Gary Beckerio sukurtas viešojo administravimo subjektų išlaidų minimizavimo modelis paremtas išvada, kad potencialūs pažeidėjai vadovaujasi šia formule: Nauda > Aptikimo tikimybė × Potenciali bauda. Nors teisės mokslų doktrinoje vis dar diskutuojama dėl tikslių šio modelio reikšmių, įskaitant optimalius baudų dydžius ir aptikimo tikimybę, tiek akademinėse, tiek viešosiose diskusijose dažnai nepakankamai atsižvelgiama į tai, kaip patys potencialūs pažeidėjai vertina galimos naudos ir sankcijų pusiausvyrą. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiama literatūros apžvalga, kurioje vertinama, ar potencialūs pažeidėjai, remdamiesi Gary Beckerio modeliu, sugeba įvertinti konkurencijos teisės pažeidimo aptikimo padarinius, vertinant baudas, nuostolius ir papildomas išlaidas, atsirandančias nustačius pažeidimą. Atsižvelgiant į marginalizmo paradigmą, elgsenos ekonomiką ir perspektyvų teoriją, straipsnyje teigiama, kad valstybės institucijos, nustatydamos baudas, kurios atgraso, turėtų įvertinti tris aplinkybes: (1) kokia yra pažeidimo nauda; (2) kokia dalis tokių pažeidimų yra nustatoma; ir (3) kokie kiti neigiami padariniai gresia pažeidėjui, jei pažeidimas būtų nustatytas. Straipsnyje duomenų prieinamumas ir patikimumas įvardijami kaip pagrindinės kliūtys šiai sistemai įgyvendinti, tačiau optimistiškai vertinama technologijų pažanga, kuri gali palengvinti tiek individualų, tiek bendrą atgrasymą.
Legal acts
European Parliament and the Council 26 November 2014 directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. OJ L 349, 2014, p. 1–19.
Lietuvos Respublikos alternatyviųjų degalų įstatymas. 2021 m. kovo 23 d. Nr. XIV-196. TAR, 2021, 7413.
Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos įstatymas. 1999 m. kovo 23 d. Nr. VIII-1099. Valstybės žinios, 1999, 30-856.
Special literature
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Case law
Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers [CJEU], No. C-209/07, [20.11.2008]. ECLI:EU:C:2008:643.
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