἰσχροῦς ἰδία μὲν τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκέταις ἀξιούν χρῆσθαι, δημοσίᾳ δὲ τοσοῦτους τῶν συμμάχων περιορᾶν αὐτοῖς δουλεύοντας, καὶ τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ Τρωϊκὰ γενομένους μίας γυναικὸς ἀρπασθείσης οὕτως ἅπαντας συνοργισθῆναι τοῖς ἀδικηθεῖσιν ὥστε μὴ πρότερον παύσασθαι πολεμοῦντας, πρὶν τὴν πόλιν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τολμήσαντος ἔξαμαρτεῖν, [182] ἡμᾶς δ’ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑβριζομένης μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, ἐξὸν ἡμῖν εὐχῆς ἀξία διαπράξασθαι.</p>
<p>1410a16–17: „ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν.”</p>	<p>Isocr. Paneg. 186: Φήμην δὲ καὶ μνήμην καὶ δόξαν πόσῃν τινα χρῆ νομίζειν ἢ ζῶντας ἔξειν ἢ τελευτήσαντας καταλείψειν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἔργοις ἀριστεύσαντας; Ὅπου γὰρ οἱ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον πολεμή-</p>

	<p>σαντες καὶ μίαν πόλιν ἐλόντες τοιούτων ἐπαίνων ἠξιώθησαν, ποίων τινῶν χρῆ προσδοκᾶν ἐγκωμίων τεύξεσθαι τοὺς ὅλης τῆς Ἀσίας κρατήσαντας; Τίς γὰρ ἢ τῶν ποιεῖν δυναμένων ἢ τῶν λέγειν ἐπισταμένων οὐ πονήσει καὶ φιλοσοφήσει βουλόμενος ἅμα τῆς θ' αὐτοῦ διανοίας καὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀρετῆς μνημεῖον εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον καταλιπεῖν;</p>
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VII. Pretty enthymemes based on antithesis, metaphor, liveliness and witty expressions

<p><i>Rhet.</i> 1410b27–35: κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ λεγομένου τὰ τοιαῦτα εὐδοκιμεῖ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τῷ μὲν σχήματι, ἐὰν ἀντικειμένως λέγηται, οἷον „καὶ τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν εἰρήνην νομιζόντων τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις πόλεμον“· ἀντίκειται πόλεμος εἰρήνῃ· τοῖς δ' ὀνόμασιν, ἐὰν ἔχη μεταφορὰν, καὶ ταύτην μὴτ' ἄλλοτριαν, χαλεπὸν γὰρ συνιδεῖν, μὴτ' ἐπιπόλαιον, οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖ πάσχειν. ἔτι εἰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖ ὄραν γὰρ δεῖ [τὰ] πρᾶττόμενα μᾶλλον ἢ μέλλοντα. [...]</p> <p>1411a26–30: καὶ „ὥστε βοῆσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα“, καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ μεταφορὰ καὶ πρὸ ὀμμάτων. καὶ ὥσπερ Κηφισόδοτος εὐλαβεῖσθαι ἐκέλευεν μὴ πολλὰς ποιήσωσιν τὰς συνδρομάς [ἐκκλησίας]. καὶ Ἰσοκράτης πρὸς τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν. [...]</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 73–74: Αἰσθάνομαι γὰρ σε διαβαλλόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν σοῖ μὲν φθονούτων, τὰς δὲ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν εἰθισμένων εἰς ταραχὰς καθιστάνας, καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν τοῖς ἄλλοις κοινὴν πόλεμον τοῖς αὐτῶν ἰδίοις εἶναι νομιζόντων, οἱ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ἀμελήσαντες περὶ τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως λέγουσιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτην αὐξάνεται, καὶ σὺ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη πᾶσιν ἡμῖν ἐπιβουλεύεις, καὶ λόγῳ μὲν μέλλεις Μεσσηνίους βοηθεῖν ἐὰν τὰ περὶ Φωκείας διοικήσης, ἔργῳ δ' ὑπὸ σαυτῷ ποιεῖσθαι Πελοπόννησον· ὑπάρχουσι δὲ σοι Θετταλοὶ μὲν καὶ Θηβαῖοι καὶ πάντες οἱ τῆς Ἀμφικτυονίας μετέχοντες ἔτοιμοι συνακολουθεῖν, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ Μεσσηνιοὶ καὶ Μεγαλοπολίται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολλοὶ συμπολεμεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀναστάτους Λακεδαιμονίους· ἦν δὲ ταῦτα πράξης, ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὀραδίως κρατήσεις.</p> <p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Philipp.</i> 12–13: Ἄλλ' ὅμως ἀπάσας ἐγὼ ταύτας τὰς δυσχερεῖας ὑπεριδῶν οὕτως ἐπὶ γήρως γέγονα φιλότιμος ὥστ' ἠβουλήθην ἅμα τοῖς πρὸς σὲ λεγομένοις καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίψασιν ὑποδείξαι καὶ ποιῆσαι φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ μὲν ταῖς πανηγύρεσιν ἐνοχλεῖν καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας λέγειν τοὺς συντρέχοντας ἐν αὐταῖς πρὸς οὐδένα λέγειν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄκυροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς βουλομένους μὴ μάτην φλυαρεῖν, ἀλλὰ προὔργου τι ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς οἰομένους ἀγαθὸν τι κοινὸν εὐρηκεῖναι τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐὰν πανηγυρίζειν, αὐτοὺς δ' ὧν εἰσηγοῦνται ποιήσασθαι τινα προστάτην τῶν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν</p>
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1411b4–13: καὶ τὸ φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσοντας, πρὸ ὀμμάτων <καὶ> μεταφορᾷ. καὶ Λυκολέων ὑπὲρ Χαβρίου „οὐδὲ τὴν ἰκετηρίαν αἰσχυρθέντες αὐτοῦ, τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν χαλκῆν“· μεταφορᾷ γὰρ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ὀμμάτων κινδυνεύοντος γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἰκετεύει ἢ εἰκῶν, τὸ „ἔμψυχον δὴ ἄψυχον“, τὸ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τῆς πόλεως ἔργων. καὶ „**πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες**“· τὸ γὰρ μελετᾶν αὖξιν τι ἐστίν. καὶ ὅτι „τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ“· ἄμφω γὰρ δηλοῖ τι.

