Problemos ISSN 1392-1126 eISSN 2424-6158

2019, vol. 96, pp. 96–106 DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.96.8

F. Brentano and K. Twardowski: Some Traces of Their Influence on the Contemporary Ukrainian Scholars

Ihor Karivets
The Chair of Philosophy
Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences
Lviv Polytechnic National University
E-mail: ihor.v.karivets@lpnu.ua

Abstract. In this article, the author considers the particularities of Franz Brentano’s psychognosy (descriptive psychology) in the context of notion of “basic” or “analytic” truths and his methodological approaches to scientific, philosophical investigations as well as his influence upon Kasimir Twardowski, who was the pupil of Brentano and accepted the main points of his methodological program.
The author also stresses that the study of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s heritage is important for tracing the origin of scientific/analytic philosophy. It is very important to investigate Brentano-Twardowski relations in the context of the concept of “basic truths” or “analytic truths”. Brentano stresses that “basic truths” can be found thanks to “psychognosy” or “pure psychology”. For Twardowski, psychology is the base for philosophical investigations because it helps to understand the formation of notions and judgements.
This article is also dedicated to the inquiries of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s legacy provided by Ukrainian scholars Borys Dombrowskiy and Yanosh Sanotskiy. The reception of Brentano’s theory of judgement in Dombrowskiy’s works and the problem of Brentano’s psychologism in Sanotskiy’s works were examined.
Keywords: Borys Dombrowskiy, Franz Brentano, Kasimir Twardowski, Yanosh Sanotskiy, Lvіv Philosophical School

F. Brentano ir K. Twardowskis: jų įtakos pėdsakai šiuolaikinių Ukrainos mokslininkų darbuose

Santrauka. Straipsnio autorius apžvelgia Franzo Brentano psichognozijos (aprašomosios psichologijos) ypatumus „pamatinių“ arba „analitinių“ tiesų, taip pat ir Brentano moksliniuose bei filosofiniuose tyrimuose taikytų metodologinių prieigų požiūriu. Įvertinama Brentano įtaka jo buvusiam mokiniui Kasimirui Twardowskiui, sutikusiam su pagrindiniais jo metodologinės programos teiginiais. Autorius pabrėžia, kad Brentano ir Twardowskio palikimas turi būti tiriamas siekiant suprasti mokslinės arba analitinės filosofijos kilmę; ypač svarbu tirti Brentano ir Twardowskio ryšį „pamatinių tiesų“ bei „analitinių tiesų“ sąvokų kontekste. Brentano pabrėžia, kad „pamatinės tiesos“ gali būti nustatytos remiantis „psichognozija“, arba „grynąja psichologija“. Twardowskio požiūriu, filosofinių tyrimų pagrindas yra psichologija, kadangi ji padeda suprasti, kaip susiformuoja sąvokos ir sprendiniai. Šis straipsnis taip pat atsižvelgia į ukrainiečių mokslininkų Boryso Dombrowskio ir Yanosho Sanotskio pastangas tiriant Brentano ir Twardowskio palikimą: įvertinama Brentano sprendinio teorijos recepcija Dombrowskio darbuose ir Brentano psichologizmo problema Sanotskio tyrimuose.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Borysas Dombrowskis, Franzas Brentano, Kasimiras Twardowskis, Yanoshas Sanotskis, Lvovo filosofinė mokykla, psichognozija, pamatinės tiesos

Acknowledgements. I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, which helped to improve the article.

Received: 26/12/2018. Accepted: 16/06/2019
Copyright © Ihor Karivets, 2019. Published by Vilnius University Press.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

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Polish philosopher Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938) was the founder of the Lviv¹ Philosophical School (1895-1939), the catalyst of development of analytic or scientific philosophy in its early period. He managed not only to revive philosophical life in Eastern Galicia, but he also turned Lviv into an important center of philosophical life in Eastern and Central Europe. It was due to fact that Twardowski managed to realize the metho­dological and psychological ideas of his teacher, the German-Austrian philosopher of Italian origin, ontologist, psychologist, and logician Franz Brentano (1838-1917), in his own philosophical activity.

