Teisė ISSN 1392-1274 eISSN 2424-6050

2026, Vol. 139, pp. 110–131 DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/Teise.2026.139.7

The Child’s Right to be Heard in Polish Civil Proceedings

Joanna Bodio
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0428-7267
Assoc. Prof. Dr, PhD, Dr Habil.
Deputy Director of the Institute of Legal Sciences
Faculty of Law and Administration
Maria Curie-Sklodowska University
Pl. M. Curie-Skłodowskiej 5
20-031 Lublin, Poland
E-mail: joanna.bodio@mail.umcs.pl

The Child’s Right to be Heard in Polish Civil Proceedings

Joanna Bodio
(Maria Curie-Sklodowska University (Poland))

The right to be heard in Polish civil proceedings (both judicial and non-judicial) is one of the procedural rights of the child. It derives from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Family and Guardianship Code, and international law. There is a debate in academic circles on several issues concerning the hearing of a child in civil proceedings. The first point of contention is the scope of cases in which a child may be heard; the second is the purpose of hearing the child; the third is whether hearing the child is mandatory or optional; and the fourth is what the procedural consequences are if the court fails to hear the child. The aim of this article is to resolve these contentious issues on the basis of views expressed in academic literature and case law.
Keywords: the right to hear, the child, civil proceedings, litigation, non-contentious proceedings, the child’s procedural rights.

Vaiko teisė būti išklausytam Lenkijos civiliniame procese

Joanna Bodio
(Marijos Kiuri-Sklodovskos universitetas (Lenkija))

Vaiko teisė būti išklausytam Lenkijos civiliniame procese (tiek teisminiame, tiek neteisminiame) yra viena iš vaiko procesinių teisių. Ji kyla iš Lenkijos Respublikos Konstitucijos, Civilinio proceso kodekso, Šeimos ir globos kodekso bei tarptautinės teisės. Akademiniuose sluoksniuose diskutuojama keliais klausimais, susijusiais su vaiko teise būti išklausytam civiliniame procese. Pirmasis ginčytinas klausimas yra bylų, kuriose vaikas gali būti išklausytas, apimtis; antrasis – vaiko išklausymo tikslas; trečiasis – vaiko išklausymas yra privalomas ar neprivalomas; ir ketvirtasis – kokie yra procesiniai padariniai, jei teismas neišklauso vaiko. Šio straipsnio tikslas – išspręsti šiuos ginčytinus klausimus remiantis akademinėje literatūroje ir teismų praktikoje išreikštomis nuomonėmis.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: vaiko teisė būti išklausytam, vaikas, civilinis procesas, bylinėjimasis, ne ginčo teisenos procesas, vaiko procesinės teisės.

_____________

Received: 10/06/2026. Accepted: 29/06/2026
Copyright © 2026 Joanna Bodio. Published by Vilnius University Press
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Introduction

The right to be heard in Polish civil proceedings (both in litigation and non-contentious proceedings) is one of the procedural rights of the child. A procedural right is understood as the ability to exercise one’s procedural rights, which is not, as a rule, linked to any obligations on the part of the other party to the proceedings or other participants in non-contentious proceedings, but to the court’s obligation to ensure the exercise of those rights (e.g., the right to express an opinion or to appeal against an unfavourable court ruling)1. The need to establish regulations that grant children procedural rights and facilitate their exercise stems not only from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Articles 32, 45 and 73(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure or non-Code statutes, but also from international regulations. The right of the child to be heard in civil proceedings is one of the key elements of the protection of children’s rights within the legal systems of the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union. International standards relating to the right of the child to be heard include, in particular: the Convention on the Rights of the Child2, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union3, the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights4, and the Council of Europe’s guidelines on child-friendly justice5. The Brussels IIa Regulation also recognises the child’s right to be heard as a fundamental human right6.

The right to be heard thus gives effect to the norms of international law. International law distinguishes between the right to hold one’s own views and the right to express those views (Article 19 of the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights7, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights8, Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms9), the right to express one’s position (Article 3 of the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Recommendation No. R (84)4 on parental responsibility10), the right to express one’s views (Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), and the right to be heard (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child)11.

