Theoretical Basis of Reichenbach’s Philosophy
Evaldas Nekrašas
Published 1979-09-29

How to Cite

Nekrašas E. (1979). Theoretical Basis of Reichenbach’s Philosophy. Problemos, 23, 61-71.


The article deals with Reichenbach’s conception of sense, probability and induction which is fundamental in his philosophy. Other major questions discussed include: relation between Reichenbach’s probability theory of sense and his statistical interpretation of probability; pragmatic justification of induction; comparative analysis of the views of Reichenbach and Carnap on the above questions. In conclusion the author states that, contrary to his theoretical principles, Reichenbach actually resorts to a non-statistical interpretation of probability in some of his contexts; his reasoning is insufficient for the foundation of the direct rule; pragmatic justification of induction is irrelevant to any interpretation of probability, except statistical.
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