Also, it is worth noting that Twardowski’s ideas and methodological approaches to philosophical researchers had influence not only upon Polish and Jewish students of the University of Lviv, but upon Ukrainian students too. The book of Polish-Ukrainian scholar Stepan Ivanyk reveals some “white spots” of relationships between Twardowski and his Ukrainian pupils; lists Ukrainian students and intellectuals, who were influenced by the founder of the Lviv Philosophical School (see Ivanyk 2014).

To sum up, there are three main goals of this article: 1) to make some contribution to the understanding of Brentano’s psychognosy (descriptive or “pure” psychology) and methodological ideas, 2) to describe briefly the influence of Brentano’s methodological ideas on Twardowski, and 3) to analyze some works of a few contemporary Ukrainian authors who demonstrated at least some reception of Brentano’s theory of judgement (Borys Dombrowskiy) and the problem of psychologism in Brentano’s philosophy (Yanosh Sanotskiy).

1. Brentano’s Psychognosy and the Idea of Methodological Unity of Sciences and Humanities

The term “psychognosy”² is quite unspecified for Ukrainian scholars. If someone hears it, then he/she may associate it with gnosis – esoteric knowledge that is accessible to a few initiated people. However, Brentano used this word in order to signify the branch of psychology, which precedes genetic psychology. The other word-combinations which Brentano uses in order to signify this branch are “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phenomenology”.

We have chosen the term “psychognosy” because the adjective “descriptive” in the word-combinations “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phenomenology” is ambiguous and it was criticized by the pupils of Husserl, for instance, by Eugen Fink.

Very often the adjective “descriptive” is associated with another adjective “naïve”, because it is connected with the superficial description of what is given before our consciousness. Moreover, description as the kind of investigation may be associated with the method of positive sciences, which is grounded in pure descriptive factual propositions. Thus, someone may think that “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phenomenology” are positive sciences. The word-combinations “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phenomenology” may give us the false understanding of the adjective “descriptive” as something not important, as something superficial, without analysis, as something positive, as something pre-conceptual etc. and based on merely sensuous perception and observation³. If we consider the adjective “descriptive” with the connection of analysis as “descriptive analysis”, even then, said Fink, we cannot avoid the association with the adjective “wearied”. Of course, Fink meant “wearied” as the synonym to “descriptive” (Fink 1981: 22-55).

Therefore, psychognosy is a neutral term and less known than “descriptive psychology” or “descriptive phenomenology”. Its meaning directly denotes the task of such science as psychognosy: it gives the knowledge about our psychic life on the basis of inner perception and introspection.

Now we consider the difference between genetic psychology and psychognosy. Genetic psychology deals with psychic phenomena which occur because of physiological, physical, chemical processes and refer to a human body. Psychognosy is different, since it deals with pure psychic phenomena of inner lives of humans on the base of their inner perception, and it helps to determine “the elements of human consciousness and the ways they are connected” (Brentano 2002: 3). Here “pure” refers to psychic processes free of the body. Psychognosy deals with consciousness only and its tasks are 1) “to provide us with the general conception of the entire realm of human consciousness”, 2) to list fully “the basic components out of which internally perceived by humans are composed”, 3) to enumerate “the ways in which these components can be connected” (Brentano 2002: 4). The important goal of psychognosy is the analysis of experience and the ways it can be the basis for certainty and clarity. In order to obtain this goal, Brentano classified the human mental states as ideas (presentations), judgements and emotions. Ideas provide the basis for judgements and emotions.

Brentano’s claim that psychognosy is an exact science seems very important (Brentano 2002: 5). We suggest that this very specific claim of Brentano is the implicit base of the scientific character of any inquiry.

For Brentano, psychognosy is an exact science because it is founded on the elements of consciousness. Those elements are immediately evident and have an apodictic character. Thus, when there is such apodictic evidence then we have also apodictic perception and on the basis of it – apodictic motivated judgement: “A judgment is motivated [motiviert] if it is directly caused by another mental phenomenon, and if we perceive this causation. In the case of apodictic judgements, we have a motivation by the matter of presentation [Vorstellungsmaterie]. One speaks of assertorial judgments if this kind of motivation is not present. Assertorial hence indicates a mere privation; the motivation by the matter of presentation is not given” (Brentano 1956: 128). Therefore, psychognosy is the basis for scientific philosophy and for any science which gives researchers strict and exact judgements about consciousness.