1411b13–15: „**οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα**“· ἄμφω γὰρ ἐστὶν μέλλοντα, καὶ ἡ ἀναβολὴ καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη εἰρήνη.

1411b16–21: καὶ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας φάναι **τρόπαιον εἶναι πολὺ κάλλιον τῶν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις γινομένων**· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν καὶ μιᾶς τύχης, αὐταὶ δ’ ὑπὲρ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου· ἄμφω γὰρ νίκης σημεῖα. καὶ ὅτι αἱ πόλεις τῷ ψόγῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μεγάλας εὐθύνας διδόασιν· ἢ γὰρ εὐθυνα βλάβη τις δικαία ἐστίν.

1411b24–28: λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει, οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορᾷ, (ἄμφω γὰρ τέλεια), ἀλλ’ οὐ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν· ἀλλὰ τὸ „**ἀνθοῦσαν ἔχοντος τὴν ἀκμὴν**“ ἐνέργεια,

δυναμένων καὶ δόξαν μεγάλην ἔχόντων, εἴπερ μέλλουσι τινες προσέξιν αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν.

Isocr. Paneg. 151: Οἱ δ’ ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις δόξαις ὄντες αὐτῶν ὁμαλῶς μὲν οὐδὲ κοινῶς οὐδὲ πολιτικῶς οὐδεπώποτ’ ἐβίωσαν, ἅπαντα δὲ τὸν χρόνον διάγουσιν εἰς μὲν τοὺς ὑβρίζοντες, τοῖς δὲ δουλεύοντες, ὡς ἂν ἄνθρωποι μάλιστα τὰς φύσεις διαφθαρείεν, καὶ τὰ μὲν σώματα διὰ τοὺς πλοῦτους τρυφῶντες, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς διὰ τὰς μοναρχίας ταπεινάς καὶ περιδεεῖς ἔχοντες, ἐξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς βασιλείοις καὶ προκαλινδούμενοι καὶ **πάντα τρόπον μικρὸν φρονεῖν μελετῶντες**, θνητὸν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνούντες καὶ δαίμονα προσγορεύοντες, τῶν δὲ θεῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὀλιγοφροῦντες.

Isocr. Paneg. 172: Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅσῳ μικροψυχότεροι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες οἱ προεστῶτες ἡμῶν, τοσοῦτω τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρρωμενεστέρως δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀπαλλαγῆσόμεθα τῆς παρουσίας ἔχθρας. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ μάτην ποιούμεθα τὰς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης συνθήκας· **οὐ γὰρ διαλυόμεθα τοὺς πολέμους, ἀλλ’ ἀναβαλλόμεθα** καὶ περιμένομεν τοὺς καιροὺς ἐν οἷς ἀνηκεστόν τι κακὸν ἀλλήλους ἐργάσασθαι δυνησόμεθα.