In accordance with Article 12(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, a child should be given the opportunity to be heard, either directly or through a legal representative, in any judicial proceedings affecting him or her. Similar provisions are contained in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on parental responsibility, which states that the competent authority responsible for deciding on parental responsibility or its exercise, where the fundamental interests of the child are at stake, should take the child’s views into account, provided that the child’s level of maturity so permits12. The Convention on the Rights of the Child sets out the means of realising the child’s right to express their views, on the understanding that these are subject to national rules in this regard13.

The European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights guarantees children the right to be informed about proceedings pending before the court that concern them, the opportunity to express their own views (Article 3 of the Convention), the right to request the appointment of an independent representative to act on their behalf (Article 4 of the ECHR14), the right to request the presence of selected persons during court proceedings, the right to be informed of the possible consequences of their position and of the possible consequences of any decision15, and the right to exercise all or some of the rights of a party in such proceedings (Article 5 of the ECHR). The court should safeguard these rights16.

Although the provisions contained in this Convention do not constitute rules suitable for direct application17, they do constitute a set of guiding recommendations establishing a specific standard that should be maintained in the area of judicial protection for minors. By granting the child specific procedural rights, the Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights has facilitated the exercise of the child’s substantive rights and ensured that the child is no longer merely an ‘object’ of proceedings, but also begins to participate in them – even if the child cannot be a party to the proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings18.

The legal measures provided for in Polish legislation allow children to exercise their rights, although they do not guarantee minors all the procedural rights granted to them by the Convention in all pending proceedings. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the provisions of Polish law meet the requirements of the Convention, and from the perspective of the child’s position in court or in non-contentious proceedings, they are even more favourable to the child19. An illustration of these provisions is, for instance, the obligation for the child to participate in person in guardianship cases (unless, on an exception basis, the court, pursuant to Article 573 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, restricts or rules out the child’s participation in the proceedings), the right to be heard (Articles 216(1), 216(2) and 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure), the child’s right to appeal against decisions (Article 573 of the Code of Civil Procedure) or the right to appoint a legal representative in situations where the child cannot be represented by their parents due to a conflict of interest (Article 99 of the Family and Guardianship Code in conjunction with Article 98 § 2 and 3 of the Family and Guardianship Code)20.

One of the most important procedural rights, which constitutes one aspect of the principle of equality of the parties in litigation and of participants in non-contentious proceedings, is the right to be heard21. Pursuant to Article 72(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, a child has the right to be heard when their rights are being determined, and their views must be taken into account as far as possible. The right to be heard, which forms part of the right to a properly conducted proceeding, constitutes the substance of the right to a court of law referred to in Article 45(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland22. A child possesses both passive rights (such as the right to be informed) and active rights (such as the right to be heard, which is closely linked to the right to a fair trial). Since a child has legal capacity and the capacity to be a party in judicial proceedings, they must be equipped with the means to protect these rights in court. The Polish Constitution that is in force in Poland guarantees the right to a fair trial, which is not limited to adults. The constitutional right to a fair trial is not merely a matter of bringing a child’s case before a court for consideration, but it should enable the child to present their case – only then does the child become a party to the proceedings, rather than its subject23.

Guided by these principles, the legislature amended Articles 2161 and 2162 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the hearing of a child. The hearing of a child in the Code of Civil Procedure is regulated separately for contentious proceedings in Articles 216(1) and 216(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and for non-contentious proceedings in Article 576(2) and (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure24. Hearing a child in Polish civil proceedings is closely linked to the substantive law provisions introduced into the Family and Guardianship Code, which require the child’s views to be taken into account in important matters concerning the child’s person or property (Article 95 § 4 of the Family and Guardianship Code)25. It is generally accepted in legal scholarship that a request for a court to hear the case cannot be granted without first considering the arguments of the party seeking legal protection26.

