Formulation of Definitions of Consciousness on the Methodological Basis of Realism
Articles
Adas Diržys
Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9776-7958
Published 2022-04-26
https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.101.4
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Keywords

philosophy of mind
consciousness
methodology
ontology
realism

How to Cite

Diržys A. (2022). Formulation of Definitions of Consciousness on the Methodological Basis of Realism. Problemos, 101, 42-51. https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.101.4

Abstract

In this paper, the traditional question – what is mind? – is suggested to be treated from the metareflective realist stance from which different determinations of consciousness could be apprehended as always instantiated and dependent on their definitions. Methodological differentiation between what is representational and what is non-representational is expressed as a divergence between particular definitions of consciousness and the ontological X, in this context, acting as a universality of consciousness. The derivation of this position is reached through the investigation of François Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy, Wilfrid Sellars’s critique of the myth of the given and Iain Hamilton Grant’s revisionary study of Schelling’s naturphilosophie.

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