Problemos <p>Founded in 1968. The journal of Philosophy that publishes academic articles, book reviews and an academic chronicle. Indexed in the <em>Scopus</em> (Q2) database since 2002 and in the <em>Web of Science</em> database since 2005.</p> en-US <p>Please read the Copyright Notice in&nbsp;<a href="">Journal Policy</a>.&nbsp;</p> (Nijolė Radavičienė) (Vigintas Stancelis) Wed, 19 Oct 2022 08:09:34 +0000 OJS 60 The Problem of Interpreting Cluster B Personality Disorders: at the Intersection of Psychiatry and Morality <p>In medicine, some personality traits, involving specific patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior, are considered to be pathological. Personality types, characteristic of such pervasive and maladaptive traits, are known under the term “personality disorders.” However, some of these pathological traits, diagnostic of so-called Cluster B personality disorders, largely describe immoral behavior. Hence, the question arises as to how such immoral behavior could be framed also as a medical problem. Moreover, it is not immediately clear whether persons with these disorders could be held responsible for their immoral actions. By drawing on virtue ethics and the concept of responsibility without blame, the article demonstrates how the problem of compatibility between medicalization, cultivation of moral character, and responsibility could be resolved. Thereby, it is suggested that Cluster B personality disorders are best understood as&nbsp;<em>both&nbsp;</em>a moral and medical problem.</p> Daniel Rogoża-Žuklys | Aistė Bartkienė Copyright (c) 2022 Daniel Rogoża-Žuklys | Aistė Bartkienė Wed, 19 Oct 2022 07:43:53 +0000 Editorial Board and Table of Contents <p>-</p> Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Author Guidelines and Bibliographical Data <p>-</p> Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Meno: Virtue as οὐσία and εἶδος <p>The article is an interpretation of the first part of the Meno (70a-79e), in which Plato deals with the problem of knowledge of virtue. Parmenides’ being, constituted by Justice, becomes a reference point for reflecting on the ontological and cognitive profile of virtue. The polemic with the sophists forces Plato to reflect on the subject of philosophizing and to realize that it is existentially rooted in the ontologised language. Here Plato finds the concept of οὐσία, which becomes for him the cognitive prototype of virtue. For οὐσία as a possession presupposes the property of a thing whose meaning is determined not by the sensually ascertainable properties of a thing, but by its social significance, which is relatively constant and correlated with justice. The distinction between the meanings of a thing and of its possession in the same object conveys the idea that virtue as a human possession, i.e., οὐσία, cannot be known in everyday thinking that hypertrophies the senses, but should be present in an alternative layer of thinking, and thus imply an alternative mode of knowledge. It can therefore be surmised that Plato’s discovery of the duality of the concept of οὐσία inspired in him both the idea of an autonomous world of ideas and the idea of a specific way of accessing it, i.e. the theory of anamnesis.</p> Skirmantas Jankauskas Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Moral Self-Realization in Kant and Spinoza <p>Spinoza and Kant are considered to be polar opposites with respect to ethics. The radical difference between them is supposed to consist in Spinoza’s ethical egoism, or interest-based&nbsp;<em>Strebensethik</em>, and Kant’s duty-cantered, deontological&nbsp;<em>Sollensethik</em>. I challenge this opposition and argue that both in Kant and Spinoza we deal with a notion of the self’s realization that is “interest”-based and therefore does not involve self-sacrifice. I show, on the one hand, that the&nbsp;<em>streben</em>&nbsp;in Spinoza’s&nbsp;<em>Strebensethik</em>&nbsp;consists in realising one’s essentially human interest, which resides in ethical-rational action, and, on the other hand, that&nbsp;<em>sollen</em>&nbsp;in Kant’s&nbsp;<em>Sollensethik</em>&nbsp;is in fact a&nbsp;<em>streben</em>&nbsp;of the Kantian “proper self” (<em>eigentliches Selbst</em>) after the realization of its ethical-rational interest.</p> Wojciech Kozyra Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Toward a New Theory of Moderate Contingentism: Individuals just are Realized Essences <p>In this paper, we propose a new actualist and contingentist modal metaphysics&nbsp;– fundamental essentialism&nbsp;– according to which individuals&nbsp;<em>just are</em>&nbsp;realized essences. Orthodox possible worlds semantics is incompatible with actualism and contingentism since Kripke models in which paradigmatic contingentists propositions are true require possible worlds whose domain contain merely possible individuals. In light of this problem, Plantinga has developed modal metaphysics based on essences, but it has been claimed by Fine, Williamson, and others, that it cannot be upheld because of the problem of unexemplified essences. We answer the latter problem by claiming that individuals just are realized essences. Then, justifying our theory further we refute Williamson’s deductive argument for necessitism. Afterward, we show in what sense fundamental essentialism is contingentist metaphysics.