The Conviction-Stage Threshold in War-Crimes Adjudication: Evidentiary Adaptation and Its Limits

Abstract

This article examines whether evidentiary hardship in war-crimes adjudication may justify adaptation in the route of proof without lowering the conviction-stage threshold. The purpose of the article is to identify the doctrinal boundary between lawful evidentiary adaptation and impermissible dilution of the conviction-stage threshold. The object of the research is the doctrinal structure of conviction-stage proof in war-crimes adjudication under conditions of evidentiary complexity. The article distinguishes the standard of proof from adjacent evidentiary categories, including admissibility, reliability, sufficiency of evidence, and burden of proof, and argues that its function is to fix the level of justification required before criminal conviction may lawfully follow. On that basis, it develops a three-part doctrinal test built around threshold stability, inferential discipline, and fair-trial control. The framework is then tested against Ukrainian war-crimes adjudication and a limited German comparator. The analysis shows that atrocity-related complexity may justify adaptation in the route of proof, including documentary, digital, contextual, testimonial, and mixed forms of proof, but cannot justify any reduction of the conviction-stage threshold. The article concludes that adaptation in route is lawful, whereas dilution in threshold is not.