TY - JOUR
AU - Evaldas Nekrašas
PY - 1979/09/29
Y2 - 2022/05/25
TI - Theoretical Basis of Reichenbach’s Philosophy
JF - Problemos
JA - PRB
VL - 23
IS - 0
SE - -
DO - 10.15388/Problemos.1979.23.6247
UR - https://www.journals.vu.lt/problemos/article/view/6247
AB - The article deals with Reichenbach’s conception of sense, probability and induction which is fundamental in his philosophy. Other major questions discussed include: relation between Reichenbach’s probability theory of sense and his statistical interpretation of probability; pragmatic justification of induction; comparative analysis of the views of Reichenbach and Carnap on the above questions. In conclusion the author states that, contrary to his theoretical principles, Reichenbach actually resorts to a non-statistical interpretation of probability in some of his contexts; his reasoning is insufficient for the foundation of the direct rule; pragmatic justification of induction is irrelevant to any interpretation of probability, except statistical.
ER -