Inner perception⁴ is always true because it is based on evidence. Inner perception constitutes inner experience that is the source of evidence. All that is given in inner experience is given clearly and evidently.

The exactness of psychognosy derives from the simple and evident ideas which lie at the basis of our mind. Brentano searched for elemental parts of our mind which are evident and undoubted. Here we can see some similarity between rationalists (Descartes, Leibniz), who also searched for evident and undoubted ideas or axioms in mind. Therefore, Descartes, Leibniz, and Brentano are representatives of inner realism. How does this inner certainty appear? Inner certainty is grounded on clear, understandable psychic elements, which we can consider as atoms of our mind. Those bases or atoms are undoubted; thus they are true. How can we find them? We can find them using the method of introspection.

Descartes dreamt of the classification of simple ideas in order to clarify human thoughts and make them transparent and unambiguous: “If someone explained correctly what the simple ideas are out of which all human thoughts are compounded, and if his explanation were generally accepted, I would venture to expect there to be a universal language that was easy to learn, to speak and to write, and – the main thing – that would help men’s judgement by presenting matters to them so clearly that it would be almost impossible for them to go wrong. Contrast that with what we have now: almost all our words have confused meanings, and men’s minds have been accustomed to them for so long that there’s hardly anything they can perfectly understand” (Descartes 2017: 8).

We must go deeper and deeper into our mind in order to find out simple and clear ideas, which we must use in our language; otherwise, we are doomed to formulate incorrect propositions. Only propositions that are grounded in simple ideas are true. As we know, Descartes found in the base of mathematics some fundamental mental operations. One of these operations is the ability of the mind (or reason) to grasp directly and clearly simple ideas, which are identical with the basic truths. The French rationalist was convinced that a human mind can know these ideas or basic truths with absolute certainty and clarity (if so, then these ideas or truths are necessary to be accepted).

It is well-known that Leibniz distinguished two kinds of truths: necessary truths and contingent truths. We are interested in the first kind of truths because they belong to mind or reason. Leibniz wrote in §33 of the Monadology: “There are also two kinds of Truths: those of Reasoning and those of Fact. The Truths of Reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary” (Leibniz 1990: 460). There are very important words of Leibniz about “the primary truths” which belong to our reason or mind and can be found by analysis. Analysis means that we “are resolving” very complex ideas of our mind into simpler and simpler ideas until we reach their ultimate ground. According to Leibniz, the truths of reason are true always, under any circumstances and conditions. In addition, we cannot forget that Leibniz argued that necessary truths depend on God’s intellect. For Descartes, God is the guarantor that simple ideas are true because they are self-evident and clear⁵.

Descartes, Leibniz, and Brentano are forerunners of scientific philosophy. What does the word “scientific” mean? This word derived from Latin verb “scire”, which means “to know” in English. Scientific philosophy strives to obtain exact and strict knowledge as well as any other science (physics, biology, chemistry, cosmology and so on). Descartes and Leibniz claimed that there is exact and strict knowledge, which we can find by analyzing of the mind/reason functioning. In the case of Brentano, the analysis of inner perception can help us to find such kind of knowledge.

We can suppose that in any science, including scientific philosophy, the exactness, and the strictness, may be defined in such a way: 1) exactness is determined by the absence of deviations in the calculations that lead to the result that coincides with the calculations, 2) strictness lies in the fact that the decision of the given task will be the same by any means. Therefore, in scientific philosophy or analytic philosophy, all judgements about some philosophical subject must demonstrate unity with that subject and must not contradict it. In the case of Brentano, we must remember that those clear and self-evident judgements are derived from inner perception. Our judgements are true when we judge with evidence on the basis of our inner perception of outer objects. In the Brentano’s early writings, especially in the “Psychology from the empirical point of view”, we can find what means to be true in relation to outer objects. Brentano said: “whether the object is of such a sort that one could stand in the appropriate relation to it” (Brentano 2009: 187) and added in his notes for “Logic Lectures” (1875): “The object is’ means… that the object is to be accepted or affirmed, i.e., that it can be correctly affirmed.”⁶ (Brentano EL 80). Therefore, the truth is the correct affirmation of an object in the appropriate relation to it. We can say that human philosophical and true scientific ideas and concepts do not fall from heaven, but they are discovered or constructed (if we are representatives of constructivism) by a human reason in the appropriate mode of relation with objects.