Cf. Isocr. Paneg. 180: Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκασεν ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν καταθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον **τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις γινομένων**· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ μικρῶν ἔργων καὶ μιᾶς τύχης ἐστίν, αὐταὶ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἅπαντος τοῦ πολέμου καὶ καθ’ ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐστήκασιν.

cf. Isocr. Philipp. 10–11: Ταῦτα δὲ διανοηθεὶς καὶ νομίσας οὐδέποτ’ ἂν εὐρεθῆναι καλλίω ταύτης ὑπόθεσιν οὐδὲ κοινοτέραν οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἅπασιν ἡμῖν συμφέρουσαν, ἐπήρθητι πάλιν γράψαι περὶ αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν οὐδὲν τῶν περὶ ἑμαυτὸν, ἀλλ’ εἰδὼς μὲν τὸν λόγον τοῦτον οὐ τῆς ἡλικίας τῆς ἐμῆς δεόμενον ἀλλ’ ἄνδρὸς **ἀνθοῦσαν τὴν ἀκμὴν ἔχοντος** καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολὺ τῶν

<p>1411b28–32: καὶ τὸ „σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄφετον” [Ἐλεύθερον] ἐνέργεια, καὶ <τοῦντεῦθεν οὖν> Ἕλληνας ἄξαντες ποσίν· τὸ ἄξαντες ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορὰ ταχὺ γὰρ λέγει.</p>	<p>ἄλλων διαφέροντος, [11] ὁρῶν δ’ ὅτι χαλεπὸν ἔστιν περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν δύο λόγους ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν, ἄλλως τε κἂν ὁ πρότερον ἐκδοθεὶς οὕτως ἢ γεγραμμένος ὥστε καὶ τοὺς βασκαίνοντας ἡμᾶς μιμεῖσθαι καὶ θαυμάζειν αὐτὸν μᾶλλον τῶν καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἐπαινούντων.</p> <p>Isocr. Philipp. 127: Διὸ καὶ σοὶ νομίζω συμφέρειν οὕτως ἀνάνδρως διακειμένων τῶν ἄλλων προστῆναι τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. Προσῆκει δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τοῖς ἀφ’ Ἡρακλέους πεφυκῶσι καὶ τοῖς ἐν πολιτεία καὶ νόμοις ἐνδεδεμένοις ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν στέργειν ἐν ἧ’ τυγχάνουσι κατοικοῦντες, σὲ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄφετον γεγεννημένον ἅπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα πατρίδα νομίζειν, ὥσπερ ὁ γεννήσας ὑμᾶς, καὶ κινδυνεύειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὁμοίως, ὥσπερ ὑπὲρ ὧν μάλιστα σπουδάσεις.</p>
<p>1412b4–11: οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ ἀστεῖα, οἷον τὸ φάναι Ἀθηναίοις τὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχὴν μὴ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν· ὄνασθαι γάρ. ἢ ὥσπερ Ἰσοκράτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆ πόλει ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν κακῶν. ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ ὁ οὐκ ἂν ᾤηθη τις ἐρεῖν, τοῦτ’ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐγνώσθη ὅτι ἀληθές· τό τε γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν φάναι ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐθὲν σοφόν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτω λέγει ἀλλ’ ἄλλως, καὶ ἀρχὴν οὐχ ὁ εἶπεν ἀπόφησιν, ἀλλ’ ἄλλως.</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. De pace 101: Χρῆ δὲ τὰς αἰτίας ἐπιφέρειν οὐ τοῖς κακοῖς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἐξ ὧν ἐπὶ τὴν τελευταίαν ταύτην κατηνέχθησαν. Ὅστε πολὺ ἂν τις ἀληθέστερα τυγχάνοι λέγων, εἰ φαίη τότε τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς γεγενῆσθαι τῶν συμφορῶν, ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης παρελάμβανον ἐκτῶντο γὰρ δύναμιν οὐδὲν ὁμοίαν τῇ πρότερον ὑπαρχούσῃ.</p> <p>Cf. Isocr. Philipp. 60–61: πεισθέντες γὰρ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν δυνάμεως ἐπιθυμήσαι, καὶ τὴν κατὰ γῆν ἡγεμονίαν ἀπώλεσαν, [61] ὥστ’ εἰ τις φαίη τότε τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς γίγνεσθαι τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ὅτε τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης ἐλάμβανον, οὐκ ἂν ἐξελεγχθεῖ ψευδόμενος.</p>