</p> Pranciškus Gricius Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 The Tension between the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and Epistemic Instrumentalism <p>In this paper, I develop a critical assessment of epistemic instrumentalism as advocated by Kyle Stanford (2006). Epistemic instrumentalism is based on the claim that the criterion for the reliability of any theory is the absence of what Stanford calls ‘unconceived alternatives’. This means that the theory is reliable if and only if it does not admit of alternatives. Since most scientific theories do admit of unconceived alternatives, Stanford claims, they cannot be reliable. In contrast, ‘common sense’ claims are not exposed to unconceived alternatives, therefore they are reliable. Here, I analyse the definition of ‘common sense’ and argue that it is equally vulnerable to the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’, pushing epistemic instrumentalism position to scepticism. The consequence is that the position of epistemic instrumentalist has nothing to stand on.</p> Lisa Zorzato Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 The Crossing of Borders <p>There are various accounts for the war in Ukraine; this essay is not contesting such accounts but, taking the classical understanding of the war between Sparta and Athens, elucidated by Thucydides, there seems to be a “hidden reason”. The latter is the declining political significance of Sparta and the expanding importance of Athens. The brief analysis of the war by Thucydides is used to establish a framework for clear understanding of behavior of nations and their leaders when, despite an absense of military threat, they opt for war. Given this context, the question arises why Russia, not being threatened militarily, opts for war against its harmless neighbor. The Soviet Union was a global power equivalent to NATO alliance, and this power was inherited by Russia. The latter could not be afraid of military invasion by the West and yet it opted for war aiming to demonstrate that it is as significant as the West. The difference between Traditional Russian autocracy and modern Western democracy is such that the latter “crosses borders” by attraction and not by military power.</p> Algis Mickūnas Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Reconsidering the Political: A Realization of a Person or a Way to Depersonalization? <p>This paper takes on the highly problematic question whether&nbsp;<em>the political</em>&nbsp;is reconcilable with the conception of a person within Robert Spaemann’s philosophy. Spaemann devotes himself to detailed explication of the moral ontology of the person, however, the political ontology in his thought is only assumed but not developed and it seems to stand in deep conflict with the developed elements of person’s ontology. The aim of the paper is to investigate whether Spaemann’s notion of&nbsp;<em>the political&nbsp;</em>can be reconciled with the rest of the person’s ontology and if this turn to&nbsp;<em>the political</em>&nbsp;rather leads to depersonalization. It is argued that it is possible to develop Spaemann’s personal ontology while integrating the concept of&nbsp;<em>the political</em>&nbsp;within the conception of a person.</p> Aistė Noreikaitė Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000 Capabilities Approach as a Metapolitical Category: Analysis of M. Nussbaum’s Conception of Justice <p>Many critics of Martha Nussbaum claim that her account of the capabilities approach is a perfectionist theory that does not provide a unique standpoint to political justice and only complements Rawls’ conception of primary goods. The purpose of this article is to show that the capabilities approach differs from primary goods in a sense that the former is orientated towards the ends of a good life, while the latter towards the means. The author argues that the capabilities approach takes an intermediate position between neutrality and perfectionism, maintains a position of relative autonomy, and in turn it can be viewed as a unique metapolitical category, that is to say, a principle of politics capable of accommodating different political views.</p> Laisvūnas Čekavičius Copyright (c) 2022 Authors Wed, 19 Oct 2022 00:00:00 +0000