2. Twardowski as a Methodological Follower of Brentano

Lviv and Vienna were connected philosophically by Twardowski. At the University of Lviv, which was provincial (once again, philosophically) at that time, Twardowski organized the Lviv Philosophical School (later, after the World War II, this school was renamed the “Lviv-Warsaw School”). In this article we consider only the similarities between Brentano and his pupil Twardowski.

The well-known scholar Betty who studies Brentano’s influence upon Twardowski mentioned: “…realism, respect for a broadly construed Aristotelian metaphysics and a preference for scientifically oriented philosophy (clear, precise, rationalistic, anti-speculative in its method) over German idealism” are the common general traits which Brentano and Twardowski shared (Betti 2017: 306). Those traits were also common for “the spirit of the epoch”; this spirit was anti-Kantian and anti-idealistic.

Twardowski brought Brentano’s ideas on the scientific style of doing philosophy, the common method for investigations in philosophy and natural sciences, the primordial role of psychology in the constitution of philosophy and natural sciences (the psychological analysis – introspection – of mental states that appear when we conduct some philosophical investigations or investigations of nature).

In 1895, Twardowski arrived in Lviv from Vienna. The young, twenty-nine-year-old professor, a student of Brentano, immediately took up the organization of scientific and pedagogical activities.

Twardowski set himself the task of bringing the ideas of his teacher and supervisor to Lviv and to create the milieu for the new philosophy: “I felt it was my call to bring closer to my compatriots the way of doing philosophy that Franz Brentano had taught me, especially to introduce the spirit and method of that philosophy to the students” (Twardowski 1992: 29).

Cavallin, the Swedish scholar who investigates Eastern-European philosophy, especially the Lviv-Warsaw School, suggested: “The most interesting of the texts kept in Lviv seems to be the installation lecture of Twardowski…” (Cavallin 1997: 33). The fact that Twardowski was a Brentanist in the field of methodology is striking in his inaugural lecture on November 15 1895, in which he refutes the distinction between the natural and philosophical branches of knowledge. He criticizes the positivists who claim that metaphysics is unnecessary. Metaphysics as well as philosophical and natural sciences deals not only with the sphere of the sensory world (phenomena and objects) but also with the non-sensual. For instance, metaphysics and natural sciences have in common the study of the relationship between objects, the research of causes and consequences, as well as the issue of the relationship between the speculative and sensual worlds, and of how the concept of natural sciences relates to the phenomena of nature and so on. Therefore, according to Twardowski, it is impossible to oppose metaphysics to natural sciences because they have a common area of research (moreover, there is an interesting question about how the development of natural sciences influenced philosophy and vice versa, how philosophy influenced natural sciences).

In the second part of the lecture, Twardowski deals with the method of philosophy and the natural sciences. It is believed that the method of the natural sciences is an induction, but that is not true. Take the example of mechanics. Twardowski claims: “At first mechanics was also inductive, but later it could reach, with the help of generalizations, the formulations of several laws from which it derives purely deductively the laws of individual phenomena of motion ... There are other natural sciences as well that use deductive method, namely zoology...” (Twardowski 1994: 231).

Although Twardowski does not deny the importance of metaphysics, he believes that metaphysicians should abandon the construction of all-embracing metaphysical systems. Metaphysics is only a partial synthesis, not a complete one.

Thus, the main idea of Twardowski’s inaugural lecture – that there is no striking difference between sciences and humanities, and the methods used by philosophy and metaphysics do not differ from those used for the study of nature. This is very Brentanian position. Therefore, it is not surprising that Twardowski advocated the creation of scientific philosophy based on the validity of judgements, non-speculative, logical-linguistic analysis of concepts, scrupulous research of narrow philosophical problems, and the refusal to build universal philosophical (metaphysical) systems.

3. The Traces of Reception of Brentano's Theory of Judgement by Contemporary Ukrainian Researches and the Problem of Psychologism

Borys Dombrowskiy (1948-2016), who, unfortunately, has passed away recently, investigated the heritage of Twardowski, due to this his scientific interests also included the views of Brentano.