VIII. Methods of composing epideictic proems: initial digression and *psogos*

<p>1414b19–35: Τὸ μὲν οὖν προοίμιόν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ λόγου, ὅπερ ἐν ποιήσει πρόλογος καὶ ἐν ἀλῆσει προαύλιον· πάντα γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ταυτ' εἰσὶ, καὶ οἷον ὁδοποιήσις τῷ ἐπιόντι. τὸ μὲν οὖν προαύλιον ὅμοιον τῷ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμιῳ· καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀλῆται, ὅ τι ἂν εὐ ἔχωσιν ἀλῆσαι, τοῦτο προαυλήσαντες συνῆψαν τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεῖ οὕτως γράφειν, ὅ τι [γὰρ] ἂν βούληται εὐθὺ εἰπόντα ἐνδοῦναι καὶ συνάψαι, ὅπερ πάντες ποιούσιν. παράδειγμα τὸ τῆς Ἰσοκράτους Ἑλένης προοίμιον· οὐθὲν γὰρ κοινὸν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς καὶ Ἑλένῃ. ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἐκτοπίση, ἀρμόττει, καὶ μὴ ὅλον τὸν λόγον ὁμοειδῆ εἶναι. λέγεται δὲ τὰ τῶν ἐπιδεικτικῶν προοίμια ἐξ ἐπαινοῦ ἢ ψόγου (οἷον Γοργίας μὲν ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ λόγῳ „ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄξιοι θαυμάζεσθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες“· ἐπαινεῖ γὰρ τοὺς τὰς πανηγύρεις συνάγοντας· Ἰσοκράτης δὲ ψέγει ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων ἀρετὰς δωρεαῖς ἐτίμησαν, τοῖς δ' εὐ φρονούσιν οὐθὲν ἄθλον ἐποίησαν),</p>	<p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Helen</i> 1–15 (too long to be quoted here)</p> <p>Cf. Isocr. <i>Paneg.</i> 1–2: Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα τῶν τὰς πανηγύρεις συναγαγόντων καὶ τοὺς γυμνικοὺς ἀγῶνας καταστησάντων, ὅτι τὰς μὲν τῶν σωμάτων εὐτυχίας οὕτω μεγάλων δωρεῶν ἠξίωσαν, τοῖς δ' ὑπὲρ τῶν κοινῶν ἰδίᾳ πονήσασι καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς οὕτω παρασκευάσασιν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελεῖν δύνασθαι, τούτοις δ' οὐδεμίαν τιμὴν ἀπένειμαν, ὧν εἰκὸς ἦν αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ποιήσασθαι πρόνοιαν·</p>
<p>1414b35–1415a1: καὶ ἀπὸ συμβουλῆς (οἷον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν, διὸ καὶ αὐτὸς Ἀριστείδην ἐπαινεῖ, ἢ τοὺς τοιούτους οἱ μῆτε εὐδοκιμοῦσιν μῆτε φαῦλοι, ἀλλ' ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἄδηλοι, ὥσπερ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ Πριάμου· οὗτος γὰρ συμβουλεύει)</p>	<p>[?]</p>