A child can only exercise their right to be heard if they are aware that this right exists. Without adequate information about their rights, the evidence gathered, and the course of the proceedings, the child who is a party to litigation or a participant in non-litigious proceedings cannot effectively exercise their right to be heard27. For this reason, the information rights falling within the scope of the right to be heard include: informing the parties and participants in the proceedings of their rights relating to the exercise of the right to be heard (in particular, under Article 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure), thus ensuring that they have access to the case file and the possibility of obtaining copies, extracts or summaries from that file (Article 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure), as well as ensuring that the parties and participants may personally take part in specific proceedings during the course of the proceedings (Article 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure)28.

Hearing the child is therefore an expression of the principle of directness, and it provides an opportunity to reveal any irregularities or abuses in relation to the child, which allows for the proper protection of their rights29 throughout the entire civil proceedings. The possibility of hearing the child applies from the moment when proceedings are initiated until a substantive decision is issued in the case. This obligation also applies after an appeal has been lodged30.

There is a debate in legal scholarship on several issues concerning the hearing of a child in civil proceedings. The first point of contention is the scope of cases in which a child may be heard; the second is the purpose of hearing the child; the third is whether hearing the child is mandatory or optional; and the fourth is what the procedural consequences are if the court fails to hear the child. The aim of this article is to resolve these contentious issues on the basis of views expressed in academic literature and case law.

1. The Scope of Cases in which a Child must be Heard

Article 72(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland requires that a minor be heard “in the course of determining the child’s rights”, but does not specify the types of cases in which they must be heard31. However, such distinctions are made in the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In proceedings under Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court shall hear a minor in cases concerning them if their mental development, state of health and degree of maturity so permit. If the child refuses to participate in the hearing before the court, the court shall refrain from conducting the hearing.

Despite the wording of this provision, the scope of cases in which a child is heard remains a matter of dispute among legal scholars. Some authors consider that, in proceedings, a child is subject to a hearing only in cases concerning the child’s person, i.e. in non-property cases32, while others argue that the legislature has not specified the type of cases to which the provision applies, and therefore hold that a minor child should be heard not only in non-property matters but also in property matters concerning them33.

Supporters of the second position point out that the placement of Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure within procedural law allows for the assumption that it applies in all cases concerning a child that are examined in litigation (and not only in separate proceedings), as well as, pursuant to Article 13 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in non-contentious proceedings34. At the same time, they point out that “the restriction of the obligation to hear a child in contentious matters solely to property matters is not supported not only by the linguistic interpretation of Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure but also by the systemic interpretation, since neither the Constitution of the Republic of Poland nor the Convention on the Rights of the Child contains restrictions regarding the matters in which a minor must be heard”35.

However, the first of the positions indicated is the correct one, as supported precisely by the systemic and linguistic interpretation. The linguistic interpretation of Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure clearly indicates that, in proceedings, a child is to be heard in non-property matters concerning them. This wording narrows the scope of application of the institution of hearing a minor to cases relating to the determination of the child’s non-property rights; consequently, property matters, and above all maintenance cases, do not fall within the scope of proceedings in which the institution of hearing a minor is applied36.

The non-property matters referred to in Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure include, for example, matrimonial cases concerning parental authority, cases concerning divorce, legal separation and annulment of marriage, as well as cases concerning a child’s parentage, the declaration of the invalidity of an acknowledgement of paternity, or the termination of an adoption (Articles 425 and 453 of the Code of Civil Procedure)37. Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is therefore a general provision, and it formally applies to any case concerning a minor child38.

This view is also supported by a systemic interpretation, i.e., the content of the provisions governing non-contentious proceedings, and, above all, Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure39. Unlike in litigation, in non-contentious proceedings, a child is heard in family and guardianship cases concerning the child’s person or property (Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and thus these are both property and non-property cases40. In practice, pursuant to Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, courts hear the child primarily in cases concerning: the removal of a child from an unauthorised person41, the restriction, deprivation, restoration or suspension of parental authority, adoption, establishing contact with the child, amending a divorce judgment in terms of parental authority or the minor’s place of residence, amending a decision concerning parental authority, establishing guardianship, placing a child in a foster family, dissolving a foster family, deciding on matters of significance to the child in the absence of agreement between the parents, for permission to carry out acts exceeding the scope of ordinary management of the child’s property, for the removal of a child subject to parental authority, for permission for a minor girl to enter into marriage, for permission to issue a passport to a child, to determine the validity of admitting a child to a psychiatric hospital, to issue orders in guardianship matters, to order contact with the child and impose a financial penalty for failure to comply with such an order, to administer the child’s property42.