For him, Brentano was the forerunner of analytic philosophy. In the center of his investigation, Dombrowskiy puts Brentano’s theory of judgement because, as he mentioned, “analytic philosophy is the analysis with the help of the linguistic tools of expression, even without questioning “analysis of what?”, the focus will be on Brentano’s theory of judgement, without the analysis of which it is impossible to understand neither the role of the tradition of Brentanism in analytical philosophy, nor the works of the Austrian philosopher” (Dombrowskiy 2011: 84).

Dombrowskiy is interested in existential judgements of the “S is P” type, which Brentano reduced to the form “that is P”, or more precisely, “that S, which is P”. In such a reduced existential judgement, the existence of a single object is confirmed on the basis of its clear and obvious inner perception (the subjectless judgement about the existence of a single thing). Dombrowskiy concludes that Brentano moves from the existence of things to their essence. This is his reism – there are things that can be given clearly and accurately in our inner perception. This Dombrowskiy’s conclusion about Brentano’s reism does coincide with Woleński’s suggestions on Brentano’s specific reism which consist of interpretation of Aristotelian understanding of being as concrete things and Albertazzi’s definition of Brentano’s doctrine as “immanent realism” (Woleński 1996: 357; Albertazzi 2006: 128). The object/thing that we perceive is presented by our consciousness. Our presentation of the object/thing is objective and reflects object/thing that exists. We can present only the object/thing that does exist⁷.

But Dombrowskiy does not agree with Brentano that the subject (individual) can make such true judgements about the existence of a separate thing. This means that perceptions are subjective, depending on the peculiarities of perception of a person, which contains not only rational-logical components but also emotional-evaluative ones. For Dombrowskiy, Brentano appears as a sophist, who relativizes existence and truth. Whatever Brentano says about the ability to clearly and accurately perceive a single thing and, based on this inner perception, to make judgements about the existence of this thing, he nevertheless continues the line of Sophists who are known to have argued that man is the measure of all things. Man cannot go beyond the limits of his own, subjective, perception of things that are not direct but are mediated by images, ideas, and concepts. We should not speak about the direct accurate and clear perception of things but rather about the fact that things are perceived by us through mental activity, as a result of which images, ideas, and concepts about things are created that are not the things themselves, but things for us. There is no identity between the philosopher and the things which he speaks up about.

Thus, Dombrowskiy addresses the problem of creativity in the broad sense of the word: from certain created physical objects of culture (artefacts) to mental creativity, which includes the creation of images, signs, symbols, and concepts. His understanding of creative activity arises from his critical considerations of Twardowski’s views on the human acts and their consequences; this is to say, products, not only as physical artefacts but also mental products, i.e. symbols as concepts (Dombrowskiy 2004; Dombrowskiy 2008a; Dombrowskiy 2008b). For Dombrowskiy, creativity has a negative meaning and it is a distortion of reality. This conclusion follows from the fact that creativity was a violation of the law as “the symbol of prohibition”, given by the Creator, and a man wants to be God (Dombrowskiy 2006: 44). There were only symbols before concepts. Dombrowskiy considers concepts as the products of creative mental activity in order to fix the existence of things, not essences (the being of things).

Another Ukrainian researcher of Brentano’s legacy is Yanosh Sanotskiy, the chief of the Department of Neurology at Lviv Regional Clinical Hospital. He is interested in Brentano’s reformation of logic and ontology. Sanotskiy was the first Ukrainian scholar who defended the PhD thesis under the title “Logic and Ontology in the Philosophy of Franz Brentano” in 1999 (Moscow, Russia). There are no other significant works of Sanotskiy; his publishing activity is low nowadays. Obviously, it is because Sanotskiy is quite busy in the medical profession. However, he has published recently an abstract under the title “Brentano on Ambiguity of the Notion of Psychologism” (Sanotskiy 2016).