IX. Employment of accusation in deliberative discourse and using witnesses in praise

<p>1418a21–32: τὸ δὲ δημηγορεῖν χαλεπώτερον τοῦ δικάζεσθαι, εἰκότως [...] καὶ οὐκ ἔχει πολλὰς διατριβάς, οἷον πρὸς ἀντίδικον ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἢ παθητικὸν ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἤκιστα πάντων, ἐὰν μὴ ἐξιστῇ. δεῖ οὖν ἀποροῦντα τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀθήνησι ῥήτορες ποιοῦσι καὶ Ἰσοκράτης· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλευῶν κατηγορεῖ, οἷον Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν ἐν τῷ πανηγυρικῷ,</p>	<p>Cf. <i>Isocr. Paneg.</i> 110–114 (too long to be quoted here)</p>
<p>1418a32–33: Χάριτος δ' ἐν τῷ συμμαχικῷ.</p>	<p>Cf. <i>Isocr. De pace.</i> 27: Ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἕξω τῶν εἰθισμένων ἐπιχειροῦντα δημηγορεῖν καὶ τὰς ὑμετέρας γνώμας μεταστήσαι βουλόμενον πολλῶν πραγμάτων ἄψασθαι καὶ διὰ μακροτέρων τοὺς λόγους ποιήσασθαι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναμνήσαι, τῶν δὲ κατηγορησῶν, τὰ δ' ἐπαιέσαι, περὶ δὲ τῶν συμβουλευσῶν· μόλις γὰρ ἂν τις ὑμᾶς ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον φρονῆσαι δυνηθεῖη προαγαγεῖν.</p>
<p>1418a33–36: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικαῖς δεῖ τὸν λόγον ἐπεισοδιῶν ἐπαίνοισι, οἷον Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ· αἰεὶ γὰρ τινα εἰσάγει. καὶ ὁ ἔλεγεν Γοργίας, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπολείπει αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος, ταῦτό ἐστιν· [...]</p>	<p>Cf. <i>Isocr. Hel.</i> 22–38 (laus Thesei); <i>Busiris</i> 12–29 (laus Aegyptiorum); <i>Panath.</i> 72–84 (laus Agamemnonis)</p>

X. Indirect self-characterization (self-defence or self-praise) through the words of another person

<p>1418b23–39: περὶ μὲν οὖν πίστεων ταῦτα. εἰς δὲ τὸ ἦθος, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν ἢ ἐπίφθονον ἢ μακρολογίαν ἢ ἀντιλογίαν ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ἄλλου ἢ λοιδορίαν ἢ ἀγροικίαν, ἕτερον χρῆμα λέγοντα ποιεῖν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Φιλίππῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀντιδόσει, καὶ ὡς Ἀρχίλοχος ψέγει· [...]</p>	<p>Cf. <i>Isocr. Philipp.</i> 4–7 Cf. <i>Isocr. Antid.</i> 132–139; 141–149</p>
<p>δεῖ δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ γνώμας ποιεῖν ἐνίοτε, οἷον „χρῆ δὲ τὰς διαλλαγὰς ποιεῖν τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας εὐτυχοῦντας· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μέγιστα πλεονεκτοῖεν,” ἐνθυμηματικῶς δὲ „εἰ γὰρ δεῖ, ὅταν ὠφελιμώταται ὦσιν καὶ πλεονεκτικώταται αἰ καταλλαγῆναι, τότε καταλλάττεσθαι, εὐτυχοῦντας δεῖ καταλλάττεσθαι.”</p>	<p>Cf. <i>Isocr., Archidamas</i>, 50: Χρῆ δὲ τοὺς μὲν εὖ πράττοντας τῆς εἰρήνης ἐπιθυμεῖν· – ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ τῇ καταστάσει πλείστον ἂν τις χρόνον τὰ παρόντα διαφυλάξειεν – τοὺς δὲ δυστυχοῦντας τῷ πολέμῳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν· – ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ταραχῆς καὶ τῆς καινουργίας θάπτον ἂν μεταβολῆς τύχοιεν</p>