In non-contentious proceedings, the scope of cases in which a child is to be heard therefore primarily covers matters decided in guardianship proceedings. It is accepted that in cases heard in other types of non-contentious proceedings, a child is to be heard only if they are a party to the proceedings. The hearing of a party to non-contentious proceedings is governed by the general provision of Article 514 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and specific provisions, e.g., Article 547 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in cases concerning incapacitation), or Article 561 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in cases concerning permission for a woman under the age of 18 to marry)43.

It follows from the wording of Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure that, had the legislature intended to extend the hearing of a child in proceedings to matters concerning the child’s property, it would have stated this expressly in Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, just as it did in Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by extending the scope to matters concerning the child’s person and property44.

At the same time, it should be noted that both Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure narrow the scope of cases in light of international legal instruments which require the hearing of a minor in all cases and in every proceeding concerning the child (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 1 and 3 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child). The same applies to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which, whilst requiring a child to be heard in the course of determining their rights (Article 72(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland)45, does not distinguish between the types of cases.

2. The Purpose of Hearing a Child in Civil Proceedings

The obligation to hear a child applies regardless of whether the child is a party to the proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings, or is not. Ensuring that a child is given the opportunity to be heard in proceedings concerning them does not, in itself, confer upon them the status of a party or a participant in the proceedings46. Hearing a child cannot therefore serve as a basis for concluding that they have acquired the status of a party or a participant in non-contentious proceedings (even if the hearing is mandatory). The right of a child to act personally in proceedings is therefore a right that goes further than the right to be heard. In practice, hearing a child before a court is the realisation of their right to a fair trial, taking the form of a procedural act which, in many cases, replaces the actual possibility for a minor to act in ‘their own’ case as a party or a participant in non-contentious proceedings. Hearing the child is not a substitute for ‘participation’ in court proceedings, but rather a procedure enabling the child’s views to be ascertained in matters concerning their person or property47.

In cases heard in court proceedings, a child does not, as a rule, have the status of a party (with the exception, for example, of maintenance cases, in which, however, due to the financial nature of the matter, children are not heard, or cases concerning the determination of a child’s parentage where the child’s father is a minor – aged 17). The minor’s right to be heard is therefore, as a rule, not linked to their participation as a party; consequently, the minor’s right to be heard in civil proceedings does not translate into the child’s right to obtain information about the case and matters of importance to them in proceedings concerning their person. Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure does not grant the child the right to obtain information about the case in which they have been heard48.

The right to be heard grants the child the status of an individual possessing human rights, their own views and a sense of dignity49. However, this is not a right to decide for oneself, but a right to participate in the decision-making process50. Consequently, the question arises as to how the hearing of a child should be understood in the light of current legal provisions. After all, the purpose of hearing a child who is a party to proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings is different from that when the child does not have such a status, or when the child participates in non-contentious proceedings as a witness51.

Hearing the parties (pursuant to Article 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure) or participants in non-litigious proceedings (pursuant to Article 514 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure) is understood to mean enabling them to provide explanations or make statements52, obtaining from them a statement of their claims and the circumstances on which the issuance and content of the decision depend (e.g., regarding the need to take evidence, the means of evidence, or the parties involved in the case)53, as well as enabling them to submit motions and objections54. By being heard, the child is treated as a party to civil proceedings who has the right to shape the proceedings, the right to present their claims and evidence in support thereof55, to take notes, the right to inspect the case files56, and to participate in the hearing57. Hearing a child who is a party to the proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings thus ensures that they have effective access to the courts and the opportunity to express their views and defend their interests58.