Sanotskiy sees the relevance of appealing to the philosophy of Brentano in the non-standard approach of the Austrian philosopher to logic. For Brentano, logic is the bridge between psychology and ontology. Logic examines the real structures of the world of things, and the mental processes (thinking) determine its laws. Introducing the concept of intentionality, Brentano “strongly” unites thinking (consciousness) with the existence of things in the outside world. The theory of objects (ontology) was developed, which corresponds to the mental processes that acquire knowledge of the objects. Thus, scientific philosophy, whose methodology does not differ from the methodology of the natural sciences, was initiated. (This method is based on introspection, through which the common field of things is singled out, both for the natural and for the philosophical sciences). For Brentano, it is not the borrowing of the methodology from the natural sciences that mattered but the creation of a common methodology for philosophy and natural sciences (and here the empirical experience is in common, as a combination of external perception and inner perception, which we have already mentioned).

Unlike Dombrowskiy, Sanotskiy does not believe that Brentano’s psychologism leads to the subjectivity of experience. Sanotskiy writes about this in his abstract mentioned above.

Sanotskiy argues that “psychology as naturalism cannot be applied to the evaluation of Brentanian understanding of the relationship between logic and psychology, since descriptive psychology is not identical to the natural-scientific, or, due to Brentano’s terminology, genetic philosophy” (ibid., 203). Therefore, Brentano cannot be considered a psychologist in the traditional sense of the word.

The second meaning of psychology, according to Sanotskiy, Brentano defines as “at the intersection of ontology and epistemology” (ibid., 203). The logic that provides the right judgement is a part of epistemology. Therefore, ontological issues are solved by logic. Brentano rejects the ideality of objects – their truth as well as their transcendence (Kant’s “things-in-themselves”); neither thing is learned a priori. Again, “only the data of internal experience are for him [Brentano – I.K.] the last reason for solving not only ontological but also all philosophical issues, including ethical and aesthetic ones” (ibid., 204). A person can achieve such beliefs that do not need proof. Such beliefs are direct cognition, on the basis of which direct judgements are formed. And, as Sanotskiy notes, “they are, in fact, the foundation on which philosophy and science are built, and they are the criterion of whether all other judgements have any value for us, that is, whether they are true” (ibid., 204).

Conclusions

In this article, the source of analytic philosophy was discussed. This source we can trace to Brentano and from him to Twardowski, the founder of the Lviv Philosophical School. Also, it is very important to trace the notion of analysis and give emphasis on the study of a priori reasoning about basic or analytic truths in Brentano’s and Twardowski’s thought to Descartes and Leibniz. These thinkers, as well as Hume, are the historical figures to which analytic philosophers look for their tradition.

The emergence of analytic or scientific philosophy is based on psychology, which Brentano called psychognosy or “pure psychology”. The very beginning of analytic philosophy is the analysis of our cognitive experience which produces notions and judgements. Brentano’s investigations of the psychic life remind us that the analytic philosopher must be attentive to his/her own intellectual states and actions, the formation of judgements and their structure; he/she must understand how perceptions have created the images which underlie the basis of concepts. Attentiveness leads to clarity and exactness in the thinking. Twardowski also claimed that philosophers must think clearly and that there aren’t any philosophical problems which cannot be expressed or presented clearly (Twardowski 1979: 1). Analytic philosophers must again pay attention to psychology, linguistic analysis of the philosophical/logical judgements, and don’t be afraid of the so-called psychologism.

Brentano’s psychognosy is very important today because we are living in the time of “the flow of consciousness” when we have two kinds of disorder of psychic life: 1) the disorder of senses and its consequence; 2) the disorder of impressions. This means the lack of “transcendental synthesis of apperception” (Kant), which provides the unity of different elements of inner psychic life and forms coherent experience. The disorder of senses causes fragmented impressions and aggressive sensualism – because of the lack of analysis of the basis of mental life. Brentano’s psychognosy describes the elements of our mind, which helps to accept the objects realistically on the base of the inner certitude; such elements of mind can organize sensuous impressions in the proper way and provide adequate pictures of objects and the overcoming of the “disorder of senses and impressions”.

We concentrated on Dombrowskiy’s and Sanotskiy’s researches in order to show some attempts to study Brentano’s and Twardowski’s thoughts in the sphere of logic and ontology. We can conclude that, in Ukraine, the reception of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy is fragmented and sporadic. There is a lack of systematic studying of their philosophy. Under systematic studying of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy, I mean: a) translating into Ukrainian all important works of Brentano and Twardowski⁸; b) the communication with well-known European scholars who investigate Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy; c) participation in the events (conferences, round tables, symposiums etc.) dedicated to Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy.

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