NUORODOS Į ISOKRATĄ ARISTOTELIO RETORIKOS MENE

Tomas Veteikis

S a n t r a u k a

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos nuorodos į Isokratą Aristotelio *Retorikoje* kaip vienas iš jo pažiūrų refleksijos akademikų ir peripatetikų retorinės tradicijoje šaltinių. Nors Isokrato citatos bei jo kalbų parafrazėmis iliustruotos retorinės priemonės jau seniai buvo apžvelgtos ne vieno mokslininko, vis dėlto ligi šiol nėra aiškaus ir sistemingo jų tyrimo. Dalis mokslininkų gilinosi tik į citatų Aristotelio tekste identifikavimą ir kodifikavimą, dalis lygino tam tikras abiejų autorių vartotas sąvokas (pvz., metafora, entimema, topas), išskirdami jų reikšminius skirtumus, dar kiti gretino jų pedagoginę veiklą, išvėlgdami tarpusavio konkurenciją ir edukacinių tikslų skirtumą. Nepaisant to, Isokrato nuorodų reikšmė Aristotelio raštų korpusė vis dar nėra aiškiai nustatyta. Šiuo straipsniu siekiama aptarti pagrindinius Isokrato retorinių priemonių ir jo kalbų citavimo atvejus Aristotelio *Retorikoje* bei suvesti juos į tam tikrą pradinę sistemą, kurios pagrindu būtų galima atlikti gilesnius Isokrato recepcijos Aristotelio ir peripatetikų retorikos mokslo tradicijoje tyrimus. Straipsnyje aprašoma dešimt svarbesnių Isokrato nuorodų pasirodymo Stagiriečio veikale atvejų, iš kurių kiekvienas reprezentuojamas skirtingo kiekio ir kokybės citatomis, parafrazėmis ar užuominomis, kreipiamas dėmesys į citavimo tikslumą, nuorodos eksplikatyvumą, Isokrato stiliaus ir loginių metodų vertinimą. Kad analizė būtų trumpesnė, citatos ir nuorodos grupuojamos teminiu principu, išskiriant sąlygines Aristotelio veikalo struktūrinės dalis pagal vėlesnės retorikos teorijos tradicijos suformuluotas retorinės veiklos sritis (*heuresis, lexis, taxis*) ir kiekvienoje iš jų aptariant pavienes bei grupines citatas. Grupinės citatos traktuojamos kaip viena didelė nuoroda (šitaip aptartos dvi pirmos nuorodos iš *heuresis*, antroji ir trečioji grupė citatų iš *lexis* ir praktiškai visos nuorodos iš *taxis* srities). Analizės metu pastebėta, kad dauguma Isokrato kalbų pavyzdžių Aristotelio *Retorikoje* paimta iš populiariausių kalbų, susijusių su politikos, visuomenės santykių, moralės ir ugdymo klausimais. Tai galėjo turėti įtakos Aristotelio ypatingam susidomėjimui retorikos deliberatyvuoju aspektu bei jo idėjai apie retoriką kaip pilietinę veiklą.

Iš pateiktos analizės galima išvesti sąlyginį scheminį ir sisteminių paveikslą. Visos nesusietos nuorodos, paimtos į glaudesnę gretą, sudaro nedidelį rinkinį (tartum simbolinę „bendruomenę“ organiškoje teksto visumoje) iš maždaug 40 komponentų (narių), siejamų trijų bendrų dėsnių, atitinkančių *tria officia oratoris* (*heuresis, lexis, taxis*). Kiekvieno dėsnių siejamų nuorodų ar citatų grupių skaičius skirtingas: *heuresis* srityje yra keturi nedideli nariai (Isokrato citatos kaip bendro dėsnių aspekto pavyzdžiai), *lexis* ir *taxis* srityse po tris skirtingo dydžio narius, iš kurių didžiausi yra *lexis* sferos nariai (čia randame 20 nuorodų į Isokratą). Tai liudija faktą, kad stilistinis Isokrato retorikos aspektas paliko bene ryškiausių pėdsaką Aristotelio teorijoje. Vis dėlto ir dėmesys Isokrato kalbose pastebimoms teminėms bei kompozicinėms variacijoms reikšmingai praplečia Stagiriečio retorikos kaip dialektikos „antrininkės“ koncepciją.

Aristotelio eksplicitinės pastabos apie Isokratą paprastai esti teigiamos, o priekaištai arba neesminiai, arba nepersonalizuoti. Tai rodo ir aukštą bendravimo kultūrą, ir tam tikrą pagarbą buvusiam mokytojui. Šiuo požiūriu Isokratas užima pakankamai reikšmingą vietą tarp kitų Aristotelio veikale minimų retorikos mokytojų.

Tai, kad Isokrato veikalų citatos yra skirtingo tikslumo (iš 26 citatų – tiek jų yra tarp visų minėtų 40 nuorodų – su mums išlikusiais Isokrato tekstais tiksliai sutampa tik 8), paremia tyrėjų skelbtą hipotezę, kad Aristotelis paprastai citavo iš atminties. Tačiau per daug stipru yra tvirtinti, kad jis nesinaudojo jokia rašytiniu teismo ar tautos susirinkimo kalbos tekstu. Bent viena, nors netikslė, nuoroda į Isokrato teisminę kalbą ir pats faktas apie Aristotelio bibliotekos egzistavimą tam subtiliai prieštarauja. Todėl atsargiau yra teigti, kad Aristotelis ir jo mokiniai, kurie užrašė jo paskaitas, nebuvo pedantiškai kruopštūs arba neturėjo motyvo sutikrinti visas citatas su jų originalais. Kita vertus, Aristotelio preferenciją parafrazėms arba supaprastintam, sutrumpintam, o ne tiksliam citavimui galima aiškinti jo pasakojimo pragmatiškumu ir taupumu, koncentracija į teorinius principus (dalykų esmę), orientacija į pagrindinę stilistinę dorybę – aiškumą.

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