On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem
Articles
Martynas Sabaliauskas
Vilnius University
Jonas Mockus
Vilnius University
Published 2014-12-15
https://doi.org/10.15388/LMR.A.2014.15
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Keywords

game theory
Nash equilibrium
polynomial complexity

How to Cite

Sabaliauskas M. and Mockus J. (2014) “On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem”, Lietuvos matematikos rinkinys, 55(A), pp. 79–84. doi: 10.15388/LMR.A.2014.15.

Abstract

Inspector problem represents an economic duel of inspector and law violator and is formulated as a bimatrix game. In general, bimatrix game is NP-complete problem. The inspector problem is a special case where the equilibrium can be found in polynomial time. In this paper, a generalized version of the Inspector Problem is described with the aim to represent broader family of applied problems, including the optimization of security systems. The explicit solution is provided and the Modified Strategy Elimination algorithm is introduced.

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