In addressing the question of the purpose of a hearing as a procedural step, some authors point to its immediate effect (namely, ascertaining the participant’s position and other circumstances relevant to the decision) and its fundamental effect, which is the issuance of a decision that takes into account the participants’ relevant submissions. From this perspective, this institution differs little from the informative hearing of the parties to proceedings set out in Article 212 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The party or participant in non-contentious proceedings being heard is treated merely as a source of information for the court regarding the factual circumstances of the case59. Apart from the fact that a child’s hearing is, in essence, similar in nature to an informative hearing of the parties, it also aims to ensure the effective protection of the individual’s interests and best reflects the essence of the hearing as an aspect of the principle of equality of the parties/participants in non-contentious proceedings60.

Other authors note that the function of a hearing is similar to that of evidence (including evidence from the examination of a witness), as it serves to enable the court to gather information on the facts forming the factual basis of the case and, consequently, may determine the content of the ruling61. Unlike giving evidence as a witness, however, a hearing is not focused on a factual account, but, rather, on the presentation of assessments62. In particular, it is not subject to the penalty of criminal liability for giving false evidence63. A hearing differs from statements made at a trial in that there is no element of cross-examination, i.e., responding directly to other claims (including opposing ones) raised by the parties to the proceedings64.

A hearing is therefore not a means of evidence, as neither the manner in which it is conducted nor the location of the provisions governing hearings indicate that the legislature intended it to constitute evidence. However, when establishing the facts, the court takes into account not only the evidence but also the hearing65. Furthermore, the placement of Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure amongst the provisions on the hearing indicates that the legislature did not intend to classify the hearing as evidence. This is supported by the fact that only the court obtains information from the child, and not the parties to the proceedings. This is because, as a rule, the hearing is not conducted in the same way as any other means of evidence, as the parties do not participate in its conduct66. Most authors therefore consider that the hearing of a child in civil proceedings is not a procedural act aimed at obtaining evidence in the case, as it is not directed at establishing facts, but rather at ascertaining the child’s position on the matter concerning them. For this reason, it should take the form of a conversation with the minor, conducted under appropriate conditions67.

Although hearing a child is not a form of evidence, it is undoubtedly a source of information for the court regarding facts relevant to the case68. For this reason, it is described in legal literature as “an auxiliary procedural mechanism of a technical and procedural nature, serving to enable the court to obtain the explanations and factual statements it requires to resolve the case”69. Thus, the hearing is a procedural institution whose purpose is to establish a fact (the child’s views and reasonable wishes) and is similar in nature to the presentation of an opinion to the court, the binding force of which is limited by the conditions set out in Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In a sense, it resembles the presentation of a view relevant to the case as in Article 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure70. The hearing may therefore provide the court with information relevant to assessing, for example, whether adoption and its form will be in the child’s best interests, which is of decisive importance in determining whether adoption may be ordered (Article 114 § 1 of the Family and Guardianship Code)71, or whether a particular person should be appointed as the minor’s guardian, or how to arrange the child’s contact with their parents72, or what the child’s relationship with their parents is73 and with which parent the child wishes to live following their divorce74. Therefore, when hearing the child, the court should take their views into account. Although the court is not obliged to act in accordance with the child’s opinion, it is nevertheless required to consider the arguments put forward by the child75 and should address them when deciding the case76. Where a child – having regard to the circumstances of the case, their mental development, state of health and level of maturity – expresses reasonable wishes concerning themselves (or their property), the court not only may but actually must take these into account77. This obligation arises from Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which clarify the meaning of the general statement in the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding “giving due weight to the views of the child’ by indicating the duty to take the child’s reasonable wishes into account ‘as far as possible”78.

It should be emphasised that hearing a minor also serves an educational purpose, which is to instil in them such important qualities as a sense of shared responsibility for decisions concerning their own affairs, as well as to demonstrate to them that they are not merely a passive subject of the decision79, but a party to the proceedings80.

3. Is Hearing a Child Mandatory or Optional?

Given varying practices of the courts, the question arises as to whether hearing a child – whether they are a party to the proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings, or do not hold such a status – is mandatory81.

