RACIONALUMO IR TEISINGUMO SĄJUNGOS PROBLEMA JOHNO RAWLSO „POLITINIAME LIBERALIZME”
Moral Philosophy
Nida Vasiliauskaitė
Published 2012-01-01
https://doi.org/10.15388/Problemos.2012.0.731
126-138.pdf (Lithuanian)

How to Cite

Vasiliauskaitė, N. (2012) “RACIONALUMO IR TEISINGUMO SĄJUNGOS PROBLEMA JOHNO RAWLSO „POLITINIAME LIBERALIZME””, Problemos, 82, pp. 126–138. doi:10.15388/Problemos.2012.0.731.

Abstract

Straipsnyje analizuojamos Johno Rawlso pastangos sukurti „politinės, bet ne metafizinės“ tvarkos modelį, kuris tenkintų specifiškai apibrėžtus „racionalumo“ bei „teisingumo“ kriterijus, ir išryškinamas šio modelio vidinis prieštaringumas. Parodoma, kokie problemiški yra pagrindiniai „politinio liberalizmo“ konstravimo įrankiai – politikos / moralės ir protingumo / racionalumo perskyros – ir teigiama, jog koncepcijos nenuoseklumų priežastis yra principinė, ji glūdi pačiame Rawlso sumanyme susieti, bet nesutapatinti du autonomiškus ir heterogeniškus normatyvumo šaltinius; o atsisakius kurio nors vieno „politinis liberalizmas“ apskritai suirtų.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalumas, teisingumas, neutralumas, politinis liberalizmas, fundamentizmas.

The Problem of Combining Rationality with Justice in John Rawls’ “Political Liberalism”
Nida Vasiliauskaitė

Summary
The article deals with Rawlsian attempts to offer a theoretical model for universal “political, not metaphysical” order, based on the ideas of rationality and justice specifically defined. My point is to reveal the inner inconsistency in the very notion of political liberalism showing that its fundamental presuppositions – the distinctions of politics / morals and reasonable / rational – are flawed. Which means that as a project built on two distinct in kind sources of normativity trying to “make them one” without damaging their logical autonomy, political liberalism is deemed to generate inconsistencies and cannot be saved by any “cosmetic changes”.
Keywords: rationality, justice, neutrality, political liberalism, fundamentism.

126-138.pdf (Lithuanian)

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