Although the linguistic interpretation and the categorical wording of the provisions of Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, according to which “the court (…) shall hear”, and not “may hear” the child, legal scholarship has expressed the view that hearing the child is of a “relatively mandatory” nature, as the mandatory nature is limited by the criteria for the admissibility of such a hearing. These criteria are the child’s mental development, state of health and degree of maturity. The decision to conduct a hearing is therefore determined not by the nature of the case, but by the specified criteria, which must be met cumulatively82. If the child does not meet the specified requirements, the court cannot conduct the hearing; otherwise, it would be in breach of procedural law83. Another argument in favour of the relatively mandatory nature of a child’s hearing is that it may take place only if it is in the child’s best interests84. A further argument supporting the relatively mandatory nature of a child’s hearing is the possibility of waiving it. The court may refrain from hearing the child not only for factual reasons, such as the child’s state of health, development and level of maturity, or if it would be contrary to the child’s best interests85. The court’s decision to refrain from hearing the child or to use an alternative method of hearing in a situation where this is contrary to the child’s best interests is consistent with the European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights86, under which, it is possible to disregard the child’s opinion if this would be contrary to their will or not in their best interests87.

A hearing may also be waived if the child refuses to take part in it. Pursuant to Article 216(1) § 1, second sentence, of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court shall waive the hearing of a minor if the minor refuses to take part in the hearing before the court. An obstacle to hearing the child may arise, for example, from the child’s reluctance to undergo the hearing88 if a dispute between the parents is having a significant emotional impact on the child89. The child, therefore, has the right to express their views on the matter90. If, therefore, the child expresses a wish to present their views on the matter, the court should allow them to do so. If, however, the minor does not wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to be heard, the court cannot compel them to do so or impose any sanctions. It cannot, however, be concluded on this basis that the court has no option to waive the hearing of the child. Otherwise, every instance of waiving the hearing of the child would have to be regarded as depriving the child of the opportunity to defend their rights91.

In the event of waiving the child’s hearing, the court should provide the reasons for this decision. This is necessary to assess the validity of the decision and to refute any allegation of unjustified omission of the child’s hearing92.

The literature also expresses the view that waiving the child’s hearing is possible where the evidence gathered is sufficient to deliver a substantive ruling without the need to hear the minor93. The relatively mandatory obligation to hear the child thus leaves it to the court to decide whether there is a need to hear them94.

4. Consequences of a Court Failing to Hear a Child

There is also a dispute in legal theory and case law regarding the consequences of a court failing to hear a child as a party or a participant in non-contentious proceedings. According to one view, failing to hear a party or a participant renders the proceedings invalid on the grounds that the person concerned is deprived of the opportunity to defend their rights95; according to another view, failing to hear a party constitutes a procedural irregularity that does not invalidate the proceedings96.

The proponents of the first position consider that failing to hear a party or a participant in non-contentious proceedings constitutes, as a rule, a procedural irregularity resulting in the invalidity of the proceedings under Article 379(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proceedings will not be invalidated on the grounds of depriving a party or a participant of the opportunity to defend their rights if they have taken an active part in the subsequent court proceedings. In such a situation, the failure to hear the party or a participant should, according to legal scholarly opinion and case law, be classified as a procedural irregularity affecting the outcome of the case, which may constitute an independent ground for a cassation appeal (Article 398(4) § 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure)97.

Opponents of this position consider it too far-reaching, because whilst the failure to hear a party or a participant in the proceedings is undoubtedly a procedural irregularity capable of affecting the outcome of the case (especially where the hearing was mandatory), the deprivation of the interested party’s ability to defend their rights is determined by the proceedings as a whole, assessed retrospectively98.

An unjustified failure to hear a child constitutes a breach of procedural law that affects the outcome of the case. However, the failure to hear a child does not lead to the invalidity of civil proceedings on the grounds of depriving the minor of the ability to defend their rights (Article 379(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure), nor does it justify an application for the reopening of civil proceedings under Article 401(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, where the minor makes procedural statements through their legal representative or an attorney duly appointed by the legal representative99.

There is also an intermediate position, according to which, the legal consequence of failing to hear a party depends on whether the hearing was optional or mandatory. According to F. Zedler, if the hearing of a party or participant in the proceedings was mandatory, failure to hear them renders the proceedings invalid on the grounds that the party or participant was deprived of the opportunity to defend their rights. In the case of an optional hearing, pursuant to Article 216(1) or 576 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it must be considered whether there was an opportunity to be heard. If the provisions of these rules have been breached, it must be assumed that there has been a breach of procedural rules capable of affecting the outcome of the proceedings, which justifies challenging the decisions by way of appeal100.

It appears, however, that even in the case of a mandatory hearing of the child, failure to hear the child does not render the proceedings invalid where the child is unable (e.g., due to health reasons) or unwilling (e.g., for emotional reasons) to exercise this right, and thus where the reason for not being heard lies with the child. In the interests of the child’s welfare, the court cannot compel the child to present their views on the matter. However, if the court deprives the child of the right to be heard, despite the child meeting all the criteria for being heard as set out in Article 216(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and expressing a wish to be heard, this will result in the proceedings being invalid101.

Summary

The right of a child to be heard is enshrined both in international law and in Polish legislation – the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Code of Civil Procedure, non-Code legislation, and the Family and Guardianship Code. Whilst in court proceedings a child is to be heard only in matters concerning their person (non-property matters – Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure), in non-contentious proceedings a child must be heard in matters concerning both their person and their property (regarding non-property and property matters – see Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure). However, both Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure narrow the scope of cases in light of international legal instruments, which require a minor to be heard in all matters and in every proceeding concerning the child. The same applies to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which, whilst requiring a child to be heard in the course of determining their rights (Article 72(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland), does not distinguish between the types of such cases.

Hearing a child is one of the institutions of substantive and procedural family law, and a relatively new one, demonstrating dynamic development. According to M. M. Cieśliński, observation of practice indicates that the hearing of a child before a court is developing progressively, which is in line with European trends. The hearing of a child should be viewed through the prism of the realisation of the child’s right to a fair trial, as this is essentially the only way in which the child can present their case. In most cases concerning the child’s person or property, the child does not, after all, have the status of a party to proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings, despite the fact that it is generally accepted that, where a case concerns a child, the child is the most important subject of the proceedings102. Thus, a child is entitled to be heard regardless of whether they are a party to proceedings or a participant in non-contentious proceedings, or whether they do not hold such a status.

Hearing a child is undoubtedly a procedural act of an examination nature and of a special character103. It is, however, an institution entirely distinct from questioning. It is not, in fact, a means of evidence within the meaning of the Code. Hearing a child is a conversation between a judge and a minor, which allows the judge to get to know the minor, to identify their attitudes and fears, and to compare their own observations of the child with the information provided by the parties/participants in the proceedings. It therefore resembles, in a sense, the presentation of a view relevant to the case (as in Article 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure)104.

The hearing is a right of the child and cannot therefore be treated as an absolute obligation. When deciding to grant the child the opportunity to be heard, the court is obliged to take all necessary measures to conduct such a hearing, while bearing in mind the best interests of the child and the circumstances of the specific case, in order to ensure that the child has a genuine and effective opportunity to express their views105.

Hearing the child is of a ‘relatively mandatory’ nature, as the mandatory nature is limited by the criteria for the admissibility of such evidence. These criteria are the child’s mental development, state of health, and degree of maturity. The decision to conduct a hearing is therefore determined by the criteria indicated, and not by the nature of the case, the child’s legal capacity, capacity to be a party to legal proceedings, or the child’s age106, especially since the age of 13 is a formal threshold and does not indicate the child’s actual (in every case) level of maturity107. Even if a child has not reached the age of 13 but has attained a sufficient degree of psychological and mental maturity to allow for a reasonable assessment of their life situation, they should be heard by the court108. The Code of Civil Procedure does not specify an age limit from which a child is subject to a hearing. The age limit of 13, established in legal scholarship, is linked to the acquisition of limited legal capacity and capacity to be a party to proceedings in guardianship cases. However, the child’s age is not the sole criterion determining whether they are to be heard; therefore, it is possible to hear a younger child, provided that they have sufficient understanding of their life situation and meet the criteria set out in Article 216(1) § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 576 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The criteria for hearing a child in civil proceedings must be assessed by the court in the light of the circumstances of the case in relation to the specific minor109, as, in some situations, the child will be ready to express an opinion on a given matter, whilst in others they will not110.

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Legal acts

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Karta Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej z dnia 30 marca 2010, 2016/C 202/01 (Wersja skonsolidowana Dz.Urz. UE C 202 z 2016 r., s. 389) / Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 30 March 2010, 2016/C 202/01 (Consolidated version, OJ EU C 202, 2016, p. 389), hereinafter referred to as: CFREU.

Europejska konwencja o wykonywaniu praw dzieci, sporządzona w Strasburgu 25.01.1996 r. (Dz.U. z 2000 r. Nr 107, poz. 1128) / The European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, drawn up in Strasbourg on 25 January 1996 (Journal of Laws of 2000, No. 107, item 1128), hereinafter referred to as: EECCR.

Wytyczne Komitetu Ministrów Rady Europy w sprawie wymiaru sprawiedliwości przyjaznego dzieciom, przyjęte wraz z uzasadnieniem 17 listopada 2010 r., Monografia nr 5, https://rm.coe.int/16806b7c62 (dostęp: 2.4.2026) / Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice, adopted together with the explanatory memorandum on 17 November 2010, Monograph No. 5, https://rm.coe.int/16806b7c62 (accessed 2 April 2026), hereinafter referred to as: CoM Guidelines.

Powszechna Deklaracja Praw Człowieka ONZ uchwalona 10 grudnia 1948 r., przyjęta i proklamowana rezolucja Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ 217 A (III); https://amnesty.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Powszechna_Deklaracja_Praw_Czlowieka.pdf. (dostęp: 1.04.2026 r.) / The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on 10 December 1948, adopted and proclaimed by UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III); https://amnesty.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Powszechna_Deklaracja_Praw_Czlowieka.pdf. (accessed: 1 April 2026).

Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych otwarty do podpisu w Nowym Jorku dnia 19 grudnia 1966 r. (Dz.U. 1977 nr 38 poz. 167), dalej jako: MPPOiP / The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966 (Journal of Laws 1977, No. 38, item 167), hereinafter referred to as: ICCPR.

Konwencja o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności, sporządzona w Rzymie dnia 4 listopada 1950 r. (Dz.U. nr 61, poz. 284) / The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drawn up in Rome on 4 November 1950 (Journal of Laws No. 61, item 284), hereinafter referred to as: the ECHR

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Case law

Judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 May 1957, II CR 26/56, LEX No. 1672395.

Supreme Court ruling of 16 September 1966, II CR 183/66, OSNCP 1967/2, item 37.

Supreme Court ruling of 27 June 1968, I CR 239/68, OSNCP 1969/3, item 57.

Supreme Court ruling of 25 September 1975, III CRN 222/75, LEX, No. 7755.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 18 January 1978, IV CR 515/77, LEX No. 8054.

Supreme Court ruling of 20 February 1990, IV CZ 29/90, LEX No. 9014.

Supreme Court ruling of 16 December 1997, III CZP 63/97, OSNC 1998/6, item 108.

Justification of the Supreme Court decision of 16 December 1997, III CZP 63/97, OSNC 1998/6, item 108.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 March 1998, I CKN 524/97, LEX No. 36069.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 1 October 1998, I CKN 825/98, LEX No. 1108442.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 1 October 1998, I CKN 825/98, LEX No. 1108442.

Supreme Court ruling of 15 December 1998, I CKN 1122/98, OSNC 1999/6, item 119.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 15 December 1998, I CKN 1122/98, OSNC 1999/6, item 119.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 15 December 1998, I CKN 1122/98, OSNC 1999/6, item 119.

Supreme Court ruling of 2 December 2011, III CSK 65/11, LEX No. 1130174.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 2 December 2011, III CSK 65/11, LEX No. 1130174.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of 2 December 2011, III CSK 136/11, LEX No. 1131125.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 2 December 2011, III CSK 65/11, LEX No. 1130174.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 22 June 2012, V CSK 283/11, LEX No. 1232479.

Resolution of the Supreme Court of 22 June 2012, V CSK 283/11, LEX No. 1232479.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 December 2013, SNO 35/13, LEX No. 1409019.